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Abstract
Emmanuel Levinas' s reorientation of ethics as preceding ontology and his radical
presentation of responsibility, justice, consciousness and knowledge are of clear
relevance for education. It is therefore not surprising that in the last decade we have
seen a number of studies ofLevinas by educational theorists.
Much of this work has focused on Levinas's relevance for issues of ethics, social
justice, multiculturalism and moral education. This thesis draws on this previous
research, but aims to take educational readings of Levinas in another direction
through considering how his presentation of discourse, language and subjectivity, as
dependent on an infinite ethical demand, troubles several dominant orientations
within educational discourse that treat education in ways that can become totalising
and instrumentalist.
I begin by offering a philosophical analysis of how Levinas describes the scene of
teaching and the nature of subjectivity. I then interrogate how this reading of Levinas
disturbs some current understandings of education: first, the way that, within
liberalism, education can be conceived instrumentally as the site for the development
of a certain kind of individual (a rationally autonomous chooser, etc.), and second, the
way that neoliberal educational ideologies have privileged managerialism,
performance and the market, with Religious Education providing a case study of the
implications of Levinas's interruption. I then consider how this leads to new
understandings of community and political subjectivity within education.
In this way, I explore how responding to Levinas, and reading his work together with
criticisms addressed by Badiou and others, leads us not just to a richer vision of the
meaning of education, but also to a more motivating understanding of the ethical
subjectivity of both students and teachers, which is dependent on a deepening and an-
archic responsibility, and which invites us to work for a better education extending
beyond the straight line of the law.
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Introduction
Why Levinas? Why Subjectivity?
On 6th January 2006, the French newspaper Le Monde, responding to the centennial
celebrations of Emmanuel Levinas's birth, published an article entitled, 'Generation
Levinas?' (Levy, 2006). This question could be seen, as Sean Hand notes in a recent
introduction to Levinas, as 'in itself confirm[ing] Levinas's rapid rise from respected
footnote of phenomenology to key representative of a decisive shift in Western
philosophy's history' (Hand, 2009, p. 109). Since his death in 1995, the influence of
the Lithuanian-born philosopher has moved far beyond post-war philosophical
reflection, permeating critical theory, theology, aesthetics, sociology, psychoanalysis,
human rights theory, war studies, literary and legal theory. That influence is still
extending, so that it might reasonably be claimed that Jacques Derrida was right to
state, in the speech he gave at Levinas's funeral, subsequently published in Adieu to
Emmanuel Levinas, that the work of Levinas is 'so large one can no longer glimpse its
edges' (Derrida, 1999, p. 3):
One can predict with confidence that centuries of readings will set this as
their task. We already see innumerable signs, wen beyond France and
Europe ... that the reverberations of this thought will have changed the
course of philosophical reflection in our time, and of our reflection on
philosophy, on what orders it according to ethics, according to another
thought of ethics, responsibility, justice, the State, etc., according to
another thought of the other, a thought that is newer than so many
novelties because it is ordered according to the absolute anteriority of the
face of the Other.
Yes, ethics before and beyond ontology (pp. 3-4).
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In light of this, it is not surprising that over the last decade, we have seen a number of
studies of Levinas in relation to education. 1 It is fair to say, however, that among
many educational theorists, there is suspicion that recent interest in Levinas is
attributable purely to his currently being in vogue, and that the present prominence of
his work may be a passing trend. The obsessive quality of his uncompromising
writing remains opaque, or at least counter-intuitive, to many working within
education. Yet the concerns of Levinas's philosophy are of obvious significance for
how we think about education on all levels. In her introduction to Levinas and
Education, Denise Egea-Kuehne emphasises this:
His concepts of ethics, justice, consciousness, and moral conscience are
deeply relevant to education, as they were developed through the face-to-
face encounter with the other, through intersubjective relation, and
through the responsibility and respect one must develop for the Other as
Other - notions which rest at the very heart of education (Egea-Kuehne,
2008, p. 1).
This thesis will be concerned with taking up and thinking further through the ways in
which Levinas's theory of subjectivity and his conceptualisation of the scene of
teaching lead us to think again about the very nature of education and teaching, what
and who education is 'for', and some challenges that follow from the way his thinking
disturbs the intellectual closure represented by some instrumentalist frameworks of
education. However, before explaining the context and purposes of my own analysis,
let me say something briefly about the context of Levinas's philosophy and how this
related to his own work within education.
Levinas; Philosopher, Teacher, Prophet
It was as if, to use the language of tourists, I went to see Husserl and I
found Heidegger. Of course, I will never forget Heidegger's relation to
Hitler. Even if this relation was only of a very short duration, it will be
forever. But the works of Heidegger, the way in which he practised
phenomenology in Being and Time - I knew immediately that this was
one of the greatest philosophers in history (RE, p. 32).
It was while studying at Strasbourg that Levinas read Husserl's Logical Investigations
for the first time, an experience that gave him the sense of 'gaining access not to yet
1 For example Todd, 2003a, Biesta, 2006, Egea-Kuehne, 2008
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another speculative construction, but to a new possibility of thinking, to a new
possibility of moving from one idea to another, different from deduction, induction,
and dialectic, a new way of unfolding "concepts'" (p. 31).2 Inspired by this sense of a
new direction in philosophy, Levinas went to Freiburg to study with Husserl himself
in 1928-29, writing his thesis on Husserl's theory of intuition. Yet the approach he
had discovered in Husserl was, as he put it, 'continued and transfigured by Heidegger'
(p. 32). While Levinas was credited with introducing Husserlian phenomenology into
France through his doctoral thesis and translation of Cartesian Meditations, his
criticisms of Husserl were informed by his engagement with Heidegger, and he came
to critique his former teacher from a 'historical' perspective, for excessive
theoreticism and 'overlooking the existential density and historical embeddedness of
lived experience' (Critchley, 2002, p. 7). Clearly much inspired by Heidegger,
Levinas describes his approach, towards the end of Theory ofIntuition in Husserl's
Phenomenology, as 'post-Husserlian' (THP, p. 130). We see also here the beginnings
of the distinctiveness of Levinas's own later position in his reservations on Husserl,
when he states that the reduction to an ego 'can only be a first step towards
phenomenology. We must also discover "others" and the intersubjective world' (p.
150). Yet in Otherwise than Being, Levinas will still describe his work as 'in the
spirit ofHusserlian philosophy', an approach he explains as follows:
Our presentation of notions proceeds neither by their logical
decomposition, nor by their dialectical description. It remains faithful to
intentional analysis, insofar as it signifies the locating of notions in the
horizon of their appearing, a horizon unrecognized, forgotten or displaced
in the exhibition of an object, in its notion, in the look absorbed by the
notion alone. (OB, p. 183)
Thus while he departs from Husserl, influenced by the Heideggerian emphasis'that
phenomenological analysis should begin in the facticity of the human in the situation
of the everyday, he nevertheless retained a sense that his work is indebted to Husserl,
though moving away from his former teacher to the extent that it is open to question
whether Levinas's own work can really be seen as remaining within phenomenology.
If the intentionality thesis, which sees every mental phenomenon as directed towards
2 By placing this term in quotation marks, Levinas might be seen as alluding to the sense in which the
place of conceptual thinking was particularly contested at this time, for example in Bergson's critique
of conceptual thinking, against which Levinas defends Husserl's theory of the relation between
concepts and intuition in Theory ofIntuition in Husserl's Phenomenology(THP, p. 119).
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its object, is axiomatic within phenomenology, then, as Simon Critchley suggests,
'Levinas's big idea about the relation to the other person is not phenomenological,
because the other is not given as a matter for thought or reflection ... Levinas
maintains a methodological but not a substantive commitment to Husserlian
phenomenology.' (Critchley, 2002, p. 8)
Husserl's phenomenological method was, Levinas argued, transformed by Heidegger.
It was, he later stated, the brilliance of Heidegger's application of the
phenomenological approach, rather than 'the last speculative consequences of his
project' that remained with him (RB, p. 33). Levinas followed Heidegger in rejecting
Husserl as too theoretical, removed from the everyday:
Husserl conceives philosophy as a universally valid science in the manner
of geometry and the sciences of nature, as a science which is developed
through the efforts of generations of scientists, each continuing the work
of the others ... In this conception philosophy seems as independent ofthe
historical situation ofman as any theory that tries to consider everything
sub specie aeternitatis ... [The historical] structure of consciousness,
which occupies a very important place in the thought of someone like
Heidegger ... has not been studied by Husserl, at least in the works
published so far. He never discusses the relation between the historicity
of consciousness and its intentionality, its personality, its social character
(THP, pp. 155-56).
In the concluding section of Theory of Intuition, we can see how far his critique of
Husserl followed from his engagement with Heidegger: he describes Heidegger's
phenomenological method as following Husserl, 'although in a profoundly original
manner, and we feel justified in being inspired by him' (p. 155).
Levinas admired the way in which Heidegger's phenomenological ontology disrupted
the primacy of consciousness in Husserl's approach. While Husserl's transcendental
Ego analyses life from a transcendent, ahistorical position, Heidegger's analysis saw
Being and beings as always already engaged in time and history, without, as Colin
Davis suggests, 'recourse to the absolute self-liberation promised by
phenomenological reduction' (Davis, 1996, p. 15). It was from this engagement
always already within time and history that meaning takes place. Thus Levinas
contrasts their positions:
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In Husserl, the phenomenon of meaning has never been determined by
history. Time and consciousness remain in the final analysis the 'passive
synthesis' of an inner, deep constitution that is no longer a being. For
Heidegger, on the contrary, meaning is conditioned by something that
already was. The intimate link between meaning and thought results from
the accomplishment of meaning in history, that something extra that is
one's existence. The introduction of history at the foundation of mental
life undermines clarity and constitution as the mind's authentic modes of
existence. Self-evidence is no longer the fundamental mode of
intellection. (DEH, p. 87)
This idea of meaning as determined 'by something that already was', which for
Levinas will be linked to the trace of an immemorial past, becomes fundamental to
the conception of language and subjectivity developed in Totality and Infinity and
Otherwise Than Being.
Levinas's fascination with Heidegger was brought to an abrupt end by his teacher's
political commitment to National Socialism, accepting the position of Rector of
Freiburg University in 1933. It is necessary to emphasise that it was precisely
because of the extent to which Levinas had been attracted to Heidegger' that,
following on from this, it is possible to see the rest of his philosophical work as an
attempt to think through 'the question of how a philosopher as undeniably brilliant as
Heidegger could have become a Nazi, for however short a time' (Critchley, 2002, p.
8). When asked how he accounted for Heidegger's commitment to National
Socialism, Levinas appears at a loss to be able to give an explanation, answering:
I don't know; it's the blackest of my thoughts about Heidegger and no
forgetting is possible. Maybe Heidegger had the feeling of a world that
was decomposing, but he believed in Hitler for a moment in any case.
How is this possible? To read Lowith's memoirs, it was a long moment.
(RB, p. 36)
Therefore, although Levinas's work was inspired by the brilliance of Heidegger,
Heidegger's involvement with Hitlerism must be seen as equally determinative for the
future direction that Levinas's work took, governed by what he expressed in Existence
and Existents as 'the profound desire to leave the climate of that philosophy, and by a
conviction that we cannot leave it for a philosophy that would be pre-Heideggerian'
3 Between 1930 and 1932 Levinas had been planning to write a book on Heidegger, which was
abandoned in response to Heidegger's actions in 1933 (cf. Critchley, 2002, p. 8).
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(EE, p. 4). It was, as Howard Caygill notes in Levinas and the Political, the
experience of National Socialism, both feared and mourned, which was to determine
the course of Levinas's subsequent philosophical reflection (Caygill, 2002, p. 5).
Levinas describes his life in the autobiographical sketch in Difficult Freedom as a
'disparate inventory ... dominated by the presentiment and memory of the Nazi
horror' (DF, p. 291), and Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being should be
seen, as Caygill suggests, as philosophical works of mourning, testified to in the
dedication of Otherwise than Being, in 'memory of those who were closest among the
six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions on millions of
all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same
anti-semitism' .4
This sense of the urgency of leaving 'the climate of [Heidegger's] philosophy' is
evident in Levinas's presentiments as well as his mourning of the Nazi horror, and we
can see this departure from Heidegger developing throughout Levinas's writings after
1933. In On Escape, Levinas's first original thematic essay of 1935, we see his initial
attempt at distancing himself from Heideggerian ontology. Here the relation to
Being, and by implication to Heidegger's ontology, is seen as oppressive, a restrictive
bond with the I chained to itself. In this text, we see Levinas's 'presentiment' of the
political horror that was shortly to follow, in his damning comment evoking
Heidegger that 'Every civilization that accepts being - with the tragic despair it
contains and the crimes it justifies - merits the name "barbarian'" (OE, p. 73). This
same prescience is also evident in the article 'Reflections on the Philosophy of
Hitlerism', published in the Catholic Journal Esprit in 1934. Although Heidegger is
not mentioned by name, in the preface Levinas wrote when the article was translated
into English in 1990, Heideggerian ontology is explicitly seen as allowing National
Socialism to occur. Levinas states that the article arose:
from the conviction that the source of the bloody barbarism of National
Socialism lies not in some contingent anomaly within human reasoning,
nor in some accidental ideological misunderstanding. This article
4 This included most members of his family, who were shot by the Nazis during the pogroms
beginning in June 1940, with the collaboration of Lithuanian nationalists. The names of the members
of his family who were murdered are included in the dedication of Otherwise than Being. Levinas's
wife and daughter were protected during the war through the bravery of several French friends,
including Maurice Blanchot (cf. Maika, 2006, pp. 64-82 for details of this period ofhis life).
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expresses the conviction that this source stems from the essential
possibility ofelemental Evil into which we can be led by logic and against
which Western philosophy had not sufficiently insured itself. This
possibility is inscribed within the ontology of a being concerned with
being - a being, to use the Heideggerian expression, 'dem es in seinem
Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht'. (RPH, p. 63)
This theme, that the self-positing, autarchic subject, a being concerned with being,
'the famous subject of a transcendental idealism that before all else wishes to be free
and thinks itself free' (ibid.), leads to the possibility of 'bloody barbarism' is the
kernel of much of what Levinas will later say. It is notable here that Levinas also
criticises liberalism as insufficient for protecting the dignity of the human subject,
because it likewise depends on a self-positing, autonomous subject. He questions:
We must ask ourselves if liberalism is all we need to achieve an authentic
dignity for the human subject. Does the subject arrive at the human
condition prior to assuming responsibility for the other man in the act of
election that raises him up to this height? This election comes from a god
- or God - who beholds him in the face of the other man, his neighbour,
the original 'site' of the Revelation. (ibid.)
Thus we can see that already in 1934, Levinas's approach to phenomenology and
ontology is leaving the philosophical climate of Heidegger, a departure signalling that
Levinas's rejection of the philosophical primacy of ontology is always already
political.
In Existence and Existents, published in 1947, the core sections of which were written
while a prisoner in Stalag XIB as a forced labourer from 1940-45, Levinas begins to
develop a philosophical course away from existence, towards the idea of the subject
as for-the-other. Here Levinas introduces the notion of the il y a, the idea of pure
unceasing being, 'a monotony deprived of meaning' (RB, p. 45). But following the
descriptions of the horror of the il y a, Levinas describes the possibility of leaving this
meaninglessness. What provides the possibility ofexit, Levinas describes as:
obligation, in the 'for-the-other,' which introduces a meaning into the
nonsense of the there is. The I subordinated to the other. In the ethical
event, someone appears who is the subject par excellence. That is the
kernel of all I would say later (pp. 45-6).
13
Time and The Other, a collection of four lectures delivered at the Philosophical
College in Paris and published in 1948, represents the hope for a different approach to
philosophy in the post-war period, focusing on alterity and the possibility of a relation
of non-reciprocity with the other. It can be seen as signalling a link between
Levinas's early phenomenological texts and the first of his two most significant texts:
Totality and Infinity. Hand describes this transitional sense of Time and The Other
clearly:
It retains from his early phenomenology the fundamentally moral nature
of singularity, and brings this now resolutely into a vision of the future
that escapes the finite concepts of freedom, forceful inquiry and mastery.
Henceforth, the intellectual tendency towards totality will be resisted by
the ethical recognition of infmity. It is this fundamental re-founding of
phenomenology that Levinas's first major work of philosophy ... will
now work to confirm. (Hand, 2009, p. 34)
The first of Levinas's two major philosophical texts, what Derrida calls 'the great
work', was Totality and Infinity, published in 1961. The emphasis that most
commentators place on the conjunction of the terms 'totality' and 'infinity' in the title
is on the contrast between the totalising approach of ontology and the infinitude of the
ethical relation. In this work, Levinas claims that if the relation to the other is
conceived of in terms of comprehension, reciprocity, equality, recognition, or
correlation, then that relation, so far as it brings that other within the sphere of my
understanding, is totalising. Although Levinas appears to use the term 'totality'
primarily to characterise the approach that he describes as dominating Western
philosophy, there is a certain equivocation about the use of the term that allows it also
to carry broader political resonances. Caygill draws attention to the wider political
context ofLevinas's use of this term:
the term 'totality' was sufficiently broad to hold both the specific political
critique of the totalitarian political of National Socialism and the general
philosophical critique of Western metaphysics. 'Totality' was at once the
specific term identified by Victor Klemperer, the philologist of the
language of the Third Reich as 'one of the keystones' of 'everyday Nazi
discourse' as well as, and perhaps not coincidentally, one of the central
concepts of modem philosophy, featuring significantly in the works of
Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. (Caygill, 2002, p. 94)
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We have seen how Levinas's texts prior to this had been concerned with a critique of
Heideggerian ontology. In Totality and Infinity, this critique that began with
Heidegger moves beyond him to the philosophical tradition that allowed his thinking
to develop in this way and led to the totalitarianism of National Socialism. Given the
influence of Heidegger's historicist approach to phenomenology, this is an
appropriate way for Levinas to deepen his understanding of how the philosophical
positions of his former teacher, which allowed 'political horror', emerged within a
particular philosophical tradition of reflecting on the human subject. The totalising
approach, towards which philosophy has tended, is disrupted by the approach of the
Others, addressing me and making me responsible in an ethical demand, prior to the
totalising relation, leading to Levinas's famous claim that ethics is 'not a branch of
philosophy, but first philosophy' (TI, p. 304).
Otherwise than Being, Levinas's second major work, was published in 1974, although
sections of it are based on lectures and articles from up to seven years prior to this.
This text extends and deepens the presentation of the ethical subject in Totality and
Infinity, with the sense of the infinite demand addressed to the subject intensified to
the point of substitution, persecution and trauma. The difficult language of the text
corresponds to the criticisms that Derrida raised against Totality and Infinity in
'Violence and Metaphysics' and primarily the question of whether Levinas's project
of moving beyond ontology is doomed because he remains within the language of
Heideggerian ontology, Hegel and Husserl (Derrida, 2001, p. 189 ff.). In an
interview, Levinas himself sums this up: 'Derrida ... reproached me for my critique
of Hegelianism by saying that in order to criticize Hegel, one begins to speak Hegel's
language. That is the basis of his critique.' (Levinas, 1988, p. 179) The difficulty of
the textual performance of Otherwise than Being, the dramatic presentation of the
intensity of the infinite ethical demand by which subjectivity is constituted, is seen by
many commentators as evidence of how seriously Levinas felt the need to respond to
Derrida Levinas himself later described how Totality and Infinity was an attempt at
systematising certain modes of experience and knowledge, implying that Derrida's
critique was justified:
S A term used by Levinas in specific and provocative ways, as I will elaborate in Chapter 1.
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The fundamental experience which objective experience itself
presupposes is the experience of the Other. .. In Totality and Infinity, an
attempt was made to systematize these experiences by opposing them to a
philosophical thought which reduces the Other to the Same and the
multiple to the totality, making of autonomy its supreme principle (DF, p.
294).
Levinas felt that he had moved beyond ontological language with Otherwise than
Being, stating, 'The ontological language which Totality and Infinity still uses in order
to exclude the purely psychological significance of the proposed analyses is
henceforth avoided' (p. 295). The title, Otherwise than Being signifies the sense in
which Levinas saw this book as moving beyond ontology to an ethical language that
draws attention to the disturbance of being by sensibility towards the need and
demand of my neighbour. I am a subject only as one primordially exposed to my
neighbour who addresses me and looks for my response. My being addressed takes
place in passivity, but in responding I am already responsible and unique in the
response I alone can give to that particular address. Caygill draws attention to how it
is possible to understand the language of this text as pointing in the direction of a
'prophetic politics'. 'Prophetic' here has the sense of an acknowledgement of and
call towards the possibility of a mode of politics and ethical relation that is vigilant
against the totalising operations of political ontology. To prophesy in such a way is
not to theorise, according to Levinas, but to perceive and bear witness to an order
prior to thematisation, revealed in illeity:
It is in prophecy that the Infinite escapes the objectification of
thematization and of dialogue, and signifies as illeity, in the third
person....
An obedience preceding the hearing of the order, the anachronism of
inspiration or of prophecy is, for the recuperable time of reminiscence,
more paradoxical than the prediction of the future by an oracle. 'Before
they call, I will answer,' the formula is to be understood literally. But this
singular obedience to the order to go, without understanding the order,
this obedience prior to all representation, this allegiance before any oath,
this responsibility prior to commitment, is precisely the other in the same,
inspiration and prophecy, the passing itselfof the Infinite (DB, p. 150).
These ideas of obedience and illeity have deep significance, as we will explore, for
how we might understand responsibility, community and fraternity in education.
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While developing the themes explored in these texts, Levinas was spending most of
his professional life as a school administrator and teacher. He became Director of the
Ecole Normale Israelite Orientale in 19456, and was to remain in this position until
1979.7 The ENIO was a school established in Paris in 1867 by the Alliance Israelite
Universelle, to train teachers to work in the Mediterranean, and Levinas describes the
institution as working 'for the emancipation of Jews in those countries where they still
did not have the right to citizenship' (RR, p. 38). The significance of this pedagogical
and administrative work in the development of his philosophy is rarely alluded to by
commentators. However, just as it is necessary to understand the context of the
emergence of Levinas's conceptualisation of ethics and politics against the
background ofhis own experience ofpolitical horror, so it is likewise necessary to see
his statements about the teaching relation, which are usually interpreted as
philosophical descriptions in an abstract sense, against the background of most of his
career spent working in education. His description of the address of the Other as the
scene of teaching, while not an empirical description of the relation between student
and teacher, must nevertheless be seen as informed by his experience of the demands
of his role as a teacher, and the way in which, while working as a teacher, he was
simultaneously a student, engaged, for example, in Talmudic studies with Monsieur
Chouchani". Therefore when Levinas states that 'The pupil-teacher relationship ...
contains an the riches of a meeting with the Messiah (DF, p. 85)', this cannot be seen
as divorced from his description of subjectivity emerging through a relationship in
which I am taught, in Totality and Infinity.
Levinas described the importance of his demanding pedagogical and administrative
work at the ENIO, and the way in which his work made the Jewish ordeal a pressing
demand to confront, as follows:
Will my life have been spent between the incessant presentiment of
Hitlerism and the Hitlerism that refuses itself to any forgetting? Not
6 In 1930, after arriving in Paris, he worked as a teacher at the Alliance Israelite Universelle in Paris,
and in 1934, after performing his French military service, he became an administrative assistant in the
education department of the Alliance. He was not able to apply for a teaching position in either a
university or a Iycee because he did not have the Agregation in philosophy (details of this time are
discussed in Maika, 2006, pp. 53-63).
7 Although he delegated more of the administrative tasks once he became Professor of Philosophy at
Nanterre in 1967.
8 Monsieur Chouchani is the 'master' mentioned by Levinas in his Talmudic commentaries.
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everything related in my thoughts to the destiny of Judaism, but my
activity at the Alliance kept me in contact with the Jewish ordeal, bringing
me back to the concrete social and political problems which concerned it
everywhere. In Europe, outside of the Mediterranean region of the
schools of the Alliance: notably in Poland, where the proximity of a
hostile Germany nevertheless reanimated anti-Semitic instincts barely put
to sleep. Concrete problems with spiritual repercussions. Facts that are
always enormous. Thoughts coming back to ancient and venerable texts,
always enigmatic, always disproportionate to the exegeses of a school.
Here you have, in administrative and pedagogical problems, invitations to
a deepening, to a becoming conscience, that is, to Scripture. (RE, p. 39)
This passage is striking in the way Levinas describes the teacher experiencing the
concrete, practical demands of conscience in very similar language to his description
of the condition of subjectivity as a deepening responsibility. The 'ancient and
venerable texts', the Scripture, that Levinas refers is, in one sense, a reference to
religious scriptures but in another sense must also be seen as metonymic for the
demand of God that Levinas will describe as the infinitude of the ethical demand that
comes to me from outside, 'bringing me more than I contain', and remaining beyond
understanding. I will explore what this idea of 'becoming conscience' means in
relation to the political subjectivity of teachers, but here it is worth emphasising that
the scene of teaching that Levinas describes, while not an empirical description, is not
some abstraction either and should be seen as relating to this context in which he was
writing both Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, directing an educational
institution, and this informs my interpretation of Levinas's presentation of
subjectivity. Having given this brief outline of the context of Levinas's writing, let
me say something about the orientation of this present work.
Levinas and the Infinite Demands of Education
In his recent systematic treatment of the relationship between philosophy, ethics and
politics, Infinitely Demanding, drawing on the work of Levinas, Alain Badiou and
Knud Legstrup, Simon Critchley argues that philosophy does not begin in the
experience of wonder, but in the experience of disappointment, 'the indeterminate but
palpable sense that something desired has not been fulfilled, that a fantastic effort has
failed' (Critchley, 2007, p.l). While I am not sure that all philosophy begins in the
experience of disappointment, I do think that much educational philosophy arises
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from the sense that there is something lacking in current educational practices and
ideologies. I would locate my work as arising from my own frustrations with the
limitations of educational frameworks that I have encountered through my experience
as a schoolteacher. The context of the pedagogical demands that Levinas speaks of,
in particular the pressing sense of the Jewish ordeal, is clearly different from the
current situation of British schoolteachers. However, this project is driven by the
sense that reading Levinas's description of the nature of teaching and subjectivity
brings to light limitations of an educational thinking currently dominated by
neoliberal educational policies that have led to the excessive prominence of forces of
economic managerialism and marketisation policies in schools in Britain and
elsewhere, and reveals how such policies distort the way we think about the meaning
of education itself. Although such policies have been criticised by other educational
theorists, it is my contention that a reading of the meaning of education influenced by
Levinas's presentation of subjectivity and Badiou's critique oflate capitalism adds a
distinctive interruption that is otherwise lacking in the debate.
Critiques of these dominant policies have tended to come from those working within
radical pedagogy, influenced by Marxism and the post-Marxist approaches of Critical
Theory, or from those working within the politics of identity, from communitarian
approaches, or from liberal humanist traditions. As I will explore through Badiou's
critique of these traditions, there can be a tendency in these approaches likewise either
to treat education in an instrumentalist sense, as the means to create a more just
society, or to be too particularist in focusing on ameliorating the conditions of certain
groups in society. Such critiques are thus unable to provide sufficient resistance
against the way in which thinking about education can be distorted by instrumentalist
discourses. Whilst obviously there is a sense in which schooling should aim to create
a fairer society, and where there are specific injustices against particular groups, these
must of course be resisted, but what is needed is space to think about the meaning of
education in a way that does not treat it solely as the means to specific ends. Reading
Levinas, together with the challenge offered by Badiou, opens up for us a way of
thinking about what it means to be taught that resists the tendency to harness
education to ideals of productivity and service delivery. Levinas also offers a way to
think through the meaning of ethics, community, knowledge, language, justice and
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politics, all of which are of deep resonance for reflecting on the nature of education
itself and how this relates to practices within educational institutions.
Critchley argues that there is a motivational deficit at the heart of contemporary
liberal democracy, which can lead to either passive nihilism, attempting to retreat
from reality in mysticism, contemplation and 'European Buddhism', or active
nihilism, attempting to destroy the current order of things, exemplified, he argues, in
the actions of Al-Qaeda and other forms of revolutionary vanguardism. This,
Critchley argues, leads to the necessity of developing an account of ethical
subjectivity in response:
What is required ... is a conception of ethics that begins by accepting the
motivational deficit in the institutions of liberal democracy, but without
embracing either passive or active nihilism ... What is lacking at the
present time of massive political disappointment is a motivating and
empowering conception of ethics that can face and face down the drift of
the present, an ethics that is able to respond to and resist the political
situation in which we find ourselves ... [Ijfwe are going to stand a chance
of constructing an ethics that empowers subjects to political action, a
motivating ethics, we require some sort of answer to what I see as the
basic question of morality .... My polemical contention is that without a
plausible account of motivational force, that is, without a conception of
the ethical subject, moral reflection is reduced to the empty manipulation
of the standard justificatory frameworks: deontology, utilitarianism and
virtue ethics. (Critchley, 2007, pp. 8-9)
Whilst I am less willing than Critchley to condemn the institutions of liberal
democracy, I agree that what is vital in attempting to resist and respond to
disappointment with current educational theories is an account of ethics that
'empowers subjects to political action, a motivating ethics', and this, I will argue,
must be related to an account of the meaning of education itself, and is opened up for
us by Levinas.
Situating my work firmly within the field of philosophy of education, my aim
throughout is to demystify the elements of Levinas's philosophy that have seemed
opaque, obtuse and difficult to educational theorists. Sections of this thesis have been
adapted for articles I have written for journals within philosophy of education and
also within theology and religious studies, demonstrating the relevance of my reading
of Levinas not just for educational theory, but also for these subject disciplines.
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These are listed in the appendix. My work draws on educational theorists who have
responded to Levinas's writing, but is distinctive in developing an extended reading
of Levinas's articulation of the scene of teaching and the nature of language and
subjectivity in relation to education in his two major works: Totality and Infinity and
Otherwise than Being. An understanding of language, as I have emphasised, must be
seen as going all the way down, deep into the heart of the meaning of education itself,
and this is something that has so far been insufficiently explored in relation to
Levinas's significance for education. The social and political climate of the late
twentieth century has, as Diane Perpich comments, been 'marked deeply by a concern
with diversity, otherness, and difference' and it is within this climate that Levinas's
philosophy has risen to prominence (perpich, 2008, p. 2). It is therefore not surprising
that much writing on Levinas in relation to education, as in other disciplines, has been
concerned with questions of multiculturalism, human rights, and social justice. In
Chapter 2, through examining Badiou's critique of Levinas, I will consider some of
the problems potentially raised by interpretations that treat the question of 'difference'
in Levinas in relation to discourses of pluralism and multiculturalism. My aim here
therefore is to take educational readings of Levinas in a different direction, beginning
with an examination of the question of language. Levinas emphasises how language
reveals the ethicality of the human subject:
Should language be thought uniquely as the communication of an idea or
as information, and not also - and perhaps above all - as the fact of
encountering the other as other, that is to say, already as response to him?
Is not the first word bonjour? As simple as bonjour. Bonjour as
benediction and my being available for the other man. It doesn't mean:
what a beautiful day. Rather: I wish you peace, I wish you a good day,
expression of one who worries for the other. It underlies all the rest of
communication, underlies all discourse. (RB, p. 47)
Since the scene of teaching for Levinas takes place in discourse, it must underlie our
understanding of the meaning of education. After examining the relation between
teaching, language and subjectivity in the first two chapters, each of the following
chapters provides a distinctive contribution to specific educational debates, whilst also
extending the analysis of the first two chapters through thinking through the ways in
which this reading of subjectivity relates to the concrete demands of educational
practice. This relation to concrete demands is not, however, an 'application' of
Levinas's thinking or an attempt to instrumentalise his philosophy in the service of
21
education. Sharon Todd eloquently articulates this difficulty in how to read Levinas
with education, and suggests that what is required is a difficult learning in response to
this reading:
In thinking the relation between education and Levinas's philosophy, it is
not about grafting his concepts onto an already existing discourse or
practice, but rather creating a self-critical response to his texts which
admits - indeed welcomes - the impossibility ofsuch transposition...
As opposed to casting his thoughts into iron-clad principles which provide
answers to preestablished problems of teaching and learning, I think,
rather, the point is to welcome his words through giving reception to his
teaching. To open one's educational home to the teaching of Levinas
means, however, to disturb it. (Todd, 2008, p. 182)
In my writing, I have attempted to read Levinas in the way that Todd suggests, not
'casting his thoughts into iron-clad principles', but a reading that follows Levinas's
own suggestion that Talmudic texts 'expect of a reader freedom, invention and
boldness' (TR, p. 5). Thus my reading has opened my own 'educational home', both
within educational theory and the current political context of my work as a teacher, to
the disturbance that follows from giving reception to Levinas's teaching. As a result
of that disturbance, I am conscious of shifts of style as I move between Levinas's
writings and educational theory, but these shifts of tone in my writing can be seen as
reflective of the way in which Levinas's writing is in a very different register from,
and interrupts, the dominant discourses within educational theory.
The first two chapters offer a reading of Levinas's description of the scene of teaching
as this relates to the nature of subjectivity itself, in an attempt to articulate a response
to the basic question of morality that underlies the possibility of education itself. I
take as the starting point for my analysis in Chapter 1, the way in which Levinas
describes teaching as the way in which language and meaning come to me from the
Other, 'bringing me more than I contain'. Todd highlights the importance of this idea
for his readers in the field of education:
What is truly extraordinary about his ethics, and consequently what is
highly relevant for readers in the field of education, is that this ethical
welcoming takes on the characteristics of a pedagogical relation. Levinas
describes welcoming the Other as the self's capacity to learn from the
Other as teacher. At the core of his philosophy, then, lies a theory of
learning - one that is not so much concerned with how the subject learns
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content, but with how the subject learns through a specific orientation to
the Other. (Todd, 2008, p. 171)
In my reading, I draw particular attention to the way in which Levinas describes the
relation between language, discourse, subjectivity and teaching. Of course, many
educational theorists, from Dewey and Buber, to Oakeshott, Bahkthin and Freire,
have emphasised the idea that the foundation of education is discourse. What I seek
to show is the distinctiveness and provocation of Levinas's view of discourse as the
relation with the Other, through which I become as a subject in response to an infinite
demand. Furthermore, just as it is necessary to attend to the question of subjectivity
in reflecting upon the nature of education, so I will argue, a theory of the subject
necessitates reflection upon how that subject comes into being through its condition
of being taught, a reflection often given insufficient attention in Levinasian
scholarship.
In Chapter 2, I explore how Levinas deepens this understanding of ethical subjectivity
in his second major work, Otherwise than Being. I consider in particular the
infinitude of responsibility in Levinas's account, and the way in which I can only
come into being through my condition of susceptibility to the need of the vulnerable
neighbour who elects me as one uniquely responsible. In this chapter, I also consider
the critique of Levinas by Badiou. The particular reason for confronting Levinas with
the thought of Badiou is because he has criticised Levinas in a searching way from an
overtly atheistic position. Hence, this is a means of testing the cogency of Levinas' s
thought and its dependence on a religious framework. Badiou's philosophical
approach and tone can be seen to interrupt the somewhat obsessive quality of
Levinas's writing, and therefore allow us to attend more closely to the distinctive
elements of Levinas' s presentation. It is my contention that reading Badiou together
with Levinas can extend our thinking about the infinite demand that, for Levinas, is
bound up with the emergence of subjectivity.
Whilst holding Levinas and Badiou together might seem an impossible task, there is
nevertheless in both their philosophies the sense that the subject is constituted in
passivity and sensibility, responding to a demand that comes from the outside and
exceeds the self, disrupting any understanding of the autarchy or self-sufficiency of
the subject. For both, education is the site of grace, and both the an-archy of the
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subject in Levinas's thinking and the idea of political subjectivity in Badiou's
conceptualisation emerge at a distance from the state, which is of significance for our
understanding of educational practice. Badiou, like Levinas, worked as a teacher yet
his understanding of education is not confined to the site of educational institutions.
Given the incommensurabilities of Levinas's and Badiou's projects, it may seem
somewhat perverse to attempt to bring these two thinkers together, and it would
admittedly be more usual to place Levinas in conversation with Derrida, for example.
My reason for preferring to read Levinas's understanding of subjectivity and teaching
through the lens of Badiou's critique is precisely because Badiou works from such a
different philosophical position. 9 The way that both he and Levinas lead us to see
education as only possible through an excessive demand, which is nevertheless in
some senses a grace, is the more striking because of their differences, and thus serves
as a forceful interruption of instrumentalist notions of schooling and education.l'' In
Levinas's Talmudic readings, there is a sense of the dynamic irresolutions of the
plurivocal texts that he is approaching, a plurivocity that Levinas himself extends by
introducing contemporary politics and philosophy in his own readings. My hope is
that the disruptive effect of reading Levinas and Badiou together in this text might
likewise point to an irresolution not just in my reading of Levinas in this thesis, but in
the very processes of reading to which Levinas draws our attention.
Following on from this, in Chapter 3, I consider how this presentation of subjectivity
extends and deepens our understanding of what has been seen as one of the principle
aims of education: autonomy. In direct continuity with the emancipatory project of
the Enlightenment, education has been seen as the site in which rationally
autonomous, moral subjects are produced. Responding to Levinas's critique that the
moral subject is, contra Kant, heteronomous rather than autonomous, I consider how
it is possible to consider the meaning of autonomy as dependent on a prior condition
of heteronomy, and how this leads to a richer conception of this principal aim of
education. Chapter 4 then turns to consider how a further aim of education - the
9 A further reason for choosing not to explore Derrida's critique of Levinas is because this has been
addressed by numerous other commentators, and I would contend that in Otherwise than Being Levinas
largely addressed Derrida's concerns.
10 The significance of Badiou for education is only beginning to be appreciated, for example there is a
forthcoming (due 2009) special edition of Educational Philosophy and Theory on Badiou (in which a
version of Chapter 4 will be published).
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production of potential workers, with a portfolio of assessable and measurable skills -
has become dominant within a neoliberal political context. For the majority of this
chapter, I turn my attention away from Levinas to consider Badiou's challenge to
such conceptualisations of education. The reason for such an extended focus on
Badiou in this chapter is because he provides a very detailed analysis of the ways in
which managerialism has become a predominant force within education in late
capitalist societies, which is for historical reasons not a significant feature of
Levinas's writing. Thus Badiou allows us to see more clearly how we might
understand the current political context of our 'educational home' (Todd, 2008, p.
182) that is being opened to these disruptive teachings of both Levinas and Badiou.
Through exploring Badiou's analysis, I consider how many of the standard critiques
of economic managerialism in education remain within the current state of the
situation. This helps us then to see how the understandings of education offered by
both Badiou and Levinas offer us a richer vision of how we might think again about
the possibilities of education beyond its distortion by policies of managerialism and
marketisation.
Chapter 5 examines how the privileging of autonomy and performance explored in
Chapters 3 and 4 have affected the subject discipline of Religious Education, and
therefore offers an example of how Levinas's understanding of teaching might have
practical consequences in the ways in which we come to understand the demands of
the curriculum. Such attention could be given to any curricular discipline: my reason
for focusing only on Religious Education arises from my own experience as a teacher
of this subject and my desire to consider how the theoretical and practical frameworks
ofmy subject discipline are affected by this reading of Levinas. Todd draws attention
to the difficulty of any attempt to 'apply' Levinas to education:
To write ... about Levinas and education is to position oneself at an
impossible threshold whose crossing seems to risk a betrayal of either
Levinas's thought or education's interests ... It is not that the words of his
texts are any more difficult than those of his contemporaries, or that his
style, to use a quaint phallic phrase, is simply impenetrable, or even that
he fails to write directly about education. Rather, it is that his self-
described project of 'fmding meaning' in ethics, coupled with his
resistance to any programmatic effort to describe an ethics, do not lend
themselves to education's interests in pursuing an ethic or in delineating
direct answers to moral questions on teaching. (Todd, 2008, p. 170)
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This is an important caveat to heed when considering the practical significance of
Levinas for particular subject disciplines and I agree with Gert Biesta's emphasis that
'the very thing which does not follow from Levinas is a clear educational program
which simply needs to be implemented by well-trained educators.' (Biesta, 2008, p.
207) Yet there clearly is a sense in which if we are affected by Levinas's description
of the nature of subjectivity, this disturbs established practices and ways of thinking
about education and opens up our thinking about how some practices might be
otherwise. Through examining the place of Religious Education in British schools, I
show how reading Levinas draws attention to what is lacking in the conceptualisation
of religion at the heart of current frameworks, in a way that leads to the possibility of
richer and more demanding approach to the subject.
Related to this understanding of religion, Chapter 6 shows how Levinas helps us to
understand the possibilities for interfaith dialogue in education and opens up
reflection on other practices of dialogue. Starting from the recent document on
relations between the Abrahamic faiths, A Common Word, which marks a decisive
shift in the possibilities for relation between these faiths, I explore how Levinas's
presentation of the relation to the neighbour provides a provocative extension of the
commandment to love the neighbour. Levinas's understanding of the relation to the
neighbour extends how we might understand our responsibilities towards those of
very different religious and political positions beyond the Abrahamic religions and
leads to a provocative consideration of the meaning of community in education,
predicated on vulnerability and illeity.
The final chapter arises from attempting to think through how I should understand the
political significance of my profession as a teacher in the current context of political
disappointment in which my work is situated, following on from the reading of
subjectivity that has informed the preceding chapters. Focus on the political
significance of Levinas's understanding of subjectivity has, arguably, been
underplayed, in educational responses to his work. Biesta's Beyond Learning:
Education for a Democratic Future is an exception to this. He argues, however, that
schools cannot be seen as where democracy emerges: the responsibility for producing
democratic citizens must be shifted away from schools and back to society at large
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(Biesta, 2006, p. 144). I am more hopeful, however, than Biesta about the difference
that schools might make to students (and teachers) as they emerge as political
subjects. Biesta leads his reader to consider the challenge of Levinas at a rather
abstract level, and the way in which he separates the need for democratic education
from schools could, arguably, lead to a sense of conservatism among teachers, if they
feel powerless to resist the political disappointments they experience in their work.
My contention is that reading Levinas leads to a sense of the infinite demand of
responsibility and the fact that my actions do have political consequences, even if the
nature of that political space ofmy responsibility is often undecidable. As a teacher, I
am always already responding to the demanding nature of my profession, and in a
sense am constituted as a political subject through the 'becoming conscience' that
Levinas speaks of, uncontained by the state, yet operating within the state. Such an
understanding leads towards a new way of considering the political subjectivity of
teachers, challenging prevailing assumptions that teachers currently lack political
agency.
Just as Levinas in Totality and Infinity attempts to outline two ways of thinking the
relation to the Other - the totalising and the ethical - so my aim throughout is to draw
attention to how reading Levinas offers us a way of thinking through the meaning of
education otherwise than the way it is currently harnessed to distorting instrumentalist
ideologies that lie within the totalising approach Levinas rejects. I, like Levinas,
cannot provide watertight proofs for this analysis, but my hope is that in writing about
the possibility of an approach to education otherwise, our knowledge of the nature of
education is deepened and transformed by Levinas's witness. Attending to Levinas
might have the effect of an experience book, in the sense that Foucault describes his
work as permitting 'a change, a transformation of the relationship we have with
ourselves and with the world where, up to then, we had seen ourselves as being
without problems - in short, a transformation of the relationship we have with our
knowledge' (Foucault, 2000, p. 244). Reading Levinas deepens our sense of the
potentialities and imperatives for justice and ethical relationality that in a sense are
already implied within education. Although these tend to be covered over in
discourses that place too much emphasis on the development of rational autonomy
and preparing students for waged work, my aim is to recover and explore the sense
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that education just might contain 'all the riches of the meeting with the Messiah' (DF,
p.85).
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Chapter 1
'Bringing Me More Than I Contain':
Discourse, Subjectivity and the Scene of
Teaching in Totality and Infinity
Let us begin our reading of the meaning and significance of education in Levinas's
philosophy with the question of language, for Levinas claims that it is through
language, or more specifically, through discourse, that my 'being is produced':
My being is produced in producing itself before the others in discourse; it
is what it reveals of itself to the others, but while participating in,
attending its revelation. (TI, p.253)
If this is true, what does it mean for our understanding of the importance of discourse
in education, and indeed for our understanding of the nature of education itself? The
idea that discourse is fundamental to the trajectory of the individual's 'becoming', and
that this is in some sense what education is, appears relatively uncontroversial.
Dewey writes: 'all communication (and hence all genuine social life) is educative. To
be a recipient of a communication is to have an enlarged and changed experience'
(Dewey, 1966, p. 5). Martin Buber also suggests such an idea: 'The relation in
education is one of pure dialogue' (Buber, 2002, p. 116). In what follows, I win
explore Levinas's presentation of discourse as teaching in Totality and Infinity,
examining how subjectivity is produced through the revealing of myself to others in
discourse as an ethical response.
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My focus is Totality and Infinity because it is here that we find Levinas's clearest and
most distinctive discussion of the nature of teaching. To say that the discussion is
'clear' is misleading, however. The language of Totality and Infinity is strange,
enigmatic, attempting to draw attention to the impossibility of capturing the relation
with the Other' in language. As Colin Davis writes:
Levinas's acute awareness of the pitfalls involved in overcoming
ontology, in becoming Abraham boldly stepping out into the unknown
rather than Ulysses seeking only what he had left behind, helps to explain
the extraordinary difficulty of his writing. His texts are assertive and
propositional, but also enigmatic, fragmented, paradoxical or perhaps just
plain inconsistent. (Davis, 1996, p.35)
The difficulty of Totality and Infinity is, as Hand argues, an implicit element of his
whole project, which aims to expose the ways in which the history of Western
philosophy, down to the very language and methods it has employed, has involved a
totalising suppression of the Other:
These ... claims are put forward in an almost prophetic or messianic way,
rather than as stages in a logical argument. But Levinas embraces such an
approach, as the way to break free from the process of offering
philosophical evidence, and therefore to get back to an original relation
with being that for him exists before and beyond totality and history. The
danger is that such an approach, relying on terms like transcendence,
infinity and revelation, could be dismissed as a purely spiritual rather than
rational vision. Again, Levinas recognizes this possibility, but turns the
tables by suggesting that the systems of totalization given by Western
philosophy and history have merely tried and failed to contain the idea of
infinity. (Hand, 2009, p. 37)
Despite this difficulty of reading and writing about Levinas, the challenge he presents
to preconceptions about the nature of language and knowledge have significant
implications for the meaning of education. I win here, therefore, attempt to delineate
how Levinas presents teaching as the Other's offering of the world to me through
speech, in contrast with more maieutic understandings of teaching, and how this
challenges other conceptions of language in education.
1 The capitalised 'Other' is typically used to translate the French l'autrui as opposed to l'autre, and it
indicates an absolute relation to the other person, independent of particular characteristics, of factors
that might differentiate this person from that person. The usage is not entirely consistent.
30
Teaching is, for Levinas, the space of encounter with the Other in which subjectivity
is revealed as ethical. In teaching, subjectivity is constituted through Desire and
goodness, both encountered through language. 'Desire' for Levinas means desire for
the absolutely Other, a metaphysical desire that can never be satisfied, as opposed to
the kinds of desires we can satisfy, and denotes a movement outwards towards the
absolutely Other, and the capitalisation of this term indicates this sense. This
metaphysical Desire could be distinguished from 'desire' that aims to bring the Other
into the field of the same, or aims at the synthesis of self and Other. Desire for
Levinas must maintain the alterity of the Other as beyond possession. He outlines this
sense of Desire in the 1964 essay 'Meaning and Sense':
The idea of the Infinite is Desire. It paradoxically consists in thinking
more than what is thought and maintaining what is thought in this very
excess relative to thought - in entering into a relationship with the
ungraspable while guaranteeing its status of being ungraspable. (BW, p.
55)
In what follows, I will consider what is unique in Levinas's account of subjectivity as
only possible through this relation with the ungraspable in which we are taught.
Discourse as Teaching
Before examining Levinas's presentation of language in Totality and Infinity, let me
briefly address the question of Levinas's philosophical approach in the text. I have
already commented on the influence of HusserI and Heidegger, and in the preface to
Totality and Infinity, Levinas describes his approach as indebted to HusserI:
the presentation and development of the notions employed owe everything
to the phenomenological method. Intentional analysis is the search for the
concrete. Notions held under the direct gaze of the thought that defines
them are nevertheless, unbeknown to this naive thought, revealed to be
implanted in horizons unsuspected by this thought; these horizons endow
them with a meaning - such is the essential teaching of HusserI. (TI, p.
28)
What matters in this approach is, however, not Husserl's thesis of intentionality but
rather 'the overflowing of objectifying thought by a forgotten experience from which
it lives. The break-up of the formal structure of thought (the noema of a noesis) into
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events which this structure dissimulates ... constitutes a deduction - necessary and
yet non-analytical' (ibid.) Nevertheless, although the account of ethical subjectivity is
presented in phenomenological terms, scholars have suggested different ways of
reading Levinas. Robert Bernasconi, for example, has suggested that it is possible to
read Levinas both transcendentally and empirically, but that neither reading is
sufficient (Bernasconi, 1989). Levinas describes his own philosophy, in his 1965
essay 'Enigme et phenomene,' as a philosophy of darkness (darkness being an
allusion to the idea of light in phenomenology). This helps us to understand his
'method': while adopting the Husserlian phenomenological method, Levinas at the
same time departs from intentional analysis by drawing attention to what lies beyond
the phenomenon, opaque to consciousness itself. Levinas is operating outside of
either descriptive or normative ethics, and his statement that 'ethics is an optics' (TI,
p. 23) reveals the sense of ethics as what enables things to be brought to light in the
phenomenological sense, while disturbing the field of consciousness itself. Levinas
points to an ethical phenomenology, demonstrating the ethical as beyond and yet
revealed by the phenomenon. This, then, is the philosophical 'framework' within
which I take Totality and Infinity to be operating.
Levinas's philosophy has been seen as underpinned by one far-reaching theme: that
ethics is first philosophy. It is in Totality and Infinity that this idea is first articulated
at length. Levinas uses the term 'ethics' not in a traditional sense as a code of
morality or moral decision-making, or meta-ethical examination? It is rather a
relation of responsibility to the Other, which, Levinas argues, Western philosophy has
sought to suppress through bringing the Other into the order of the Same. In Totality
and Infinity, the linguistic order is the site of totality but also the site of infinity, or
ethics. Levinas states that 'the essence of language is goodness... the essence of
language is friendship and hospitality' (TI, p. 305): having language depends, as we
will see, on the precondition of having responded in peace to the demand that the
Other addresses to me. The use of language, however, may be totalising, bringing the
Other within the totality of the Same, for example: 'Thematization and
conceptualization, which moreover are inseparable, are not peace with the other but
suppression or possession of the other' (p. 46). In Totality and Infinity, Levinas seeks
2 Diane Perpich provides an excellent discussion of the relation between Levinas's ethics and more
traditional ethical enterprises in The Ethics ofEmmanuel Levinas (Perpich, 2008).
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to show that the essence of language is interpellation, the Other's addressing me and
my response. As thought is conditioned by language, the very structure of logical
thought is anchored by the relation to the Other.
For Levinas, language presupposes a relation to the Other, who remains transcendent
to the same. In Part I of Totality and Infinity, Levinas states that one of the aims of
his work is to demonstrate that the relation with alterity is language itself:
We shall try to show that the relation between the same and the other - upon
which we seem to impose such extraordinary conditions - is language. For
language accomplishes a relation such that the terms are not limited within
this relation, such that the other, despite the relationship with the same,
remains transcendent to the same. The relation between the same and the
other, metaphysics, is primordially enacted as conversation, where the same,
gathered up in its ipseity as an 'I', as a particular existent unique and
autochthonous, leaves itself. (p. 39)
Levinas uses the terms 'conversation' and 'discourse' synonymously in Totality and
Infinity. Conversation is a relation that maintains separation between self and Other,
while at the same time allowing the Other a right over the egoism of the self.
Through the approach of the Other, my spontaneity is limited: 'The strangeness of the
Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely
accomplished as a calling into question ofmy spontaneity, as ethics.' (p. 43)
This Other has been suppressed, Levinas argues, by the history of Western
philosophy, exemplified by the teaching of Socrates as maieutics. Socrates's teaching,
Levinas suggests, means: 'to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me' (ibid.).
In order to consider how Levinas' s presentation of teaching is radically different from
Socratic maieutics, it is worth considering what is meant by the Socratic method. In
the Theaetetus, Socrates claims that he is a midwife (Theaetetus 184b), who can
deliver thoughts through his maieutic art. It is, as Kenneth Seeskin writes, 'the
respondent, and by implication the reader, who gives birth to an idea. All Socrates
does is facilitate the delivery' (Seeskin, 1987, p. 13). The method of this delivery is
the elenchos: the process of cross-examination and testing of opinions to disperse the
clouding of the mind by false opinions, produce uncertainty and thence the desire to
know. The metaphor of Socrates as midwife would see the unsettling effects of the
elenchos, through which what we thought we knew is challenged through the process
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of testing, as the birth pangs. But Socrates is a barren midwife; the Socratic dialogue
is not an insemination, but rather bringing to birth what is innate within the
individual. Thus Socrates insists: 'You ask me if I teach you when I say there is no
teaching but recollection' (Meno 82). For Socrates, then, knowledge and
understanding are not imparted from without, but are seen as 'in' the soul of the
individual.3
Levinas is radically opposed to the Socratic idea of pedagogy as maieutics. For
Levinas, language, knowledge and meaning are predicated on the relationship with
the Other. To be taught means to encounter what is wholly other, which is precisely
opposite to maieutics:
To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in
which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from
it. It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I,
which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity. But this also means: to be
taught. The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is a non-allergic
relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a teaching
[enseignement]. Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the
exterior and brings me more than I contain. In its non-violent transitivity the
very epiphany ofthe face is produced (TI, p. 51).
To be taught is to have been summoned into a non-violent relation with the Other,
who is always in a position of magisterial height. The radical openness of this
encounter is, Levinas suggests, the opposite of Socratic pedagogy. It is through this
approach of the Other that I am called into question, and my subjectivity is only
possible through the condition ofbeing taught:
The height from which language comes we designate with the term
teaching. Socratic maieutics prevailed over a pedagogy that introduced
ideas into a mind by violating or seducing (which amounts to the same
thing) that mind. It does not preclude the openness of the very dimension
of infinity, which is height, in the face of the Master. This voice coming
from another shore teaches transcendence itself. Teaching signifies the
whole infinity of exteriority. And the whole infinity of exteriority is not
3 It would be interesting to explore further the ways in which Plato's Good Beyond Being, as
acknowledged by Levinas, allows for alterity, or whether the Other is still subsumed in the self in our
relation to the Good. Levinas suggests that the notion of desire presented in Diotima's speech in the
Symposium is a form of incest, while at the same time pointing out that Plato presents discourse as
discourse with God in the Phaedrus and thus suggesting that 'metaphysics is the essence of language
with God; it leads above being.' (TI, p. 297). The relationship between self, Other and teaching for
Plato is more complex than the simple rejection ofmaieutics implies.
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first produced then to teach: teaching is its very production. The first
teaching teaches this very height, tantamount to its exteriority, the ethical.
(TI, p. 171)
As Robert Gibbs suggests, the social image that Levinas prefers to signify the relation
between self and Other is that of a teacher. The height of the teacher 'signals the
resistance without power, a command that can compel only pacifically' (Gibbs, 1995,
p. 15). Levinas emphasises that the Other is my master, in a mastery 'that does not
conquer, but teaches. Teaching is not a species of a genus called domination, a
hegemony at work within a totality, but is the presence of infinity breaking the closed
circle of totality' (TI, p. 171).
If this encounter with the Other is a teaching that interrupts 'the closed circle of
totality', how are we taught through this relation? In an essay entitled 'Dialogue',
Levinas emphasises that discourse is the Other's call to me, and my response to them:
'Is not the very opening of the dialogue already a way for the I to uncover itself, to
deliver itself, a way for the I to place itself at the disposition of the You?' (GM, p.
149). Only in the opening oflanguage, in which I am placed at the disposition ofyou,
can I be taught what I could not have discovered within myself. This is, as Levinas
emphasises, similar to Descartes's meditation on the idea of infinity coming to him
from outside himself For Levinas, in the approach of the Other, meaning and truth
are produced from beyond myself, and in this way a common world is created
between self and Other: 'To speak is to make the world common, to create
commonplaces. Language does not refer to the generality of concepts, but lays the
foundation for a possession in common' (TI, p. 76). As Davis writes, 'through
discourse I fmd that I am not the exclusive possessor of the world. What had seemed
uniquely mine is revealed as shared with the Other' (Davis, 1996, p. 47). Through
discourse, the world and things are placed in the space between me and the Other and
their possession is put into question, as they are offered to me and I offer them to the
Other. Speech itself is therefore a teaching in its founding of the world and
community:
As an attendance ofbeing at its own presence, speech is a teaching. Teaching
does not simply transmit an abstract and general content already common to
me and the Other. It does not merely assume an after all subsidiary function
of being midwife to a mind already pregnant with its fruit. Speech first
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founds community by giving, by presenting the phenomenon as given; and it
gives by thematizing. (TI, p. 98)
The etymology of 'thematising', from tithemi, implies placing/setting. Here the
placing refers to placing what is offered in speech before the self, the Other setting it
in the space before me, giving me the phenomenon, or to use Levinas's phrase,
'presenting the phenomenon as given.' The term 'given' here has the force of 'gift'
rather than a flat geometric 'given' and is an intrinsic aspect of Levinas's
phenomenology, moving beyond Husserl by emphasising that the Other cannot be
seen as phenomenological, since he is not given as something one can think about. As
Critchley writes, 'the other is not a phenomenon but an enigma, something ultimately
refractory to intentionality and opaque to understanding' (Critchley, 2002, p. 8). But
in speech, the phenomenon is given. Thus the Other, who speaks to me and sets the
phenomenon in my world remains outside my knowing, beyond any phenomenon.
This idea of being taught should not be taken in a straightforwardly developmental
sense, as the development of consciousness; it is rather a description of the conditions
of consciousness and subjectivity. However, thinking about how a child might
develop language helps us to think further about what this notion of the phenomenon
as a gift means. Let us imagine, for example, a small child being given a bowl of
raspberries by her mother. The child's consciousness of the fruit and its meaning are
invested through the actions and address of her mother, her mother looking for the
child's response to her action (in perhaps accepting the fruit). Thus it is the mother
who 'gives' the child 'raspberries', in the sense that the fruit is thematised, set in
place in the world for the child by the mother, given a meaning and a context. By
placing inverted commas around the terms 'gives' and 'raspberries', I am trying to
suggest that the terms are being used here in a particular way. What is significant is
not the idea that the child learns the word 'raspberry', or the concept 'raspberry'
through the mother's actions, but rather that through the 'giving', through the
mother's actions in addressing the child and looking for her response, raspberries can
appear as raspberries in her world, or, in other words, the phenomenon of raspberries
comes to the child. The child may be only at an early stage in developing language,
but as the mother looks for the child's response to her offering, the child is already
subjected to the address of the Other with which subjectivity begins. We can easily
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see why this kind of interaction is a 'teaching', and why it is opposed to Socratic
maieutics, since the phenomenon comes to the child from beyond herself, and it is this
structure of the Other's offering me phenomena, and my receiving them, which is for
Levinas fundamental to all consciousness, subjectivity and objectivity.
Although we are taught by the Other in the encounter, the teacher remains outside of
my knowing: 'The master, the coinciding of the teaching and the teacher, is not in
turn a fact among others. The present of the manifestation of the master who teaches
overcomes the anarchy of facts' (TI, pp. 69-70). It is phenomena, not the Other, that
are thematised; the infinite cannot be a theme 'but signals itself... as thematizing, as
him starting from whom everything can be fixed in its identity' (ibid.). This teaching
founds objectivity:
Teaching, the end of equivocation or confusion, is a thematization of
phenomena. It is because phenomena have been taught to me by one who
presents himself - by reviving the acts of this thematization which are the
signs - by speaking - that henceforth I am not the plaything of a
mystification, but consider objects. The presence of the Other dispels the
anarchic sorcery of the facts: the world becomes an object. (TI, p. 99)
Objectivity is the result of putting things in question between self and Other, the
offering of the world by the Other and speaking about the world 'with someone who
has broken through the screen of phenomena and has associated me with himself
(ibid.). This is the precondition for reason. Difference and separation are then
necessary conditions for reason, rather than reason being the overcoming of
difference. Jeffery Dudiak, in The Intrigue ofEthics, suggests how the offering of the
word by the Other establishes rational thought:
Objectivity, or the truth of objects... , the very rationality of the logos, ...
rests upon a reference to the other who, while himself withdrawing from
the realm of 'objective facts' that he offers or that I offer to him, would
produce the objectivity of things that enter into commerce between us,
and this by means ofhis status as teacher. (Dudiak, 2001, pp. 121-22)
For Levinas, objectivity, reason and truth are predicated upon the relation with the
Other: the condition for language is a relation with what is beyond language. Reason,
it should be emphasised, is therefore a significant aspect of this notion of language.
In The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common, Alphonso Lingis, who
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translated several of Levinas's major works including Totality and Infinity, expresses
how this idea ofresponsibility is intimately bound up with reasoning:
The other turns to me and speaks; he or she asks something of me. Her
words, which I understand because they are the words of my own tongue,
ask for information and indications. They ask for a response that will be
responsible, will give reasons for its reasons and will be a commitment to
answer for what it answers. But they fIrst greet me with an appeal for
responsiveness. (Lingis, 1994, pp.130-31)
For Levinas likewise, the exercise of rationality is always intimately bound up with
the ethical conditions ofresponsibility that makes its exercise possible.
When language is viewed primarily as communication, as it often is in common
usage4 and in some conceptions of English teaching, the ethical preconditions of
language can be hidden:
The 'communication' of ideas, the reciprocity of language, already hide the
profound essence of language. It resides in the irreversibility of the relation
between me and the other, in the Mastery of the Master coinciding with his
position as other and as exterior. For language can be spoken only if the
interlocutor is the commencement of his discourse, if, consequently, he
remains beyond the system, if he is not on the same plane as myself. (TI, p.
101)
Levinas here suggests that the idea of language as communication, implying a
transparency of ideas and reciprocity and reversibility of relation, misses the alterity
of the Other which is the foundation of language. Reversibility and reciprocity would
imply that I and Other are on the same plane, equals in a symmetrical relationship,
thus failing to recognise that I am responsible to the Other's address in an
asymmetrical responsibility. This idea that the relation between I and Other cannot be
seen as reciprocal is fundamental to Levinas's argument, since if I posit the Other as
another I, I minimise their alterity and presume to know them as one like me.' The
4 Heidegger, for example, in 'Language' suggests that language is commonly viewed as a means of
communication primarily: 'The current view declares that speech is the activation of the organs for
sounding and hearing. Speech is the audible expression and communication of human feelings.'
(Heidegger, 2001, p. 190)
5 This notion of non-reciprocity in Levinas has been criticised, for example Derrida suggests that this
must depend on a metaphysical symmetry of asymmetrical responsibility (Derrida, 2001, p. 160). We
will explore how Levinas takes up this theme of the irreversibility of relation in Otherwise than Being
in the following chapter.
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speaking of language depends on its commencement by one who is outside language
and beyond my knowing, for whom I have responsibility, and thus he is, in this sense
my Master, calling me to responsibility from his position of vulnerability.
This should not be understood as an authoritarianism of the other person who stands
outside language and commands me. It conveys more the idea that language comes
from an alterity that is rooted in the vulnerability of other persons to my responses,
refractory to intentionality and lying beyond understanding. This emphasis that
language is the site of my ethical subjectivity and that to receive language is to be
taught, is very different from the common emphasis on the communicative function of
language in teaching. While not wishing to deny the importance of communication
within schooling, pedagogic theories that over-emphasise the communicative function
of language can lead us to miss the ethical conditions of language, and the alterity of
the Other who brings me language. For Levinas, if we are to talk about
communication at all, then this notion of what is communicated must be seen as
inextricably bound up with that which cannot be communicated: the Other.
Whilst opposing the VIew that language is primarily communication, Levinas's
understanding of language also leads us to reflect upon ways that other philosophies
of language can miss the ethical condition of language, for example the views of
structuralism or Heidegger," Let us pause to consider these alternative approaches
and how Levinas's understanding is distinct from these. Levinas takes many ideas
from structuralist linguistics but diverges at significant points. Ferdinand de
Saussure's Course in General Linguistics was the catalyst for the cluster of ideas
known as structuralism, in which language is presented as a system, or a structure.
For Saussure, language is a system of signs, each sign composed of two parts: a
signifier (signifiant), which is a word or sound-pattern, and a signified concept
(signifie'). The signifier itself is arbitrary and has no intrinsic relation to the signified,
yet because our thought is structured by language, we cannot separate the phonetic
and conceptual aspects of language: they are as closely linked for us as two sides of a
sheet of paper. In the human sciences, one of the most significant uses of the
6 I focus on the contrast with these two approaches to language particularly, rather than a Lacanian
approach, for example, because they appear to have influenced Levinas's own approach.
39
Saussurian model was to challenge the modernist emphasis on autonomy. John
Llewelyn summarises this point clearly:
because in structuralist semiotics the components or terms owe their
meaning to their internal interrelations, it is arguable that there is only one
unit, the system as a whole. This suggests an analogy with mathematical
systems, where it is arguable that the mathematician reads off from the
system as a whole the theorems he calculates or infers. One might say
that it is the system that thinks through the mathematician. And
something like this is what is said by some of the human scientists who
apply Saussure's model to their own special fields. With some
structuralists the idea that 'it' (es, 9a) thinks in me turns into the idea of
'the death ofman,' so that it becomes debatable whether they can properly
be called 'human' scientists. Lacan in psychoanalysis, Althusser in
political theory, Levi-Strauss in anthropology and Foucault in the
genealogies of knowledge and power are among those whom Levinas
would see as representatives of 'modem antihumanism'. (Llewelyn, 2002,
pp. 120-21)
The relationship between language and autonomy for Levinas is distinct from such
'antihumanist' models in which the free human is subsumed within systems and
structures of language, knowledge and power. But it is also clearly distinct from the
emphasis on human autonomy in the use of language that we [md in thinkers such as
Locke, in his nomenclaturist philosophy of language. For Levinas, because all
experience and cognition come from the relation with the absolutely Other, I cannot
have autonomy in the Lockean sense, yet neither am I subsumed by the system of
language as I am in the structuralist opposition to autonomy. Levinas's view that we
are heteronomous subjects implies a singularity of the I: although language and
understanding are brought to me by the Other, my responses are an integral aspect of
the appearance of my world within my horizons. There is thus a confirmation of the
self as unique in the way it alone can respond to the appeal of the Other's address, but
this is neither the autonomy of the Lockean subject, nor its antithesis in structuralism.
Response, responsibility and signification are therefore intimately related for Levinas,
as he explains in an interview conducted in 1986 and subsequently published in The
Provocation ofLevinas:
the beginning of all language is in the face. In ... its silence, it calls you.
Your reaction to the face is a response. Not just a response, but a
responsibility. These two words [reponse, responsabilitei are closely
related. Language does not begin with the signs that one gives, with
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words. Language is above all the fact ofbeing addressed. (Levinas, 1988,
pp.169-70)
Thus we can see that although Levinas takes from structuralism the use of the words
signifiant and signifie, his emphasis is very different. As Llewelyn points out,
Levinas uses the term signifiant not to refer to the phonetic or graphic signifier, but to
the speaker who issues the signs, who looks for my response and thus elects me as
responsible. Thus in Totality and Infinity, Levinas writes:
The way the object is posited as a theme offered envelops the instance of
signifying - not the referring of the thinker who fixes it to what is
signified (and is part of the same system), but the manifesting of the
signifier, the issuer of the sign, an absolute alterity which nonetheless
speaks to him and thereby thematizes, that is, proposes a world. (TI, p. 96,
emphasis mine)
The signifier is here the Other, not signified by the sign. It is precisely in the moment
of signifying that the alterity of the Other is revealed: 'The Other, the signifier,
manifests himself in speech by speaking of the world and not ofhimself; he manifests
himself by proposing the world, by thematizing it' (ibid.).
Meaning is therefore dependent on the interpellation of the Other who signifies, an
idea absent from the structuralist emphasis on meaning as determined through the
differences between interdependent terms within the system of language. For
Levinas, meaning is part of a system of different terms as in structuralism, but this
system arises through speech, or, to be more specific (since structuralists might agree
that language and speaking go together), the Other's speaking to me: 'Speech is thus
the origin of all signification - of tools and all human works - for through it the
referential system from which every signification arises receives the very principle of
its functioning, its key' (TI, p. 98). It is only through the revelation of the Other that
the world can be oriented and take on signification. The address of the Other is the
absolute upon which all meaning depends and the site of meaning is also the site of
teaching, for to receive a meaning is to be taught: 'To have meaning is to be situated
relative to an absolute, that is, to come from that alterity that is not absorbed in its
being perceived... To have meaning is to teach or to be taught, to speak or to be able
to be stated' (p. 97).
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There is a further parallel between Levinas and structuralism here, in Levinas's
suggestion that all thought, and hence our sense of reality, is always already
structured by language, for example, in 'Meaning and Sense': 'Everything remains in
a language or in a world, for the structure of the world resembles the order of
language' (BW, p. 38). As Llewelyn points out, the use of this idea in structuralism
led to 'the death of man', in terms of the end of the notion of a completely
autonomous and free human who is author of his acts. Although sharing this
emphasis that language is given to the self from outside, for Levinas the language that
I speak is a gift to me from the Other, and in the approach of the Other, I am called to
a position of ethical subjectivity, and this leads to a new sense of autonomy, as I will
explore in Chapter 3.
As we have seen there are both similarities and striking differences between Levinas's
presentation of language and structuralist linguistics, so also with Heidegger's views
of language. We see Levinas taking up Heidegger's phraseology and emphasis that to
be human means to have language in 'Meaning and Sense': 'There never was a
moment in which meaningfirst came to birth out ofa meaningless being, outside of a
historical position where language is spoken. And that is doubtless what was meant
when we were taught that language is the house of being.' (BW, p. 38) We also hear
echoes of Heidegger, when Levinas describes language as poetry: 'Language qua
expression is, above all, the creative language of poetry' (p. 41). Heidegger's later
essays on language state that poetry is language in its purest form, but we can see here
there is a different emphasis from Levinas's statement that language qua expression is
poetry, for Heidegger specifically states that, 'In its essence, language is neither
expression nor an activity of man' (Heidegger, 2001, p. 194). Language, for
Heidegger, revealed in its purest form as poetry, speaks itself: 'Language speaks [Die
Sprache spricht]. Man speaks in that he responds to language. This responding is a
hearing' (p. 207).
For Heidegger, poetry is the essence of language, and not merely verse. As pure
language, it names, a naming that is not a designation: 'This naming does not hand
out titles. It does not apply titles, but it calls into the word. The naming calls' (p.
196). The naming calls what is concealed to come to language as unconcealed, thus
instituting Being. We can see this idea in The Origin ofthe Work ofArt: 'Language,
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by naming beings for the fIrst time, first brings beings to word and to appearance.
Only this naming nominates being to their being from out a/their being' (p. 71). This
bringing to Being through language also means a bringing to being as in some sense
beyond speaking, as unsayable: 'Projective saying is poetry... Projective saying is
saying which, in preparing the unsayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as
such into a world' (ibid). This is why poetry is language in its purest form, showing
the unsayable as such, revealing it to be other than the word, in a sense beyond
language even while being brought to presence as hidden by language.
This idea of the unsayable being brought to presence as unsayable through language
has resonances with Levinas's writing. Levinas states that 'The signified is never a
complete presence; always a sign in its turn, it does not come in a straightforward
frankness' (TI, p. 96). However, there is a different emphasis on the unsayable for
Levinas, whose concern is to show that the signifier, the Other, the one who addresses
me is beyond language, as the forever inaccessible origin of language. This we can
see clearly in 'Meaning and Sense':
The Other (Autrui) who faces me is not included in the totality of being
expressed. He arises behind every assembling of being as he to whom I
express what I express. I find myself facing the Other (Autrui). He is
neither a cultural signification nor a simple given. He is sense primordially,
for he gives sense to expression itself, for it is only by him that a
phenomenon as a meaning is, of itself, introduced into being. (BW, p. 52)
The term sens used in the statement that the Other is 'sense primordially' can be
translated as both 'meaning' and 'direction'. The Other, while bringing me meaning,
is also my direction. As I turn towards the Other who always escapes me, my world is
unfolding and given new meanings: I am taught.
For Heidegger, the emphasis is less on the signifier lying beyond signification or
expression than on the simultaneous absence and presence of the signified, While
Heidegger challenges us to consider the nature of language as beyond
conceptualisation, Levinas shows us how language is invested with meaning by the
fact that it is spoken by one who is vulnerable to my response to that speaking. While
Heidegger emphasises that it is language that speaks, for Levinas, this speaking is
inextricably bound up with the offering of the word by the Other, the interpellation of
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the Other. It is not that Levinas would disagree that language speaks in the Other or
in me - indeed the idea of language as brought to me from outside, by the Other,
implies that language does 'possess' me. But Levinas's emphasis on the Other
speaking and founding my meanings and a common world of objects, shows the
ethical nature of language in a way that is deliberately different from Heidegger's
approach, motivated by the desire to leave the philosophical climate of his former
teacher. Llewelyn summarises this difference between them thus:
Prior to my being possessed by language, Levinas maintains, is my
possession by the human being who speaks to me.... For both Heidegger and
Levinas [sociality] is linguistic, and a way of being possessed by language.
But, to repeat, whereas for Heidegger possession by language is a way of
being with others, for Levinas it is also a possession by others. This latter
possession disrupts my being possessed by language as this is understood by
Heidegger. (Llewelyn, 2002, p. 123)
Ultimately, Levinas's philosophy of language, like Heidegger's, suggests that
language is the 'house of being', but for Levinas, this being depends on a prior
orientation towards the Other who, in addressing me, founds my language, and this
ethical orientation is not present in Heidegger's discussion of language. Even the use
of the term 'house of being' by Heidegger emphasises this difference: in language, for
Heidegger, I dwell poetically. For Levinas, my abode as a subject is a tent rather than
a house, as I do not dwell but rather move towards the Other.
Although language begins with the approach of the Other, Levinas is careful to
emphasise that we do not always relate to the Other in discourse. Rhetoric is the term
Levinas uses for discourses that are not primarily relations with exteriority. Thus he
points out that what we most often approach in conversation is not the Other, 'but an
object or an infant, or a man of the multitude' (TI, p. 70). Rhetoric does still approach
the Other, but is a corruption of discourse, as 'propaganda, flattery, diplomacy, etc.'
(ibid.), and is a violence in its corruption of freedom. The tendency of rhetoric is
totalising, unlike discourse as teaching, in which I am summoned to a position of
infinite responsibility. This notion of infinite responsibility does not imply that we
are always aware of such responsibility, but demonstrates the way in which
intersubjective space is 'curved', and the sense of responsibility deepens the more we
attend to it:
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The infinity of responsibility denotes not its actual immensity, but a
responsibility increasing in the measure that it is assumed; duties become
greater in the measure that they are accomplished. The better I
accomplish my duty the fewer rights I have; the more I am just the more
guilty I am. (TI, p. 244)
This responsibility is asymmetrical: 'what I permit myself to demand of myself is not
comparable with what I have the right to demand of the Other. This moral experience,
so commonplace, indicates a metaphysical asymmetry' (p. 53). I cannot demand
responsibility from the other, and I cannot appeal to the neutral third term to demand
that the Other take responsibility for me. Peace is my responsibility alone: 'Peace
must be my peace, in a relation that starts from an I and goes to the other, in desire
and Goodness, where the I both maintains itself and exists without egoism' (p. 306).
This does not mean that the Other will not take responsibility for me, but rather that
when this does happen, this is an experience ofgrace.
As we have seen, the opening of language in Totality and Infinity is the Other's
address to me. Language, objectivity and truth are made possible by the Other's
teaching, 'bringing me more than I contain' and electing me as responsible. Thus
Levinas's philosophy demonstrates the primacy of the ethical conditions of language
before its communicative function. What does this mean, then, for our understanding
of what it is to be a subject?
Subjectivity as Ethical
It is only in approaching the Other that I attend to myself. .. . [I]n
discourse I expose myself to the questioning of the Other, and this
urgency of the response - acuteness of the present - engenders me for
responsibility; as responsible I am brought to my final reality... When I
seek my final reality, I fmd that my existence as a 'thing in itself begins
with the presence in me ofthe idea ofInfinity. (TI, pp. 178-79)
In this passage, we see the idea that my subjectivity, my final reality, is only as one
responsible for the Other. I am thus, contra Heidegger, not fundamentally a being-
towards-death so much as I am a being-towards-the-other, or a being-ror-the-Other.
Being oneself in this way means to express oneself, which is already to serve the
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Other in a relation of obligation. The address of the Other confrrms my subjectivity
as unique. 1cannot escape the call singularly addressed to me:
The I is a privilege and an election. The sole possibility in being of going
beyond the straight line of the law, that is, of fmding a place lying beyond
the universal, is to be I... The call to infinite responsibility confirms the
subjectivity in its apologetic position... To utter 'I,' to affirm the
irreducible singularity in which the apology is pursued, means to possess
a privileged place with regard to responsibilities for which no one can
replace me and from which no one can release me. To be unable to shirk:
this is the I. (TI, p. 245)
Subjectivity in this view is constituted in receptivity and passivity. It is only as turned
outwards towards the Other that I am. Subjectivity, the condition of being taught,
means that my spontaneity, which was and is always an illusion, is called into
question, and I realise that that the world is common between I and the Other.
The relationship between the I and the Other should not be seen, however, as a party
of two. The relation with the Other means entering into a relation with others through
the third party who is brought to me in the address of the Other:
Language as the presence of the face does not invite complicity with the
preferred being, the self-sufficient 'I-Thou' forgetful of the universe; in its
frankness it refuses the clandestinity of love, where it loses its frankness
and meaning and turns into laughter or cooing. The third party looks at
me in the eyes of the Other -language is justice. (TI, p. 213)
Levinas's target here, with the phrase 'I-Thou', may be Buber's presentation of the
reciprocal relation between self and Other, in which all my awareness is drawn
towards the living reality of another. The language of 'laughter' and 'cooing'
suggests that Levinas rejects the sentimentality of such a relation, or what the
popularisation of such a relationship quickly becomes. Levinas's conception is far
from self-sufficient and clandestine. Through the Other 1 am also drawn into a
relation with others, so that there never exists a self-sufficient I-Thou. The third party,
always already present in the approach of the Other, demands justice and justification
for my actions, how I divide, weigh up, calculate and make decisions about my
practical responses to the needs ofmany others. In this sense, the ethical relation with
the Other is always already political because of demand for justice. As Madeleine
Fagan writes on the inseparability of ethics and politics for Levinas, 'If the Third is
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taken seriously in Levinas's work, ... ethics cannot be separated from politics, charity
not separated from justice and responsibility not separated from irresponsibility.'
(Fagan, 2009, p. 11) Fagan goes on to outline how the approach of the third and with
it the excessive, impossible nature of my responsibility not just to the Other but to all
the others means that a particular response is not determined in advance. This is the
possibility of my responsibility rather than a clear knowledge of what I must do. The
presence of the others, leading us to make comparisons, calculate, decide about the
distribution of resources, is already there in the approach of the Other, and so we are
obliged simultaneously to the infinite demand of the Other and the demands of many
others, making totalising rules and judgements necessary. We will explore the
aporetic nature of the ethico-political towards which this points at length in Chapters
6 and 7, but it should be emphasised here that any attempt to separate politics and
ethics is impossible, because the presence of many others means that the totalisation
of comparison and political judgement is necessary, yet only possible because of the
prior condition of ethical responsibility. The political can therefore be seen, as
Caygill states, as the movement between totality and infinity (Caygill, 2002, p. 96).
The relationship to the Other is phenomenologically fundamental, but, as we have
seen, what the Other means is always conditioned by the others and in this way I am
an ethical and political subject. To be a subject means to be subject to the Other,
which is always is to be subject to the others, a subjection I cannot escape. As Peter
Atterton writes:
the self is a subjectum (sub-jacere, to throw, place, or set under) in the
sense that it is subjected or subordinated to the responsibility that
ultimately serves and defines it... [T]he self is a subject, then, not in any
traditional Cartesian or humanist sense. Self-presence, the presence of
self to self in the interiority of consciousness (the cogito), which
Descartes took to be the first certainty, is secondary to the relation with
other. (Atterton 2004, p. 14)
At one level, this idea that subjectivity is constructed through a relation with alterity is
not unique to Levinas. In Lacan, for example, it is through entry into the symbolic
order, which is other, that subjectivity is constructed. In Hegel also, subjectivity
depends on alterity, with subjectivity experienced as the restoration of the self-same
that has been subjected to otherness. What is distinctive in Levinas's presentation is
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this ethical subversion: to be a subject means that my spontaneity is always already
limited in responsibility to the Other, and I am 'elected' to my unique subjectivity
through the singular way in which I can respond. My singularity is confrrmed as
irreducible because only I can answer: 'The uniqueness of the I is the fact that no one
can answer for me.' (BW, p. 55)
My unique responsibility for the Other arises before I could choose to accept it: I am
always already obligated, and the uniqueness of my responsibility is termed
'election.' In 'God and Philosophy', Levinas describes this obligation deepening the
more I attend to it:
This is the subject, irreplaceable for the responsibility there assigned to
him, and who therein discovers a new identity. But insofar as it tears me
from the concept ofthe Ego [Moi], the fission of the subject is a growth of
obligation in proportion to my obedience to it; it is the augmentation of
culpability with the augmentation of holiness, an increase of distance in
proportion to my approach. (GM, p. 73)
This view is radically different from most conceptions of responsibility in moral and
political philosophy, and indeed in most conceptions of subjectivity. To assume
responsibility for the Other dependent on alterity rather than any shared membership
of a community or reciprocal responsibility, is intrinsic to this notion of
responsibility.
What then does this view of ethical subjectivity as a turning outwards towards the
Other, always already obligated to them in a relation of infinite responsibility, mean
for how we understand education at a conceptual level?
Election to Subjectivity - a Teaching
Levinas's concern to show that the subject is formed in infinite responsibility to the
Other, disrupting the order of the self-same, can be seen as in some ways comparable
to the idea of subjectivity constructed through language, always other to the self, as
argued, for example, by Lacan.' What is distinctive in Levinas's approach is that
7 I do not propose to compare Levinas and psychoanalytic perspectives on alterity and affectivity, since
Todd has already provided an illuminating reading of how Levinas allows us to see possibilities for
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language depends on the prior possibility of goodness, of responsibility: as one who is
taught, receiving language as an eleve, I am elevated in my election to subjectivity
(Llewelyn, 1995, p. 98). This responsibility is not to be understood in terms of
moments of intense relationality, but as a condition and orientation that pervades
everything, including the whole of education. Paul Standish puts this well:
The Other is plainly not to be thought of as the stuff of 'peak experiences'
between human beings, especially in view of the pervasive nature of
responsibility - hardly the stuff ofexperience, considering how readily we
lose sight of our responsibilities or how easily we go to sleep on them. In
contrast, it is to be asked what human beings do that does not involve this
responsibility - neglected or covered over though that usually is. If the
obligation to the Other should be seen as pervasive, the things that we
interact with and the way we word the world should be seen in this light.
(Standish, 2007, pp. 79-80).
Standish here points towards how this way of understanding responsibility towards
the Other might affect the way we conceive of the meaning of education at every
level.
But what does this mean in relation to other more standard conceptualisations of the
meaning of education? In subsequent chapters I will consider how reading Levinas
interrupts and disturbs particular educational discourses relating to particular liberal
and neoliberal understandings that have been dominant in recent years, therefore in
the remainder of this chapter, I will only briefly draw attention to themes that relate in
particular to Totality and Infinity. These themes are: the Ulysses/Abraham
comparison, Bildung as an educational ideal, Martin Buber's dialogical philosophy of
education and Michael Oakeshott's presentation of education as 'the conversation of
mankind.'
Ulysses and Abraham
A motif that reverberates throughout Levinas's work and is set out within Totality and
Infinity is the Ulysses / Abraham comparison. Against Ulysses, who after his
ethical relationality in education, informed by psychoanalytic readings of ethics, in Learning from the
Other: Levinas, Psychoanalysis and Ethical Possibilities in Education (2003a), and Critchley has
likewise given a thoughtful reading of how the ethical demand proposed by Levinas can be related to
Freud's idea of trauma in Infinitely Demanding (2007).
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wanderings returns to Ithaca, Levinas prefers Abraham, who leaves his homeland in
search of an unknown land. Levinas describes the history of Western philosophy -
and, that is to say, in Western thought - as following Ulysses: it is characterised by its
failure to recognise the Other, always aiming to return to the same. Totality and
Infinity attempts to take philosophy elsewhere, highlighting the engagement with the
Other that is prior to knowledge itself. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas describes
labour and economic exchange as following Ulysses's path: 'Labor remains
economic; it comes from the home and returns to it, a movement of Odyssey where
the adventure is pursued in the world is but the accident of a return' (TI, pp. 176-77).
This motif has significant implications for how we think about education. Standish,
in 'Data Return: The Sense of the Given in Educational Research', has explored how
the sense of a movement outwards towards the Other is at odds with ways of thinking
about both educational research and education itself in terms of targets, goals and
productivity. This is exemplified in the New Labour vision that universities should
become productive forces in a 'knowledge economy', in which all is justified under
the logic of Capital, seeking to bring all within the logic of the Same. An important
policy document issued from the Treasury under Gordon Brown demonstrates this
approach:
The government's ambition, shared with its partners in the private and
not-for-profit sectors, is for the UK to be a key knowledge hub in the
global economy, with a reputation not only for outstanding scientific and
technological discovery, but also as a world leader in turning that
knowledge into new products and services (H M Treasury, Science and
Innovation Investment Framework 2004-2014, cited in Callinicos, 2006,
p.12).
We will explore in detail how Levinas's approach, read together with Badiou, exposes
the limitations of this approach in Chapter 4. However it is worth emphasising here
that Levinas's writing challenges us to think about the meaning of education
otherwise, beyond the logic of economic exchange that follows Ulysses' path, as
instead a giving up of oneself to the Other, 'expend[ing] myself ... My work goes
beyond me in ways I cannot foresee, and with effects I cannot know. Without this all
is limited.' (Standish, 2001, p. 513) The currently dominant aims of productivity
within neoliberal education policies or the focus on the development of rational
autonomy in liberalism confront in the thinking of Levinas a vision of the ethical that
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interrupts self-consciousness and rationality and proposes a venturing forth with no
return, interrupting these closed circles ofproductive logics. While the conversations,
the writing, the performances that arise within formal education may belong within
the totality of economic exchange, the challenge Levinas poses is to recognise them
as arising from an offering up of the self to the Other prior to this, from which there is
no return. Such an understanding has been, on this account, suppressed by
educational discourses, in order to confme what we can think within the realms of
categorisation, exchange and possessive rationality. Although Levinas would not
oppose the idea that formal education should promote rationality and autonomy, as we
will explore later, his writing nevertheless challenges the priority that has been
accorded to these in liberal education.
Bildung as an Educational Ideal
This potential provocation of Levinas's writing for the ideal of the return to the same
is similar to the challenge these ideas pose to the concept of Bildung in educational
theory. The notion of Bildung has been used with the sense of 'upbringing' of an
individual to a model image, ideal ambition or telos (Nordenbo, 2003, p. 27). There
is not scope here to explore the various ways in which this ideal has been conceived
within education, and the relation between the self and society that is implied within
the concept. However, the teleology and focus on the individual implied in the
concept of Bildung differs from Levinas's presentation of the scene of teaching, in
which the subject is always moving towards an unknown land. While Levinas might
not have wanted in practical terms to challenge the idea of character development
implicit in Bildung, his writing on the scene of teaching provides a way of thinking
about teaching that demonstrates the troubling inadequacy of viewing the self as prior
to the Other, or having any idea ofmodel image or telos as an outcome of education.'
Marlin Buber's Dialogical Philosophy ofEducation
8 Biesta offers a more detailed examination of how Levinas's writing challenges conceptions of
Bildung as these relate to Enlightenment conceptions of education as the 'servant' of the individual
(Biesta, 2008, p. 199 ff.).
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With his emphasis on the phenomenological irreducibility of the Thou in his I-Thou
formulation, Buber stands close to Levinas. 9 But Buber's educational philosophy and
Levinas's presentation of the relation with the Other as a teaching depart at significant
points. Buber summarises education and the role of the educator thus:
The world, that is the whole environment, nature and society, 'educates'
the human being: it draws out his powers... What we term education,
conscious and wined, means a selection by man ofthe effective world: it
means to give effective power to a selection of the world which is
concentrated and manifested in the educator. The relation in education is
lifted out of the purposelessly streaming education by all things, and is
marked off as purpose. In this way, through the educator, the world for
the first time becomes the true subject of its effect. (Buber, 2002, p. 106)
We see here how Buber's account of teaching, like Levinas's, depends on an
encounter with what is outside the self. For Buber, the encounter draws out from the
learner 'his powers.' Elsewhere Buber writes that "'to educate" means to draw out of
the child that which is in him; not to bring the child anything from outside, but merely
to overcome the disturbing influences, to set aside the obstacles which hinder his free
development - to allow the child to "become himself" (Buber, 1948, p. 149),
demonstrating the traditional idea of education as 'drawing out', indicated in the
etymology of the term. This is in contrast with Levinas's view that teaching depends
on what could not have come from myself - the idea of infinity, the site of the opening
of language.
It is perhaps unfair to draw extended comparison between Levinas's description of
teaching and Buber's, since Buber is addressing very specific pedagogical questions
concerning the role of the educator. Yet, as discussed earlier, I think we must see
Levinas's description of the scene of teaching, although not an empirical description,
as nevertheless informed by his pedagogical experience as both teacher and student
for most of his career. After reading Levinas, what could it mean for me as a teacher
to view my students as 'bringing me more than I contain'? Might it lead to a radical
understanding of the possibility of equality in educational institutions and in our
attitudes towards knowledge? It would be interesting to consider further what might
9 For detailed examination of this, see Bernasconi's 'Failure of Communication as a Surplus: Dialogue
and Lack ofDialogue between Buber and Levinas' (Bernasconi, 1988).
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follow on from this for understanding the dynamics of teacher-student relations, and
the philosophical underpinnings of these modes ofrelation.!"
The 'Conversation ofMankind'
Another model of education that appears initially similar to the notion of teaching as
discourse is Michael Oakeshott's view of education as 'the conversation of mankind.'
What is implied in this when examined through our reading of Levinas? If I consider
my own education as part of 'the conversation of mankind', and reflect on the way in
which the Other has been addressed to me through various traditions and disciplines,
in texts, conversations, images, music, and gestures, I can appreciate that the not-I
addressed to me is vulnerable to my response. In a very real sense, traditions survive
in the receptivity of each successive generation, and are vulnerable to those to whom
they are passed on. But this is perhaps to extend the implication of the vulnerability
of the Other too far. The way in which each individual uniquely receives aspects of
different traditions and in turn offers them to others in ways that are again different
reveals this as simplistic. One way to interpret Levinas's view of teaching, as part of
the 'conversation ofmankind', would be to recognise the inherent risk that the learner
will react with hostility or indifference towards what is brought to them.I' Thus the
position of magisterial height is precisely a position of vulnerability, and the
'conversation of mankind' contains ethical possibilities inherent within every word
that is uttered.
This could be linked to Standish's view that we might view the content of the
curriculum as potentially a form ofrelation to the Other:
The curriculum - say, the triangle of teaching, learning, and content - is
one way in which the relation to the Other can be realised. By the same
token, but accenting the negative correlate of this, the curriculum is a site
in which the underlying relation to the Other - this obligation and
10 Some provocative implications of these dynamics, following Levinas, are explored by Clarence
Joldersma in 'The Importance of Enjoyment and Inspiration for Learning from a Teacher' (Joldersma,
2008) and Todd in 'A Fine Risk To Be Run? The Ambiguity of Eros and Teacher Responsibility'
(Todd, 2003b), but there is more that could be said on these questions, as opened up by these
considerations.
11 Example of such reactions are explored by Todd in relation to Melanie Klein's case studies (Todd,
2003a, pp. 32-3)
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responsibility - is commonly, causally, systematically denied (Standish,
2008, p. 61).
Standish suggests that it is important to recognise the dominance of totalising forms
of education that emphasise mastery of the subjects under study, and instead move
towards a kind of thinking that goes beyond the self towards the stranger. He
suggests that this practically challenges 'the assumption that there must be a tidy
matching of learning outcomes and learning outcomes, or. . . the exhaustive
specification of criteria' (p. 64). Rather 'teaching and learning should open ways
beyond what is directly planned' (ibid.), I would agree that it is possible to view
objects of study in this way: the Other is not straightforwardly the other person as is
sometimes suggested, and as Levinas himself sometimes seems to emphasise. It is
not possible to say who the Other is, because this would bring the Other into
categories of the same: all we can do then is to speak of ways in which the Other
addresses me. In light of Standish's suggestions, it would be worth exploring further
how it might be possible to view objects of study as a way in which we are addressed
by the Other, and considering how such a notion might trouble traditional concepts of
teacher / teaching / learner / learning.
Some Possible Objections
Before attempting to draw this chapter to a close, it is worth pausing to consider some
challenges that might be raised against this presentation of subjectivity.
The first challenge to consider is whether someone might take Levinas's message to
be something like Jesus's, calling us to live in a new way, repenting and turning from
our former selfish ways, in which case, someone might question why we should
follow him. This would be to misinterpret what Levinas is saying: he is not offering
an ethical option among others but rather describing the conditions of subjectivity as
ethical, conditions of which we are commonly in denial. Thus, as Perpich comments,
if I ask the question of why I should be concerned with the Other, the question has
already come too late: 'If I ask this question, it indicates that an other has already
passed my way, already opened to me a world in which critical reflection is possible.'
(Perpich, 2008, p. 140)
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Yet despite the seeming abstraction of some of his formulations, it is important to
emphasise that Levinas sees these ethical conditions of subjectivity as having bearing
on the way we think about specific ethical needs, stating in an interview with Francois
Poirie that one has to consider the meaning of these conditions 'in an even more
concrete manner' (RE, p. 68) and elsewhere he considers in very practical terms how
our thinking about the nature of human rights is transformed and deepened by
considering the priority of the Other, in 'The Rights of Man and the Rights of the
Other', for example (aS, p. 120 in particular). The following passage, from an
interview conducted in 1986, is a clear example of how the transcendental conditions
of subjectivity described in Totality and Infinity relate to concrete political
judgements:
I maintain that this ideal of saintliness is presupposed in all our value
judgements. There is no politics for accomplishing the moral, but there
are certainly some politics which are further from it or closer to it. For
example, I've mentioned Stalinism to you. I've told you that justice is
always a justice that desires a better justice. This is the way that I will
characterize the liberal state. The liberal state is a state which holds
justice as the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection.
'Concretely, the liberal state has always admitted - alongside the written
law - human rights as a parallel institution. It continues to preach that
within its justice there are always improvements to be made in human
rights. Human rights are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And
consequently, I believe that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is
more moral than the fascist state, and closer to the morally utopian state
(Levinas, 1988, pp. 177-78).
Here we see that for Levinas there is an essential link between the transcendental
condition of relation with the Other and the practical demands for justice and political
judgement. This is not presented as a formulaic ethical imperative, but as a
possibility yet to be realised in practice, and we will explore some of the possibilities
of this for education in subsequent chapters.
A further objection that might be raised is whether the notion of the Other as the
teacher is an apologia for authoritarianism. As Todd comments, the idea of the Other
as master and stranger seems at first sight 'downright indigestible' for education to
swallow (Todd, 2008, p. 172). However, the mastery of the Other does not come
from a concrete relationship of power, and is not an empirical description of the
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teaching relation, but rather the conditions of learning, which are the conditions of
subjectivity. Todd articulates this clearly:
it is not as if we can transpose Levinas's 'master' onto the classroom
'teacher.' For what he is at pains to depict are neither the empirical
conditions of teaching, nor even an ideal of 'good' teaching ... As I read
his writing on teaching, the master gives in a relation of height to the
learner a gift which challenges the subject to think outside of herself and
compels a response from her. Thus, what Levinas achieves is a depiction
of relationality which uses the figure of the teacher to reveal the
fundamental asymmetry at stake in our communicative relationships and
in our capacity for thought ... The master does not conform to the role of
the teacher in a school setting; it is, rather, that the master reveals to us the
dynamics in our encounters with strangeness. (Todd, 2008, p. 175)
The mastery of the Other stems not from a relation of institutional power, but in a
sense from his very vulnerability: that vulnerability gives his interpellation an urgency
that undoes my self-sufficiency and places his need before my own. This could be
illustrated in the way in which an infant might be seen to have 'mastery' over its
mother. The mother will put the infant's needs before her own, where mastery resides
in the power of this vulnerability's appeal. The Other is not a specific person, but
their mastery resides in the appeal of the face that, as in this illustration, assumes an
authority in vulnerability as potent as that of an infant.
Related to this notion of the mastery of the Other, someone might question whether
Levinas is prescribing self-effacement, an impression perhaps encouraged by the
vocabulary used to describe the subjection to the Other. However, the notion of
subjection does not mean that we must agree with or acquiesce in everything others
say or do to me. The ideas of fraternity and community, which we will explore in
Chapter 6, suggest that the condition of responsibility to the Other is worked out in
practice against the needs of many others. The interpellation of the Other is not a
private imperative: 'Everything that takes place here "between us" concerns everyone,
the face that looks at it places itself in the full light of the public order' (TI, p. 212).
Although my responsibility is infinite, what that responsibility means is always
worked out within the bonds of human kinship and fraternity, which leads to
responsibility for myself:
Society must be a fraternal community to be commensurate with the
straightforwardness, the primary proximity, in which the face presents
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itself to my welcome. Monotheism signifies this human kinship, this idea
of a human race that refers back to the approach of the Other in the face,
in a dimension of height, in responsibility for oneself and for the Other.
(TI, p. 214, emphasis mine)
Responsibility does involve self-sacrifice, but this is not the same as self-debasement.
Having paused to consider these objections, let us draw this chapter to a close.
The Possibility of Ethical Subjectivity
In contrast to the conceptualisations of the subject as a social construction, or as an
effect of various power relations, in thinkers such as Foucault, Pierre Bordieu and
Louis Althusser, what does it mean to think in terms of ethical subjectivity after
Levinas? In such constructions, there is, as in Levinas, the notion of interpellation as
fundamental to subjectivity, but here it is ideologies that interpellate, calling
individuals as subjects of systems that give identities, necessary to the functioning of
the social order. Levinas's conception of subjectivity does not imply the unified
notion of subjectivity that these thinkers were attacking, indeed Levinas specifically
states that isolated subjectivity is a myth. What is unique however in Levinas's
provocation is the attention he gives to the ethical conditions of the interpellation to
subjectivity as infinite responsibility. In coming to see my subjectivity as a
continuing responding to the Other's prior address, I, Levinas's reader, am challenged
to work out for myself what an ever-extending responsibility means in my situation as
teacher and student - and this not in some theoretical elaboration but in response to
the practical demands I experience. Perhaps this is similar to Bauman's description of
moral responsibility, which 'cannot be taken away, shared, ceded, pawned, or
deposited for safe-keeping'; as 'unconditional and infinite, ... it manifests itself in the
constant anguish of not manifesting itself enough.' (Bauman, 1993, p. 250) As my
subjectivity is found in this unconditional responsibility in the present, it is also
shown as not-yet: this extending responsibility towards the infinite and transcendent
Other deepens, yet this not in any developmental, linear sense. The possibility of
ethical subject is already revealed as a trace in the very conditions of language,
knowledge and relationality.
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There is, therefore, a sense in which all education is predicated on my already being
an ethical subject, already obligated, responsible to the Other. But there is another
sense in which this deepening understanding of subjectivity challenges how we tend
to conceive of education, but this not offered in terms of a straightforward moral
imperative, but rather as an interruption of the way we conceptualise education. In
Totality and Infinity, Levinas is offering me, his reader, a word of invitation to
recognise the structure of my subjectivity as responsibility. This is a prophetic
discourse that appeals to me to join it and judge it. Reading Levinas draws me to (but
could not force me to) question whether I can also testify to the possibility of
goodness. This prophetic form of discourse could be seen as a kind of (a)theology of
education. God is central to Levinas's thinking, but here God means what is
otherwise than being. This God is not some sacred power or numen (DF, p. 14), but
the transcendence of alterity and the infinity of my responsibility, eluding
intelligibility. This view of God is similar to Franz Rosenzweig's view of redemption
in The Star ofRedemption, in which the messianic happens now, the not-yet is in the
present moment through the proximity of the neighbour and the act of neighbourly
love. Kenneth Reinhard elaborates on what this messianic temporality means:
For Rosenzweig, love of the neighbor is not merely the first step on the
path to redemption, the good deed that might help make the world a better
place in some hypothetical future, but its realization now, the immanent
production of its transcendental conditions. The nearness of the neighbor
materializes the imminence of redemption, releasing the here and the now
from the fetters of teleology in the infinitesimal calculus of proximity.
(Reinhard,2005,p.21)
We will take up and explore the implications of this non-teleological understanding of
the messianic as an interruption of totalising ontology in Chapter 7. But given
suspicions that many have of the prominence of religion in Levinas's writing, it is
worth emphasising that these theological ideas do not imply the idea of the divine as a
being as in classical theism, or ground of Being as in existentialist theology, but
precisely the beyond being, which is the site of my (already ethico-political)
subjectivity, as we will explore in the following chapter. Such theological notions do
not therefore need to be read as belonging to a religious framework, but rupture
notions of education that prioritise communicative rationality as foundational,
revealing the interruption of the logos by ethics, prior to intelligibility. We will
consider further the particular challenges of Levinas' s notion of religion in the
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following chapter, before considering in more detail the implications of Levinas's
understanding of religion for education in Chapters 5 and 6.
In reading Levinas I come to understand that who I am is always already the result of
a teaching. Reading Totality and Infinity also testifies to how language can be both
totalising and yet reveal the infinite ethical relation. Indeed the title Totality and
Infinity draws attention to the way in which it is impossible to altogether avoid a
totalising orientation: the scene of teaching cannot be separated from a totalising
thematisation, even though that depends on the infinite space between I and Other.
But the text calls me to be vigilant and attend to the tendency of my language, my
thought, and my actions to be totalising, and move towards a more ethical orientation,
responding to the address of the Other with full hands. CaygiU explains these
possible two orientations wen:
The self embroiled within totality can orient itself towards a war against
the other in a bid to preserve its identity and resources, or towards a
welcoming of the other in a redistribution of its resources and a risking of
its identity. The outcomes of orientation are not mutually exclusive, but
are developments that contain each other and thus call for vigilance.
(Caygill, 2002, p. 102)
In order to think through further what being vigilant in this sense means within an
educational setting, we need to be careful that the overstraining language of
transcendence does not come to represent an obstacle to attending to the concrete
needs of the many others who confront us with the need for action within education.
In the following chapter, we will consider how Levinas's presentation of these
transcendent conditions on which alterity appears to depend have been criticised by
Badiou. But before examining Badiou's critique, and the possible meaning of this
ethical vigilance towards which Levinas leads us, let us first turn to consider how
Otherwise than Being, Levinas's second major work, deepens this understanding of
ethical subjectivity.
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Chapter 2
The Demand of Infinite Responsibility in
Otherwise than Being
If Totality and Infinity has allowed us to think through the meaning of education and
provided an understanding of ethical subjectivity as responsibility, Otherwise Than
Being allows us to extend this understanding. I do not propose to provide an analysis
here of the various ways in which Levinas, in Otherwise Than Being, answers
Derrida's questioning of Totality and Infinity in 'Violence and Metaphysics', given
that this has been covered at length by different interpreters of Levinas'. In brief, I
would tend to agree with Morgan's interpretation that Otherwise Than Being
represents philosophical growth from the positions outlined in Totality and Infinity, in
response to Derrida, rather than a radical rejection of the ideas of his earlier work
(Morgan, 2007, p. xvii). Thus Otherwise than Being represents a revision of the
central concepts of Totality and Infinity, using a reoriented vocabulary, examining
some new issues, and shifting the focus from the Other to the subject.
This chapter will examine how Levinas's treatment of subjectivity in Otherwise than
Being builds on Totality and Infinity. I will consider how the distinction between le
Dire and le Dit, the saying and the said, develops the theorisation of language in
Totality and Infinity and informs the central themes of Otherwise than Being. I will
also examine what Levinas describes as the central concept of the work: substitution,
showing how it is bound up with the ideas of anarchy and sensibility. In this way I
hope to show how this leads to an understanding of the ethical subject constituted in
1 See for example Davis, 1996, pp. 63-9; Hand, 2009, pp. 58-62
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an infinite, unfulfillable demand that exceeds what can be thought. Having outlined
these themes, I will then examine one of the most provocative recent critiques of
Levinas: that of Badiou. Through considering Badiou's rejection of Levinas's ethics,
and Badiou's own articulation of subjectivity, I will suggest that it is helpful to read
both accounts together, following Critchley, to bring us to a sense of ethical
subjectivity as infinite responsibility that avoids the overtly religious overtones of
Levinas's philosophy, which alienate some of his readers.' Both, I will argue, offer a
view of ethical subjectivity as only becoming possible in response to an infinite
demand that comes to the self from outside: for Levinas, the demand of my
neighbour; for Badiou, the demand of the event. Read together, they offer an
understanding of the subject constituted in passivity, but emerging in responsibility, a
notion of the subject that offers a way of thinking about education that exposes the
limitations of current educational discourses and, following Critchley, addresses 'the
motivational deficit at the heart ofliberal democratic life' (Critchley, 2007, p.7).
Let us start by returning to the question of language.
The Saying and the Said
In Chapter 1 of Otherwise than Being, Levinas indicates the structure and aims of the
text:
It aims to disengage the subjectivity of the subject from reflections on
truth, time and being in the amphibology of being and entities which is
borne by the said; it will then present the subject, in saying, as a
sensibility from the first animated by responsibilities. Then it will set out
to show proximity to be the sense of the sensibility, substitution as the
otherwise than being at the basis of proximity, and as a relationship
between a subject and infinity, in which infinity comes to pass (OB, p.
19).
Here we can see that the same concern is present in Otherwise than Being as in
Totality and Infinity, to trouble the grounds of knowledge and subjectivity as related
to 'truth, time and being', and to show instead that the subject is constituted 'as a
sensibility from the first animated by responsibilities.' Thus, as we have already seen
2 Although this should not necessarily be seen as a wholly secularised reinterpretation, following
Badiou.
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in Totality and Infinity, a subject emerges through the condition of responsibility to
the Other, only possible through the approach of the Other. However, the ideas of
'proximity as the sense of the sensibility' and 'substitution as the otherwise than
being at the basis of proximity' represent a significant development of the earlier
theme of responsibility in Totality and Infinity. How then do these ideas relate to the
earlier treatment of language?
As in Totality and Infinity, so also in Otherwise than Being, Levinas's exploration of
language is fundamental to his presentation of subjectivity. The terms 'saying' and
'said' extend the view of language presented in Totality and Infinity as interpellation
and thematisation. While in Totality and Infinity Levinas appears to oppose the
notion of language as communication, since it implies a reciprocity between self and
Other, and hides the authority of the Other who is beyond the plane of discourse (TI,
p. 101), in Otherwise than Being Levinas suggests that the saying is communication,
but this is primarily the exposure of oneself to another, which is prior to the more
usual understanding of communication in terms of the sharing of propositions and
messages:
Saying is communication, to be sure, but as a condition for all
communication, as exposure. Communication is not reducible to the
phenomenon of truth and the manifestation of truth conceived as a
combination of psychological elements.. . The unblocking of
communication, irreducible to the circulation of information which
presupposes it, is accomplished in saying. It is not due to the contents that
are inscribed in the said and transmitted to the interpretation and decoding
done by the other. It is in the risky uncovering of oneself, in sincerity, the
breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all shelter, exposure to
traumas, vulnerability. (OB, p. 48)
Here, Levinas allows that language should be seen as communication, but not
conceived of primarily as a mode of cognition. Communication shares a common
Latin root with 'community', but Levinas's understanding of both communication and
community are not founded on commonality, but on the 'risky uncovering of oneself.'
Language depends on the self's exposure to the Other, risking the uncertainty of the
Other's response: 'Communication is an adventure of subjectivity... it will involve
uncertainty. .. Communication with the other can be transcendent only as a dangerous
life, a fine risk to be run' (p. 120).
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But what does Levinas mean by suggesting that this saying is an exposure? Morgan
provides a clear indication ofLevinas's line of thought:
Language involves concepts and universality; universality requires
singularity; singularity for human beings only occurs as the proximity of
one person to another, the face-to-face. Language and meaning are
developments from the foundation of a unique I encountering a unique
other... This is what he calls the "saying', which is the ground of all
speech, discourse, communication, thought, and conceptualization.
(Morgan,2007,p.131)
The givenness of the sign to one exposed and receptive is necessary for the event of
meaning, as made clear in the 1967 essay "Languageand Proximity': "A sign is given
from one to the other before the constitution of any system of signs, any common
place formed by cultures and sites, a sign given from null site to null site' (CP, p.
122). But this is not however to be understood as any kind of speech act or
conversational situation, but rather, as Morgan suggests, as "the encounter of two
utterly unique persons, indeed between every two utterly unique persons. It involves
one making a claim of assistance and support on the other and therefore one being
totally, unqualifiedly responsible for the other' (Morgan, 2007, p. 131). The
signification in this saying is beyond and radically different from thematisation, and
yet its very ground, signifying as the exposure of one to another:
The one is exposed to the other as a skin is exposed to what wounds it, as
a cheek is offered to the smiter. On the hither side of the ambiguity of
being and entities, prior to the said, saying uncovers the one that speaks,
not as an object disclosed by theory, but in the sense that one discloses
oneself by neglecting one's defences, leaving a shelter, exposing oneself
to outrage, to insults and wounding. But saying is a denuding of
denuding, a giving of a sign its very signifyingness. (OB, p. 49)
It is the said that is the thematisation that takes place in language, "the contents
conveyed in language - logos, information and knowledge' (Pinchevski, 2005, p. 10).
While the Other in Totality and Infinity is beyond thematisation, the saying is in a
sense thematised through the said:
In correlation with the said... the saying itself is indeed thematized,
exposes in essence even what is on the hither side ofontology, and flows
into the temporalization of essence. And this thematization of saying does
indeed bring out in it the characteristics of consciousness: in the
correlation of saying and said the said is understood as a noema of an
intentional act, language contracts into thought, into thought which
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conditions speaking, thought that in the said shows itself to be an act
supported by the subject, an entity as it were put in the 'nominative,' in a
proposition. (OB, p. 46)
By suggesting that the correlation of saying and said shows the said 'as a noema of an
intentional act', there is the implication that the relation between subject and object
brought about through the said is the subject-object relation of intentionality of the
Husserlian conscious subject. Yet the saying interrupts this subject-object relation, by
remaining 'on the hither side of ontology,' even while being thematised. The saying
points beyond the said to the radical passivity of the subject as one only brought to
being-by-the-other as for-the-other and this is the condition of signification: 'The-
one-for-the other is the very signifyingness of signification!' (p. 100). The saying,
then, is a way of accounting for signification, which can only take place in exposure
to another in passivity.
This notion of signification as saying does not come from my freedom, but arises in
the approach ofmy neighbour, for whom I am called to responsibility. This approach
is described in visceral terms as traumatic, founded in the subject's vulnerability:
Saying, the most passive passivity, is inseparable from patience and
pain... , finding again in a wound the caress in which pain arises, and then
the contact, and beyond it the knowing of a hardness or a softness, a heat
or a cold, and then the thematization... Signification, as the one-for-the-
other in passivity, where the other is not assumed by the one, presupposes
the possibility of pure non-sense invading and threatening signification.
(p.50)
The saying does not signify action on my part, but rather indicates my receptivity to
the demands of the Other, my openness to their 'being'. This is inextricably bound up
with my vulnerability and my capacity for pain and patience since, in my exposure to
the Other in the saying, I am open to their capacity to be wounded, traumatised by the
possibility of their pain, and this affects me and my response.
Despite Levinas's suggestion that the saying is thematised in correlation with the said,
the saying that signifies interrupts the said and remains beyond the content exposed in
the said. The language of Otherwise than Being itself, its disturbance of its own said
through a textual performance which often endangers meaning, can be seen as an
attempt to exemplify this idea of a saying which itself slips through and yet disturbs
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comprehension. Levinas is aiming to draw attention to the tension always present
within language in the very way he writes, thematising the saying whilst showing its
trace that must always remain beyond the said. This is why Otherwise than Being is
in many ways such a demanding text. As Davis suggests, 'In order to say the other-
than-Being, language must be torn away from such ontological assumptions. To
achieve this is no easy matter, since philosophical prose is both the site and the object
of the struggle' (Davis, 1996, p. 75). Thus, although the saying is thematised in the
text of Otherwise than Being, it is nevertheless not obliterated by the said, but leaves
its trace, to which Levinas aims to draw his reader's attention. The trace of the saying
is present in all language, as Levinas points out: 'the plot of saying that is absorbed in
the said is not exhausted in this manifestation. It imprints its trace on the
thematization itself' (p. 46). Thematisation therefore always involves the duality of
saying and said, the responsibility in passivity of the saying and the activity of
consciousness in the said. The passivity of the saying does not refer to any
Heideggerian notion of language speaking:
It is not the discovery that 'it speaks' or that 'language speaks' that does
justice to this passivity. One must show in saying, qua approach, the very
de-posing or desituating of the subject, which nonetheless remains an
irreplaceable uniqueness, and is thus the subjectivity of the subject. (pp.
47-8)
In the passivity of saying, the subject is desituated and elected as uniquely
responsible, and it is towards the approach of my neighbour rather than towards the
materiality of language that I am passive.
Edith Wyschogrod points out that this saying 'must fmd its way into the language ...
of the said, in order to make thought and justice in the social order possible'
(Wyschogrod, 2002, p. 201). I will examine this idea in relation to the third party and
proximity in Chapter 6, but it is worth emphasising here that as in Totality and Infinity
totality and infmity are necessary for the operation of society, so in Otherwise than
Being, both the said and the saying are of fundamental importance for the existence of
society, justice, and philosophy itself. The said and saying belong together in an
intricate tension, with the saying anchoring language in the exposure of the self to the
Other, in a relation of responsibility. As Derrida writes, 'This lace of obligation holds
language. It maintains it, preventing it from falling apart in passing through the
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eyelets of a texture' (Derrida, 1991, p. 30). The said, while retaining the trace of
saying, is what expresses the meaning of being:
But in the said, the essence that resounds is on the verge of becoming a
noun. In the copula is scintillates or sparkles an ambiguousness between
the essence and the nominalized relation. The said as a verb is essence or
temporalization. Or, more exactly, the logos enters into the amphibology
in which being and entities can be understood and identified, in which a
noun can resound as a verb and a verb of an apophansis can be
nominalized. (OB, pp. 41-2)
The said brings beings to light from their opacity, founds phenomenality, designates
and allows beings to be nominated to their existence (p. 42). Yet the said does not
have priority over the saying. Levinas is aiming at what he terms a 'reduction' from
the said to saying (pp. 43-4). This reduction exposes the saying as leading back to the
pre-original subject, not meant in a developmental state of a condition prior to
language, but rather an examination of the conditions necessary for subjectivity prior
to consciousness and the Ego.
Having explored how Levinas sets up this distinction between saying and said, it is
worth noting that Caygill suggests that this 'formulaic distinction between the modal
"saying" and the qualitative "said" can be said to compromise the radical
philosophical and political implications of that work' (Caygill, 2002, p. 63). It is
possible to see that this might lead to a conservative approach to ethics and politics:
one carries on as before, merely more attentive to the fact that what is said is bound
up with the saying, but because of the necessity of the said, there is no need
necessarily for radical change. Furthermore, the emphasis on the need for the
ontological, shown by the necessity of the said, as well as the structural alliances that
take place with the emergence of the third party, arguably 'sanctions the violent
qualification of ethics' (p. 132). We will consider the way in which ultimately the
presentation of the relation to the neighbour and the third can lead to 'the violent
qualification of ethics' that we must be vigilant against in Chapter 6. But here I have
felt it necessary to provide this examination of the saying and the said, in order to
consider how Levinas himself extends the view of discourse as teaching in Totality
and Infinity, through the deepening of the sense of exposure and radical passivity in
the saying. However, I would agree with Caygill that it is not the distinction between
the saying and the said that is the most compelling vision of Otherwise than Being.
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What is distinctive in Levinas's reduction from the said to the saying, as the
disentangling of the knot of subjectivity, is described by Levinas in terms of passivity,
sensibility, exposure and vulnerability, and this leads on to the more demanding
elements of subjectivity to which Levinas draws our attention.
Subjectivity as Sensibility, Delivered up to the Other
The notion that subjectivity is passivity rooted in sensibility is one of the most
provocative insights of Otherwise than Being, particularly in Levinas's elaboration of
this idea in terms of substitution. But what does sensibility mean here? Sensibility
cannot be seen as an experience of another person, but is found in the receptivity of
one to another. Sensibility makes possible any experience one has of another, and is
described by Levinas as: 'exposure to the other, it is signification, is signification
itself, the-one-for-the-other to the point of substitution, but a substitution in
separation, that is, responsibility.' (OB, p. 54) All my relations with others, founded
on my sensibility, depend on my being exposed to their wounding, to my being
addressed in the accusative with a demand that only I can answer. I am unique, not
merely one instance of moral responsibility conceived in universalist terms. This idea
is clearly seen in a lecture Levinas gave entitled 'Ethical Subjectivity':
Assigned, placed in the accusative, the 'me' [moi] is not a particular case
of the universal... I am unique, and my uniqueness consists in the
impossibility ofmy slipping away ... in substituting itself on the in-side of
its own identity; in this way alone does it show its uniqueness. (GDT, p.
162)
This idea of signification taking place through the accusation of 'me' as one unique is
central for understanding what Levinas means by ethical subjectivity.
The chapter entitled 'Substitution' is described by Levinas as central to Otherwise
than Being. Here he elaborates this notion of sensibility as the-one-for-the-other and
the condition of being hostage. The task that Levinas sets himself in this chapter is,
as Bernasconi points out, to provide a theory of subjectivity counter to those theories
in the Western philosophical tradition in which relations to beings take place
primarily through knowledge (Bernasconi, 2002, pp. 237-38). He also aims to
examine what makes ethics, being-for-the-other, possible. Bernasconi points out that
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in examining the possibility of self sacrifice in 'Substitution', Levinas appears to
target three rival accounts of the possibility of ethics: the egoism of Hobbes,
Heidegger, and the possibility that sacrifice is rooted in human freedom. Against
Hobbes (although not mentioned by name), Levinas suggests that sacrifice would not
be possible unless the self were already subjected to the appeal ofthe other:
All the transfers of feeling, with which the theorists of original war and
egoism explain the birth of generosity... , would not succeed in being
fixed in the ego if it were not with its whole being, or rather with its whole
disinterestedness, subjected not, like matter, to a category, but to the
unlimited accusative of persecution. (DB, p. 118)
Bernasconi suggests that Heidegger is, 'as almost always in Levinas', a target, since
sacrifice cannot be possible if the human is fundamentally concerned for his own
existence. But it is not only Heidegger whom Levinas criticises in this respect in
'Substitution', but all notions of the self grounded in ontology, including Hegel and
Sartre:
The reduction of subjectivity to consciousness dominates philosophical
thought, which since Hegel has been trying to overcome the duality of
being and thought, by identifying, under different figures, substance and
subject ... Philosophy which states essence as an ontology, concludes this
essence, this lucidity of lucidity, by this logos. Consciousness fulfils the
being of entities. For Sartre as for Hegel, the oneself is posited on the
basis of the for-itself. The identity of the I would thus be reducible to the
turning back of essence upon itself. (DB, p. 103)
Levinas goes on to suggest that notions of subjectivity grounded in ontology or the
idea of consciousness do not make sense without a prior relation to the Other. In this
relation, I am an exile, offered to the Other, extradited, and it is only through this
condition that I could return to myself. This idea of return to the self is to be
distinguished from what Levinas characterises as a Hegelian notion of self-
consciousness: 'The uncancellable recurrence of the oneself in the subject is prior to
any distinction between moments which could present themselves to a synthesizing
activity of identification and assemblage to recall or expectation' (p. 104). The return
to the self already exiled, in contrast to this, is described as 'a sound that would
resound in its own echo, the node of a wave which is not again consciousness' (p.
103). I am sent back to myself, but cannot stay there, always moving outwards again
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in responsibility, but in that movement 'I am one and irreplaceable, one inasmuch as
irreplaceable in responsibility.' (ibid.)
The third philosophical target of substitution is the idea that ethics could be grounded
in freedom:
In opposition to the vision of thinkers such as Eugen Fink or Jeanne
Delhomme, who require, among the conditions of the world, a freedom
without responsibility, a freedom of play, we discern in obsession a
responsibility that rests on no free commitment, a responsibility whose
entry into being could be effected only without any choice. (p. 116)
For Levinas, freedom and choice are only possible through the condition of
responsibility, prior to any empirical self, without origin, an-archic. The term anarchy
is contrasted by Levinas with the idea of 'self-possession, sovereignty, apxrt' (p. 99).
The anarchic responsibility to the other, irreducible to any theme, to the order ofapxy/,
is not however a disorder, but rather 'troubles being over and beyond these
alternatives' (p. 101). Anarchy is the undoing of the logos through which
consciousness can take control, become self-possessed, and is the persecution, the
accusation, through which the self as responsible can emerge. The empirical self,
existing with others, would not be possible without this anarchic state of being turned
towards the Other in proximity. This is not to be understood according to the usual
meaning of political anarchy, but nevertheless, can be seen to have political
significance, as we win explore in Chapter 7.
Levinas describes subjectivity as persecution by the neighbour, accusation, a gnawing
that I did not bring about or choose, but through which I am already responsible, to
the point of substituting myself for her. This is radical passivity: 'I have not done
anything and 1 have always been under accusation - persecuted. The word I means
here I am, 3 answering for everything and for everyone.' (p. 114) Subjectivity is not
therefore rooted in any altruistic will or my choosing to take responsibility: my
subjectivity is entirely founded on my relationship to the Other. This is an obsession
3 In Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life, Hilary Putnam explains the significance of the biblical
resonances of this phrase clearly and explains how it is linked to the Hebrew hineni: 'hine performs the
speech-act of calling attention to, or presenting, not describing ... "hineni!" performs the speech act of
presenting myself, the speech act of making myselfavailable to another' (Putnam, 2008, p. 74). In the
very fact that I respond to the address of another, without which I could not have language, I have
already called attention to the fact that I am present.
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because it entirely dominates who I am." I cannot escape this overwhelming
domination and thus am persecuted - there is nowhere to which I can flee to escape
the responsibility for which the Other engenders me. Levinas describes this state as
being hostage, indicating the extent of my responsibility, being entirely-for-the-other,
constrained and targeted. To be a hostage in this way means to be responsible even
for the other's responsibility for others and for me:
To be oneself, otherwise than being, to be dis-interested, or to bear the
wretchedness and bankruptcy of the other, and even the responsibility that
the other can have for me. To be oneself, the state of being a hostage, is
always to have one degree of responsibility more, the responsibility of the
other. (p. 117)
In this subjection, I am without identity: consciousness and identity belong to the
order of the said and follow from this an-archie state of already being a hostage,
whereas the passivity ofmy subjectivity both precedes and exceeds my identity.
But what exactly is substitution here? Bernasconi points out the problems with trying
to analyse the concepts presented in 'Substitution':
The complexity of his strategies, in so far as they can even be identified,
are such that one is in no danger of reducing the essay to a theme. It is not
only subjectivity as such that cannot be pinned down or identified, but
also Levinas himself... There are times when one wonders if the question
to which 'Substitution' is the answer is not 'what is the most obscure
philosophical concept of the twentieth century?' The difficulty is that
Levinas nowhere clearly sets out the rules under which his exposition is to
be judged. The status of his discourse is unclear. (Bernasconi, 2002, p.
238)
Yet, as Bernasconi also suggests, certain indications do emerge in 'substitution' that
help demonstrate Levinas's concerns. There is a sense that this substitution, to the
extent of taking on responsibility for the other's responsibility, seems to imply the
infinitude of responsibility. The language that Levinas uses to describe 'substitution'
echoes the theological concept of kenosis, used to convey the idea of the Godhead
divesting itself of divinity in order to become en-fleshed, for the sake of others, 'the
self emptying itself of itself as the recurrence that 'would be the ultimate secret of the
4 Levinas's use of the term 'obsession' is distanced from its psychoanalytic meaning, and is used to
invoke the troubling nature of the relation with the other which reveals the passivity of the self, always
already put in question.
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incarnation of the subject' (DB, p. 110-11). Yet substitution is not the same as
kenosis, since here the self-emptying takes place not out of any divine will in an act of
love, but out of 'bottomless passivity'.
In substitution, my being is in question to an infinite degree. I am totally exposed to
the wounding of the Other and take on their responsibility for the others, in an
asymmetrical relation - 'the uniqueness of the self is the very fact of bearing the fault
of another' (p. 112) - even to the point ofbeing responsible for the other's persecution
of me. Davis notes that 'the claim that this also requires that I expiate the crimes of
my own persecutor takes the argument into murky waters' (Davis, 1996, p. 81). And
this indeed seems to be what Levinas's notion of infinite responsibility for the others
suggests, but he resists universalising this notion of infinite responsibility: one cannot
demand that others sacrifice themselves - 'No one can substitute himself for me, who
substitute myself for all.' (DB, p. 126)
Through substitution then, the subject's responsibility is infinite, and this infinitude is
inspiring. Caygill puts this point well:
It is in this way [through substitution] that the subject assumes an infinite
responsibility that is beyond its capacity, an assumption that is inspiring
and elevating, since it involves the ethical assumption of the infinite by
the finite. The contraction of the infinite is experienced as an expansion
by the subject, for whom the act of substitution can never fully be
discharged. (Caygill, 2002, p. 139)
Thus the infinitude of responsibility in the subject's state of substitution is inspiring
and at the same time a difficult, unsettling demand. Julian Edgoose considers how we
might see this idea as potentially elevating in an educational context:
In Levinas's terms, the teacher 'substitutes' for the student - substitution
grows out of the very nature of interaction; it is a by-product of human
interconnectivity and not a question of pre-existent moral laws... Perhaps
the clearest illustration of substitution comes from the following
questions: Imagine you hear that an ex-student has become a Nobel
laureate. Would you feel ... responsible? Perhaps that's too conceited.
However, would you feel implicated? Would you glow after hearing the
news, and walk with a certain spring in your step? Or what if you heard
that an ex-student had become a mass murderer? Now would you feel
responsible or implicated? If Levinas is right, the answer to both
questions should be yes. (Edgoose, 2008, p. 109)
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In a sense, I disagree that substitution can be seen as a 'by-product of human
connectivity', since substitution is used to illustrate the intensity of the demand of
morality, the fact that it can never be discharged, and that the demand is already there.
But I do think his questions illustrate in some way Levinas' s idea that substitution
shows how the mature moral subject is aware that her responsibility extends to feeling
responsible for her neighbour's actions.
Bernasconi points out that Levinas' s notion of responsibility in no way resembles the
legal form of responsibility that is the focus of much Western ethics. Accepting that I
am responsible for the suffering of the other, and the suffering that the other causes,
challenges me to act in response: this would not be a willing act rooted in spontaneity,
but rooted rather in the prior approach of my neighbour, in which I am dispossessed
in passivity and ' lose my sense of mine in the face of the other' (Bernasconi, 2002, p.
240). This passivity relates back to the theme of obsession, of being overwhelmed by
the vulnerability and suffering of the other, in persecution and accusation. As one
who bears the suffering of others, my freedom is always put into question by the
demands that others place on it. In discussing the notion of infinite responsibility in
Dostoevsky's thinking, Rowan Williams clarifies how this idea of accusing
responsibility is perhaps not as alarming as it can sound:
it's not a practical programme. I don't think it's meant to be. In the long
run Dostoevsky's world is one in which what's bad and destructive for Sri
Lanka or Burundi or Guatemala is bad for humanity. Because there is this
call ... there are no bounds to that.'
In Levinas' s world, as in Dostoevsky' s, there are no bounds to the responsibility I
have for the other who accuses me and for whom I substitute myself.
Luce Irigaray questions this idea of substituting oneself for the Other:
this nondefmition of the other, when the other is not considered to have
anything to do with sexual difference, gives rise to an infinite series of
substitutions, an operation which seems to me nonethical. No one can be
radically substituted for the other, without depriving the other of identity.
(Irigaray, 1991, p. 112)
5 From http ://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008 /oet/08/religion.anglicani sm. accessed 26.08.09
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This appears perhaps to be a knowing mis-reading of Levinas, since the Other cannot
be defined as this would bring them into the order of thematisation. Irigaray is surely
aware of this, but part of her project is to draw attention to the other of sexual
difference as the other. Her question however ofwhether substitution is non-ethical is
worth pondering. Can one substitute oneself for another as Levinas suggests, without
depriving them oftheir identity? If I take another's place, do I take their identity?
This raises the question of whether Levinas's concept of substitution is descriptive of
some kind of ethical experience. In a sense, Levinas's descriptions of persecution by
the neighbour and taking responsibility for him do seem rooted in the experience of
feeling responsible that Alyosha describes in The Brothers Karamazov, as Levinas is
so fond of quoting. Yet Levinas emphasises throughout 'Substitution' that this state
of being hostage occurs prior to consciousness and identity, since the definition that
occurs in identity is already part of the said, thematisation. Thus in substitution, I am
not depriving the Other of identity, substituting my identity for his; the substitution
Levinas describes is in a sense illustrative of the way in which subjectivity depends
on the deposition and undoing of autonomous self-sufficiency, the unfulfillable
demand of responsibility which means that I am always late. These very conditions
of subjectivity mean that taking responsibility for others in the empirical realm is
possible: 'It is through the condition of being hostage that there can be in the world
pity, compassion, pardon and proximity - even the little there is, even the simple
"After you, sir." The unconditionality of being hostage is not the limit case of
solidarity, but the condition for all solidarity' (OB, p. 117). Whether specific
empirical acts of responsibility are 'nonethical,' as Irigaray suggests is, another
question.
In substitution, I am an exile - 'To transcend oneself, to leave one's home to the point
of leaving oneself, is to substitute oneself for another' (OB, p. 182). Bernasconi
points out how this notion of substituting oneself to the point of leaving oneself in
substitution runs counter to the rhetoric of absolute alterity in Totality and Infinity,
most pointedly when Levinas adopts Rimbaud's phrase in 'Substitution', 'I am an
other' (Bernasconi, 2002, p. 243). This shift in language between Totality and Infinity
and Otherwise than Being, however, is a difference of register, not a major fracture
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between the two works. While in Totality and Infinity, the focus is on the alterity of
the Other, in Otherwise than Being, the focus on substitution plays up the infinitude
of responsibility and the traumatic nature of the approach of the neighbour, in which
the I itself becomes an Other. The idea here that I am an other does not imply any
reversibility of relation between I and Other, and Levinas emphasises that he does not
mean it in the sense that Rimbaud implies:
I am outside of any place, in myself, on the hither side of the autonomy of
auto-affection and identity resting on itself. Impassively undergoing the
weight of the other, thereby called to uniqueness, subjectivity no longer
belongs to the order where the alternative of activity and passivity retains
its meaning. (DB, p. 118)
I am 'in myself, but to be in my own skin in this way means to be 'under the weight
of the other', exposed, rather than an ego free in-itself and for-itself. The subject is in
exile, de-posed from its place, withdrawn from manifestation, strange to itself as
always 'on the hither side of ...auto-affection' . Thomas Carl Wall describes how as
always for-the-other, surrendering itself to the other, subjectivity 'is nothing but a
primordial delay behind the Other. This is absolute passivity... The subject would be
forever devoted to an obligation that would forever exceed it' (Wan, 1999, p. 40).
The subject then is always strange, exiled from its own place, through the
responsibility to which it is bound by the Other but which always exceeds it. I am
caned to be a subject that I cannot be, since the demand of responsibility is infinite
and I cannot know its source. This demand is traumatic and impossible, but also
opens the possibility of peaceful response:
This trauma which cannot be assumed, inflicted by the Infinite on
presence, or this affecting of presence by the Infinite - this affectivity -
takes shape as a subjection to the neighbor. It is thought thinking more
than it thinks, desire, the reference to the neighbor, the responsibility for
another. (CP, p. 166)
To be a subject is to be traumatised, to be affected, by the demand of my neighbour.
The visceral nature of the exposure to my neighbour is replayed throughout Levinas's
writings. The demand of the Other is traumatic, and this trauma is not an abstraction.'
6 Todd provocatively highlights how in relation to education, if we follow Levinas, there is always a
sense of violence, of trauma, in the pedagogical demand. The question that educators must therefore
attend to, she suggests, is the ethical significance of their role, and the conditions of non-violence
bound up with the implicit violence of their work (Todd, 2003a, p. 40).
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Levinas describes this trauma in terms of the impossibility of indifference 'before the
misfortunes and faults of a neighbor, the unexceptionable responsibility for him'
(ibid.).
Caygill's discussion of Levinas's treatment of the theme of hunger provides a helpful
illustration of this impossibility of evading the traumatic responsibility through which
I am individuated. Caygill highlights how for Levinas, the hunger of the other 'puts
the question of nourishment to God' (Caygill, 2002, p. 155): God is one name
Levinas gives to the transcendence, the height, of the demand that is addressed to me
and elicits my response. He cites an illuminating passage from a lecture given by
Levinas on this theme of hunger:
We cannot wonder enough over the transference, which goes from the
memory of my own hunger to suffering and compassion for the hunger of
the other man. This is a transference in which an untransferable
responsibility is expressed, and with it the impossible evasion that
individuates even him who, sated, does not understand the hungry one and
does not cease escaping his own responsibility without also escaping
himself. Individuation is this impossibility of hiding even as we slip
away. (GDT, p. 171, cited in Caygill, 2002, p. 155)
This traumatic responsibility is limitless, exemplified in the transference between my
own experience of hunger and my responsibility for the hunger of my neighbour. I
can never discharge all the demands made of me, and so I am always dislodged,
always late to answer to the call addressed to me.
This responsibility of subjectivity is then always there, yet I can forget it - I do not
and could not act in a way that takes responsibility for all the misfortunes of my
neighbour - and the forgetting of this an-archic relation of substitution leads to
egoism: 'The unlimited initial responsibility, which justifies this concern for justice,
for oneself, and for philosophy can be forgotten. In this forgetting consciousness is
pure egoism. But egoism is neither first nor last.' (OB, p. 128) Consciousness as
linked to apX17 rather than an-archy implies forgetting the prior condition of
responsibility. The conditions of living in a society with many others will necessitate
egoism in this sense. Yet egoism is neither 'first nor last', and the challenge of
Levinas is to live in a way that maintains the tension between egoism and the
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condition of responsibility, through drawing our attention to that very condition of
responsibility which makes it possible for me to say '1'.
Levinas describes the impossibility of escaping the responsibility for my neighbour as
the impossibility of escaping God, lying 'in the depths of myself (ibid.). In an
interview, responding to a question about whether his 'ethics' are utopian, Levinas
explains this point further, suggesting that the fact that we can be moral and hold
values at all implies the infinity of responsibility he has described, but that being
human we often fail to recognise and respond to our responsibility:
It is not difficult to recognize the face. There is the commandment, the
form in which its excellence appears. It is commanded excellence
because it is not an excellence given simply, in an intuition. It is the being
that we are, being itself, which prevents people from recognizing our
ethical duties.... That is the great separation that there is between the way
the world functions correctly and the ideal of saintliness of which 1 am
speaking. And I maintain that this ideal of saintliness is presupposed in
all our value judgments... [I]t is the recognition of something which
cannot be realized but which, ultimately, guides all moral action.
(Levinas, 1988, p. 177-8)
Levinas's use of the term 'excellence' carries with it its etymological sense of
'surpassing', from the Latin excellere, of the face revealing the surpassing nature of
goodness and the infinite commandment of responsibility for the other. When Levinas
then speaks of the difference between the way the world functions 'correctly' and 'the
ideal of saintliness', this seems almost a mirroring on an external stage of the division
of the subject between the itself it is, and the infinite demand which constitutes it and
yet it cannot ever fully meet? This state of being infinitely responsible is the
condition of subjectivity, but is never fully realised in our actions. Yet without this
orientation towards the neighbour, ethics, and indeed language, justice and society,
would not be possible. Levinas does acknowledge that in a sense we are all 'equal',
but justice and the ethical relation depends on my altruism (not an altruistic will or
action that is rooted in my spontaneity), my putting my neighbour's needs before my
own. 1 can only assume my responsibility myself: I cannot project myself into my
7 Critchley and Fryer both provide provocative suggestions of how this idea of the dividualism of the
subject, between the way it is constituted through the ethical demand and the infinitude of the demand
it is called to take up, can be explored further through Lacanian readings of subjectivity (Critchley,
2007, pp. 63-9; Fryer, 2004, pp. 31-64).
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neighbour's being to say that he is just as responsible for me. Levinas explains this
fundamental asymmetry:
But, in the ethical act, in my relationship to the other, if one forgets that I
am guiltier than the others, justice itself will not be able to last. But the
idea of dissymmetry is another way of saying that in the perseverance in
being we are all equal, but the idea that the death of the other is more
important than my own is an affirmation that we are not being looked at
from outside, but the essential difference between me and the other
remains in my look. (Levinas, 1988, p. 179)
My obligation to my neighbour remains mine and mine alone. I cannot escape from
my unique election: thence I am a subject.
This asymmetric responsibility, emphasised through the difficult vocabulary of
persecution and accusation, extends our understanding of the scene of teaching as the
opening of discourse considered in the previous chapter. Llewelyn comments on how
the idea of subjection to the Other is always understood by Levinas as the state of
being educated and requires 'a leading out, education, of the self from the ego, the
turning of the named subject's will to mastery over itself and others into the other's
educative mastery over the subject: the subjection of subjectivity to teaching, its de-
struction by instruction' (Llewelyn, 1995, p. 183). The language of Otherwise than
Being shows how Levinas's description of subjectivity, hostage to the Other who
'brings me more than I contain', destabilises understandings of education that
prioritise the development of self-sufficient autonomy as an aim. We will see in the
following chapter how Levinas's writing does admit of a notion of autonomy, but a
conception ofautonomy always bound up with heteronomous responsibility.
Having examined this notion of subjectivity predicated on substitution and sensibility,
it is worth noting that this view has attracted much criticism. Let us therefore now
turn to one of the most significant recent critiques of Levinas: that of Badiou. After
exploring Badiou's critique, I will outline Badiou's own articulation of subjectivity in
order to suggest that reading Levinas together with Badiou offers a way of thinking
about subjectivity as emerging in response to an infinite demand that allows us to
think beyond the limitations of current educational discourses.
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An 'Ethics ofDifference' or 'an Ethics of Truths"?
In truth, Levinas has no philosophy - not even philosophy as the 'servant'
of theology. Rather, this is philosophy (in the Greek sense of the word)
annulled by theology, itself no longer a theology (the terminology is still
too Greek, and presumes proximity to the divine via the identity and
predicates of God), but, precisely, an ethics. (Badiou, E, p. 23)
After the complexity of Levinas's language, his attempt to disturb the said and reveal
the trace of the saying through the textual performance of Otherwise than Being, the
straightforwardness of Badiou's critique comes as something of a shock. In Ethics,
Badiou is concerned to expose how prevailing ethical ideologies, of which Levinas
and Derrida's projects are one pole, lack the potential for radical innovation and
cannot challenge the status quo of capitalism. In Badiou's account, Levinas's ethics
depends on 'everything... [being] grounded in the immediacy of an opening to the
Other which disarms the reflexive subject' (p. 19). Those claiming to speak in the
name of this configuration of ethics, Badiou argues, have seen this as amounting to
'recognition of the other', 'the ethics of differences' ... 'good old-fashioned tolerance,
which consists of not being offended by the fact that others think and act differently
from you' (p. 20). Within educational theory, we can certainly see this appropriation
of Levinas that Badiou speaks of by those who have used him when looking at
multiculturalism in relation to ethics, to the extent that, as Zelia Gregoriou comments,
'Levinas's language of the Other has become almost a common topos in the
educational discourse on ethics, multiculturalism and reconciliation' (Gregoriou,
2008, p. 213).8 But, as Badiou points out, this appropriation within multiculturalist
ethics and politics is not how Levinas himself conceived the relation to the Other.
Indeed, I would argue this can come to represent a perversion of Levinas's thinking,
as I will explore in relation to Wright's argument that a Levinasian approach leads us
towards a celebration of difference in Chapter 5.
Badiou's primary criticism ofLevinas's own description of ethics runs as follows:
the ethical primacy of the Other over the Same requires that the
experience of alterity be ontologically 'guaranteed' as the experience of a
distance, or of an essential non-identity, the traversal of which is the
ethical experience itself. But nothing in the simple phenomenon of the
8 For example Gregoriou, 1995, Diprose, 2001, Wright, 2004
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other contains such a guarantee. And this simply because the finitude of
the other's appearing certainly can be conceived as resemblance, or as
imitation, and thus lead back to the logic of the Same. The other always
resembles me too much for the hypothesis of an originary exposure to his
alterity to be necessarily true. (E, pp. 21-2)
Badiou here argues that the phenomenon of the other does not reveal them as Other,
but rather reveals their resemblance to me. There would need to be an ontological
guarantee of the distance between self and Other, but this is not provided by Levinas's
phenomenological method and rejection of ontology. Badiou goes on to argue that
for alterity to be possible in Levinas' s conception, the Other must in some sense be
'carried by a principle ofalterity which transcends mere finite experience', and which
Badiou suggests is, for Levinas, 'quite obviously the ethical name for God' (p.22).
This is why, for Badiou, Levinas's ethics cannot be separated from religion: the only
way the Other could assume priority over the same is if it is bound up with a religious
axiom. Badiou dismisses efforts to try and remove religion from Levinas's ethics:
What then becomes of this category if we claim to suppress, or mask, its
religious character, all the while preserving the abstract arrangement of its
apparent constitution ('recognition of the other', etc.)? The answer is
obvious: a dog's dinner [de la bouillie pour les chats]. We are left with a
pious discourse without piety, a spiritual supplement for incompetent
governments, and a cultural sociology preached, in line with the new-style
sermons, in lieu of the late class struggle. (p. 23)
The reason the Levinasian approach divorced from religion ends up 'a dog's dinner'
is because those who interpret his approach as being primarily about a 'right to
difference' are actually, Badiou claims, horrified by any differences that are not
'parliamentary-democratic, pro free-market economics, in favour of freedom of
opinion, feminism, the environment' (p. 24). In other words, the only differences to
be recognised are those which themselves recognise difference. This secularised
version of Levinas then becomes a perversion of what Levinas himself advocates and
in effect ends up as totalising: 'Become like me and I will respect your difference.'
(p.25)
Badiou rejects both what he sees as Levinas's own ethics, predicated on God as the
principle of absolute alterity, on the grounds that there is no God. He also rejects
those ethics of difference based on a non-religious interpretation of Levinas because
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he sees nothing ethical about that approach: "infinite alterity is quite simply what
there is. Any experience at all is the infinite deployment of infinite differences'
(ibid.). Ethics cannot be concerned with difference, since difference is what there is,
whereas ethics relates to what Badiou describes as truth, which is 'the coming-to-be
of that which is not yet' (p. 27). An ethics based on difference, Badiou claims,
amounts to an ethics based on cultural relativism, an ethics founded on 'a merely
contingent state of things'. Against this, Badiou argues that there can be no ethics in
general, but only an ethic-of something in a particular situation, pertaining to a truth.
He sets out his manifesto for an ethics of truths as follows:
The only genuine ethics is of truths in the plural- or, more precisely, the
only ethics is of processes of truth, of the labour that brings some truths
into the world. Ethics must be taken in the sense presumed by Lacan
when, against Kant and the notion of a general morality, he discusses the
ethics ofpsychoanalysis. Ethics does not exist. There is only the ethic-of
(of politics, of love, of science, of art). (E, p. 28)
For Badiou, there can be no ethics in general because there is no abstract Subject,
only subjects constituted in fidelity to particular events. But what does this mean?
A subject, for Badiou, only emerges in the process of fidelity to an event:
I call 'subject' the bearer of a fidelity, the one who bears a process of
truth. The subject, therefore, in no way pre-exists the process. He is
absolutely nonexistent in the situation 'before' the event. We might say
that the process of truth induces a subject. (p. 43)
The event, in this view, is what happens in a situation that cannot be accounted for by
prior opinions and knowledges. It is therefore the possibility of innovation, making
possible what previously seemed impossible, rupturing previous coordinates of
knowledge and breaking with the ordinary situation in which it took place. It could,
however, only occur from within the situation in which it took place. The event is
only named as such by one who constitutes it as an event, and thus becomes subject to
this event. Its truth cannot be proven: it is entirely subjective and it can only occur
through grace. In his study of Saint Paul as paradigmatic subject, Badiou describes
the event as 'grace ... It is supernumerary relative to all this and presents itself as pure
givenness.' (SP, p.63) The subject is thus addressed, through evental grace, to decide
on and work towards a new way of being, and it is only through this that truth is
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possible, as stated in Being and Event: 'subjectivization is that through which a truth
is possible' (BE, p. 393).
There are, Badiou argues, four fields of truth in which events happen: art, politics,
love and science. He gives many examples of events in these four fields throughout
his writing: in Ethics he cites the French Revolution of 1792, the love affair of
Heloise and Abelard, Galileo's creation of physics, the classical music style invented
by Haydn, the Chinese Cultural Revolution of 1965-67, mathematician
Grothendieck's creation of Topos theory, Schoenberg's invention of the twelve-tone
scale, personal amorous passions. All these provide clear indications of how in the
event, the one who is subject to that event works towards a new way ofbeing through
working out the meaning of the event in the context of a specific situation (E, p. 41).
The subject is constituted through the process of fidelity to the event, which means
investigating and working out what the event means in the present, forcing new
knowledges in response to the event. The event will always be in excess of the
subject constituted in fidelity, and in this process, the fidelity gathers together and
produces truths.
Let me at this point provide some clarification of Badiou's use of the term 'truth'.
Truth, for Badiou, does not mean any kind of propositional knowledge, but rather
relates to the idea of being true to something. It is universal in the sense that the
demand of the particular truth, although situated in a singular way, is nevertheless
addressed to all. Critchley gives an example from the activism of a political group
with which Badiou is affiliated, L 'organisation politique, to illustrate this point
clearly: 'the demand that flows from the situation of the discriminatory treatment of
immigrant workers in Paris by the city authorities is a general claim for equality that
exceeds that situation' (Critchley, 2007, p. 43). The demand that compels the
political activist, in response to this situation of discrimination, to work over a period
of time for immigrant workers, is a truth-procedure and she is the subject to a truth in
that process of fidelity. But the demand presented by the need of les sans-papiers is
addressed to all, and thus universal. This might seem in contradiction with the
asymmetry of the demand Levinas emphasises, but the two ideas can be held together:
while Badiou suggests that the demands of the sans-papiers are addressed to all,
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Levinas would suggest that I cannot escape that particular demand that is addressed to
me, and morality consists in my responsibility, my taking up ofthe demand.
Given this conception of the subject, which we will explore further in Chapter 4, what
does it mean to speak of an ethic of truths? Badiou describes this ethic of a truth as
'the principle that enables the continuation of a truth-process - or, to be more precise
and complex, that which lends consistency to the presence of some-one in the
composition ofthe subject induced by the process ofthis truth' (p. 44). This idea of
consistency as ethical is crucial for Badiou. Consistency means perseverance,
continuing in the process of becoming subject to a truth. What it means to persevere
will be singular for each subject in the situation in which they are located, but this
consistency is revealed as 'disinterested interest'. The term 'disinterest' is used by
Badiou to illustrate the sense that the process of fidelity to an event takes the subject
out of himself, or rather out of his state of animal self-interest, so that the truth passes
through the subject, a truth that is always in excess of the subject. Of course the
individual will be interested in one sense in the truth with which he is concerned, and
Badiou gives the example of the theatre spectator on the edge of her seat. But this
interest is not because I know in any sense that the truth I am seeing has anything to
do with my concerns. The language Badiou uses to describe this process of
consistency to a truth-procedure as disinterested interest, I would argue, resonates
strongly with the idea of the infinite demand that shatters self-sufficiency in the
Levinasian depiction of subjectivity. It is worth quoting the following passage at
length to explore this point further:
Nevertheless, as regards my interests as a mortal and predatory animal,
what is happening here does not concern me; no knowledge tells me that
these circumstances have anything to do with me. I am altogether present
there, linking my component elements via that excess beyond myself
induced by the passing through me of a truth. But as a result, I am also
suspended, broken, annulled; dis-interested. For I cannot, within the
fidelity to fidelity that defines ethical consistency, take an interest in
myself, and thus pursue my own interests. All my capacity for interest,
which is my own perseverance in being, has poured out into the future
consequences of the solution to this scientific problem, into the
examination of the world in the light oflove's being-two, into what I will
make of my encounter, one night, with the eternal Hamlet ... There is
always one question in the ethic of truths: how will I, as some-one,
continue to exceed my own being? (E, pp. 49-50)
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The subject, emerging through fidelity to the event, is also an ethical subject in
working out the conditions of fidelity to that event. The subject cannot exist as one
for-itself, but only as one that has encountered a truth and thus poured out in the
service of that truth-procedure, which Badiou describes as 'Immortal'.
The concepts of love and hope are also central in Badiou's theory of subjectivity.
Love is 'charity' and this is seen as the work, the labour of the process of fidelity
through which the subject is constituted. In other words, the subject can only become
a subject through the actions of working out what fidelity to that event means. A
teacher, for example, may have been convicted by a sense of truth manifest in The
Brothers Karamazov, and in the work of making this truth present to her students, she
is a subject who loves, who wants this truth also to be known to others. Hope is
related to this idea of love as the persevering in the work of love. Hope, for Badiou is
the principle oftenacity, the maxim of continuation. In Saint Paul, Badiou comments
on Paul's understating of hope:
In Thessalonians I, faith is compared to striving (ergon), and love to
gruelling work, to the laborious, the troublesome. Hope, for its part,
pertains to endurance, to perseverance, to patience; it is the subjectivity
proper to the continuation of the subjective process. (SP, p.93)
Hope is not hope in a future, but is the patience of the subject who practically
universalises in love the conditions of truth. This perseverance in love declaring the
universal singularity of truth is, for Badiou, what allows me to be counted as a
subject, as in the following passage from Saint Paul:
For Paul, universality mediates identity. It is the 'for all' that allows me
to be counted as one .... What designates and verifies my participation in
salvation - from the moment I become a patient worker for the
universality of the true - is called hope. From this point ofview, hope has
nothing to do with the future. It is a figure of the present subject, who is
affected in return by the universality for which he works. (p. 97)
It is only because I work for all, responding to the event as universal singularity, that I
can be counted as one. Hope is the conviction of the subject in what they are
labouring for, in the process of which, they are in turn affected. We will consider
what this means for how we might understand teachers as political subjects in Chapter
7.
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But what does this mean for how we understand Levinas's presentation of
subjectivity? Is it possible to defend Levinas against the charge that his ethics is
'philosophy annulled by theology'? Is it possible to relate Badiou's understanding of
the subject to the Levinasian subject? Let us consider how Badiou's critique might
provide a helpful opening up of Levinas's understanding of subjectivity in a way that
might allay fears ofreligious pietism as unavoidable in his philosophy.
Reading Levinas with Badieu: Impossibly Demanding?
Whilst Badiou's critique of unfaithful interpretations of Levinas leading to an ethics
of multiculturalism is argued persuasively, what are we to make of his claim that
Levinas's focus on the absolute otherness of the Other depends on an idea of God as
the principle of alterity within this relation-without-relation? In a sense, perhaps
Badiou is right. Perhaps Levinas does place too much emphasis on the transcendence
of the Other, and is anti-philosophical in the sense that Badiou indicates in placing
absolute value on what lies beyond conceptual distinction. However, it is worth
pausing to consider what is at stake in this anti-theological critique of Levinas.
Certainly, we have seen how theological terms - God, transcendence, the Other -
reverberate in Levinas's writing. I mentioned in the previous chapter that God is not
to be understood as any kind of being, or even as the Ground of Being. Although
Levinas uses theological terms, he draws attention to how theology is mistaken when
it reduces the idea of God to a being, or Being, instead of seeing God as what has
passed-by and left its trace in the face of my neighbour. God, for Levinas, is no
otherworldly being, but is what is revealed in the possibility of attending to the
infinite demands ofjustice addressed to me:
The fact that the relationship with the Divine crosses the relationship with
men and coincides with social justice is therefore what epitomizes the
entire spirit of the Jewish Bible. Moses and the prophets preoccupied
themselves not with the immortality of the soul but with the poor, the
widow, the orphan and the stranger. The relationship with man in which
contact with the Divine is established is not a kind of spiritual friendship
but the sort that is manifested, tested and accomplished in a just economy
and for which each man is fully responsible. (DF, p. 20)
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Levinas emphasises, in 'A Religion for Adults', that this understanding of both God
and religion must leave behind any numinous concept of God and affirm human
independence, and recognises that for many this will seem close to atheism: 'The
rigorous affirmation of human independence of its intelligent presence to an
intelligible reality, the destruction of the numinous concept of the Sacred, entail the
risk of atheism. That risk must be run' (DF, p. 15). Thus we can see that whilst using
theological terms to challenge the primacy of ontology, Levinas at the same time
challenges conceptions of religion and theology that treat God as a metaphysical
being, the object of belief and knowledge. Witnessing to God does not take place in
any statement about God, or creed, but in taking up responsibility to the neighbour:
the sentence in which God gets mixed in with words is not 'I believe in
God.' The religious discourse that precedes all religious discourse is not
dialogue. It is the 'here I am' said to a neighbor to whom I am given over,
by which I announce peace, that is, my responsibility for the other. (CPP,
p.170)
Levinas's theological terms must not be seen in the way that theology is usually
understood as 'reasoning about God', for to reason about God, is already impossible
and missing the very point of what is beyond being. Rather, the language of divinity
shows how the ethical is both present and yet absent, as a promise yet to be fulfilled,
in our daily lives, underlying the possibility of thought. Morgan suggests that the way
in which the divine interrupts ontology in Levinas's presentation can help us
understand what is at stake in the fact-value distinction:
Too much of one would mean a thoroughgoing naturalism; too much of
the other would mean absolute subordination to God. Neither is
acceptable. Human existence occurs neither in a world of facts nor a
world of values simpliciter but rather in a world where the two
interpenetrate and suffuse one another. That interpenetration occurs in
human social life, our lives with one another. (Morgan, 2007, p. 197)
While it is easy to appreciate that Levinas's theological vocabulary is an obstacle for
many, his use of such terms stands as a challenge to both a thorough going naturalism
that has led to some of the more objectionable outpourings in the God-debate
espoused by the 'New Atheists', and to religious approaches that affirm the existence
of God as a being who can be known. I will explore the challenges that Levinas's
conception of illeity poses for such approaches to religion and the implications of this
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for religious education in Chapter 5, but it is worth stating here that Levinas' s view,
emphasising the limits of human understanding of any idea of infinity or the ethical,
lacks the arrogance of the epistemological certainty exemplified in Dawkins' or
Hitchens' brands of atheism. As Simon Blackburn commented, 'The question is more
nuanced [than their positions allow]. These people like Hitchens and Dawkins who
announce themselves as atheists make it sound like a stance, as if you really know
what you don't believe in. , 9
Badiou perhaps challenges us therefore to clarify the way in which Levinas is using
theological language. But at the same time, I would argue that Levinas' s use of
theological terms draws attention to what can be lacking in secularist discourses,
including those within dominant humanist strands of educational theory, that can
demonstrate profound lack of understanding of the complexity of the ways in which
the word 'God' can be used to manifest the asymmetry of the ethical and the
possibility of goodness, gesturing to what lies beyond comprehension.l" Levinas' s
vocabulary, aiming to move beyond the language of ontology, points towards the idea
of language, knowledge and social action as founded on an address taking place in
vulnerability and refractory to cognition, rather than to the transcendent divine alterity
Badiou suggests. In this sense, the ethical lying beyond the ontological in Levinas is
comparable to what Kant identifies as the impossibility of being able to explain the
origin of the moral sensibility in the self. Whilst obviously there are significant
differences between Levinas and Kant, which we will explore in the following
chapter, there nevertheless remains the sense in both that it is impossible to know the
origin ofmy ethical subjectivity.
For Levinas then, I emerge as an ethical subject in ways that I can never fully account
for. Yet it is possible to think of subjectivity in this way without this being dependent
9 From The Guardian, May zs",2009 http://www.guardian .co.uk/theguardian/2009lmayI28/hav-
festival-ruth-padel-hugh-masekel~ accessed 18.08.09
10 Badiou articulates his own atheism in a profoundly different register from Dawkins or Hitchens. To
say you are an atheist in France has, I would argue, a different force than in Britain, and this difference
has perhaps, inter alia, to do with the French separation of Church and state, the history of the
Revolution, and the very different intellectual climate that is the French legacy of revolution, Marxism,
existentialism and poststructuralism, the latter three all utilising to different degrees post-Christian
vocabulary, which relies on a degree of metaphysical and theological literacy. Thus it is not wholly
surprising that a self-professed atheist such as Badiou devotes a whole book to examining the structure
of St. Paul' s subjectivity, whereas you are unlikely to find Dawkins interested in such a project.
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on any orthodox religious framework. Judith Butler's use of Levinas in her most
recent writings has been particularly illuminating in the way in which she leads us to
consider how this understanding of subjectivity, learning to say 'I' in response to
others' prior addresses, is a way of considering how one becomes human. She
articulates her understanding of Levinas in such a way that the specifically religious
overtones of his language are absent, other than her continued use of the capitalised
'Other'. In her interpretation, Levinas is read with Foucault, Adorno and Althusser to
think how the subject is subjected to social discourses that always exceed the subject,
yet which constitute the subject in responsibility. We see this powerfully articulated
in Giving an Account ofOneself.
If, at the beginning... I am only in the address to you, then the'!, that I
am is nothing without this 'you,' and cannot even begin to refer to itself
outside the relation to the other by which its capacity for self-reference
emerges. I am mired, given over, and even the word dependency cannot
do the job here... [P]art of what I find so hard to narrate are the norms -
social in character - that bring me into being. They are, as it were, the
condition of my speech, but I cannot fully thematize these conditions
within the terms of my speech. I am interrupted by my own social origin,
and so have to fmd a way to take stock of who I am in a way that makes
clear that I am authored by what precedes and exceeds me, and that this is
no way exonerates me from having to give an account of myself. (Butler,
2005, p. 82)
We see here how Butler draws on Levinas's insights that the subject is only possible
through its condition of susceptibility to what lies beyond the self and beyond
cognitive grasp. Hand criticises Butler's interpretation, suggesting that her writing
demonstrates 'an embarrassed secularization and politicization of theological
premises, in the name of cultural transposition' (Hand, 2009, p. 118). He is right that,
while making use of Levinas, Butler does not tackle the question of the degree to
which his writing depends upon a religious framework, as I have attempted to
address. But I would argue that her interpretation shows that the notion of infinite
responsibility, and the condition of susceptibility to the vulnerability to my neighbour,
does not depend on language of the divine. While Levinas utilises theological
vocabulary to emphasise the dizzying height of the Other, it is nevertheless possible
to take from this his intuition of a subjectivity only possible through responsibility,
responding to an address that it did not solicit, through which its exceptional
singularity is confirmed, without having to rearticulate this using the same theological
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terms. Although Levinas' s own understanding of religion is monotheistic, his
understanding of subjectivity does not depend on this to confmn that there is
separation between self and Other, or that my having language depends on my
responsibility as responsivity to the address that comes to me from outside. Badiou
himself says that 'Infinite alterity is quite simply what there is' (p.25), without
needing God to guarantee such a statement.
Badiou's contention here is perhaps less about alterity and more about the idea of an
infinite Goodness lying beyond philosophy. But, as with Kant, does not Badiou's
ethics of truths also require an anti-philosophical moment, in which, as in Levinas, the
subject is constituted in a responsibility that lies beyond knowledge? Whilst
incommensurable in many ways, it is nevertheless possible to see in Badiou's figure
of the subject responding to the infinite and excessive demand of the event, a
resonance with Levinas's thinking so that for both, the subject is only possible
through its condition of responding to what forever exceeds it. For both, the demand
(of the event and of the Other) through which the subject emerges as one responsible
is irreducible to knowledge and interrupts established knowledges. Badiou's choice
of Paul as paradigmatic subject of the event of the resurrection, which Badiou
describes as a fable, illustrates how the event cannot be demonstrated empirically or
logically within the order of being.
In Infinitely Demanding, Critchley lucidly draws aspects of Levinas and Badiou
together to develop an idea of ethical subjectivity taking place in response to a
demand that exceeds the self. So, he takes from Badiou the idea of subjectivity as
commitment to an event, which motivates action that exceeds the justification of the
situation. From Levinas, he takes the idea of the subject emerging only in response to
the traumatic demand that comes from the Other, but which leaves the trace of that
demand in the self: 'At its heart, the ethical subject is marked by an experience of
hetero-affectivity. In other words, the inside of my inside is somehow outside, the
core of my subjectivity is exposed to otherness.' (Critchley, 2007, p. 61) Linked with
this, Critchley also emphasises, drawing on Knud Ejler Legstrup's theological ethics,
that the ethical demand, experienced as infinite, can never be fulfilled. He explains
his thesis of subjectivity drawing on these three as follows:
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Commitment or fidelity (Badiou) to the unfulfillable, one-sided and
radical demand that pledges me to the other (Legstrup) can now be seen to
be the structure of ethical subjectivity itself (Levinas). The ethical subject
is defined by the approval of a traumatic heteronomous demand at its
heart. But, importantly, the subject is also divided by this demand, it is
constitutively split between itself and a demand it cannot meet, but which
is that by virtue ofwhich it becomes a subject. (pp. 62-63)
While Critchley's synthesis is compelling, I do not feel the need to hold both Levinas
and Badiou together in one unified theory of the subject. There are significant
differences in their approaches and philosophical projects that resist synthesis. But
nevertheless, I am drawn to the way that, as Critchley emphasises, for both thinkers,
the infinite, unfulfillable (impossible) demand, addressed to the subject from the
outside, is what makes ethical subjectivity possible. For both, the source of my
ethical obligation to what exceeds me is outside of cognition. Yet in both, what
exceeds knowledge is intimately bound up with the conditions of knowledge and
action, and justification and being reason-able are important aspects of their ethical
action. Critchley's notion of the subject emphasises the subject 'binding itself to the
ethical demand. I prefer the language of responsibility, since we are, following
Levinas, always already responsible, and our moral maturity depends on growing
awareness of this condition. The language of 'binding' implies, even if this goes
against Critchley's own interpretation, the freedom and spontaneity of the Kantian
subject and a sense of self-consciousness. The subject as one always responsible,
vulnerable to the demands made on her by others also vulnerable, does allow the
possibility of freedom, as we will see in the following chapter, but this freedom only
comes to me as a grace, from outside.
But why do we need such conceptions of ethical subjectivity in order to think about
education? As we draw this chapter to a close, let us turn to consider this question.
An Impossibly Demanding Education
In Beyond Learning: Democratic Education for a Human Future, Gert Biesta
explores how it might be possible to think about what education might mean after the
death of the rational, autonomous subject of the Enlightenment. In this he draws on
Levinas as providing a way of thinking about the human that leaves open the question
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of what it means to be human in a radical way. He highlights how educational theory
since the Enlightenment has tended to treat educational practice as the production of
human subjects with particular qualities, most importantly rationality and autonomy,
so that they are able to live flourishing and productive lives. Levinas shows how we
are always already ethical subjects prior to such a process. Biesta draws the
Levinasian notion of responsibility together with Arendt's theory ofpolitical action to
outline the fragile conditions of the possibility of subjectivity and democracy.
Considering the possibility of a democratic education in response, he suggests that
this view of ethical subjectivity does not lead to ethical demands about what schools
should do:
I propose to shift our thinking about democratic education away from an
approach that puts the burden on individuals to behave democratically and
on schools to create democratic individuals toward an approach that
conceives of democracy as a situation in which an individuals can be
subjects, in which they can all act in the Arendtian sense, in which they
can an 'come into the world.' (Biesta, 2006, p. 143)
Whilst Biesta's exposition of Levinas in relation to humanism and education is very
helpful, I want to go further than this: reading Levinas together with Badiou does lead
us to reconsider what the demands of justice and responsibility mean in formal
education. In this way, the descriptions of subjectivity that we have been considering
in both Levinas and Badiou have both descriptive and normative force for educational
theory and practice. Both Levinas's and Badiou's understandings of education and
subjectivity describe what happens in the encounter which exceeds the self, through
which the self is taught, and both convincingly suggest that this encounter is ethical,
in the way that the subject emerges through responsibility (to the Other, or in fidelity
to the event). Both also interrupt and expose the limitations of current neoliberal
educational discourses, dominated by hegemonies of performativity, assessment,
managerialism, and marketisation. Thus my project here, outlining a reading of
ethical subjectivity and thinking through how this both disturbs our understanding of
education and enriches our sense of its possibility, is similar to how Critchley
describes his own project in Infinitely Demanding:
I am not making the questionable claim that it is the job of philosophers to
manufacture moral selves. They exist already as the living, breathing
products of education and socialization. What I am seeking to offer is a
model of ethical subjectivity with some normative force that might both
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describe and deepen the activity of those living, breathing moral selves.
(Critchley, 2007, p. 10)
As Todd suggests, Levinas leads us away from the idea that ethics can be
instrumentalised through education, 'viewing education as an instrument for ethics'
(Todd, 2003a, p. 6), and instead offers us a way of thinking through what already
happens within education, and a way of deepening our sense of the ethical
possibilities and challenges implied by what takes place.
What I find ultimately compelling in both Levinas's and Badiou's accounts is the
motivational force of the demand to respond to my neighbour's need, or the demand
to carry on working out the conditions of fidelity to the particular event. Both expose
the illusion of the self-sufficient I, the subject existing for-itself. For Levinas, a
subject only exists as one for-the-Other, whilst for Badiou, the subject only exists as
one-for-the-others. Both provide accounts of ethics that invite the reader to respond
and awaken to the conditions of their own responsibility. Whilst neither provides any
kind of normative framework that could in any way be applied to education, both lead
us towards a kind of thinking about education that moves beyond instrumentalist
frameworks.
In each of the following five chapters, I will examine specific debates within
education and consider how this reading of subjectivity, drawing on central themes in
both Levinas and Badiou's presentations, disturbs and changes the way we understand
these discourses. If, as I suggested earlier, philosophy of education arises from
disappointment with the status quo, then Levinas and Badiou provide a motivating
reading of the meaning of ethics and education, that allows us respond to some of the
disappointments experienced by those working within education. The importance of
continuing to reflect on the possibility of the ethical subject could be seen as
constituting a form of resistance to current ways of thinking about education which
seem colonised by thinking of the student and her parent primarily as consumers of
education, a set of skills the product of such an education. Levinas and Badiou allow
us to step beyond and outside such limiting logics in an act of resistance. As
Catherine Chalier writes:
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The reflection on the moral subject in a world marked by objectivism,
scientific speculations, and by the negation in some quarters of any
specificity to man, also constitutes a point of resistance. But, in its
fragility, and in the face ofthe constant perils, is that point invincible?
The task of the moral subject is to allow that question to receive a positive
response. (Chalier, 2002, p. 175)
These impossible demands of responsibility need not be seen as forbidding, but
rather, as Critchley suggests, as a reason for courage, persevering to create a better
education despite the fact that we will never fully succeed, because the demands of
responsibility are limitless. He expresses this need for perseverance in response to the
infinite demands of subjectivity well:
far from failure being a reason for dejection or disaffection, ... it should
be viewed as the condition for courage in ethical action. The motto for
ethical subjectivity is given by Beckett in Worstwood Ho, 'Try again. Fail
again. Fail better.' (Critchley, 2007, p. 55)
As educational theorists and teachers, this reading of subjectivity leads us to see that
all we can and should do is fail better, working towards better responses to the
problems and demands that education confronts us with. What is demanded is
perseverance in moving towards a better justice and a better education in response to
the needs of the many neighbours who confront me with their vulnerability. In the
words of Beckett that Badiou frequently cites: it faut continuer.
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Chapter 3
The Very Subjection of the Subject:
Heteronomy, Autonomy and the Aims of
Education
Thus far we have explored Levinas's description in Totality and Infinity of
subjectivity as a condition of being taught, taking place when I am addressed by the
Other who looks for my response, through which I can have language and knowledge.
We have also seen how Otherwise than Being extends this idea of subjectivity as only
possible through the condition of being susceptible to an infinite demand, my
responsibility ever deepening the more it is assumed, and how this can be compared
with Badiou's notion of subjectivity as only possible in response to the infinite
demand of fidelity to the event. In this chapter we will turn to consider how one of
the primary aims of education since the Enlightenment has been the development of a
certain kind of autonomy. Such an approach, I will argue, can lead us to conceive of
education in a narrowly instrumentalised way, and Levinas's understanding of
subjectivity disturbs such an approach.
Levinas describes autonomy as 'the philosophy which aims to ensure the freedom, or
the identity, of beings, presupposes that freedom is sure of its right, is justified
without recourse to anything further, is complacent in itself, like Narcissus.' (CP, p.
49) To an educational theorist unfamiliar with Levinas, this might seem unsettling
and at odds with the dominance of autonomy within moral philosophy and philosophy
of education. Levinas indeed goes further in his critique of autonomy, arguing for the
priority of heteronomy over autonomy, an idea that seems to sit in uneasy tension
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with the idea of education as liberating. How are we to read this in relation to the
ideal of autonomy, seen as fundamental to liberal democracy and human flourishing
itself, often cited as the most important ideals ofeducation?
In this chapter, I will examine the relationship between autonomy, heteronomy and
education in Levinas's writing, to show that despite Levinas's insistence on
heteronomy over autonomy, his understanding of subjectivity need not necessarily be
seen as undermining the ideals of autonomy and liberal democracy so beloved to
philosophers of education. Most interpretations of Levinas tend to focus on his
rejection of autonomy', so it is not surprising that in his recent chapter 'Autonomy
and Heteronomy' in Levinas and Education, Zdenko Kodelja highlights how it is
usually assumed that if we follow Levinas, this leads us to reject autonomy as an aim
of moral education and instead educate for heteronomous responsibility' (Kodelja,
2008, pp. 192-93). I will argue, however, that Levinas's writings on autonomy and
heteronomy are nuanced in particularly subtle ways, allowing us to retain autonomy
as an educational aim, but not conceived in a narrowly instrumentalist sense, but
rather leading us towards a deeper consideration of the ethical implications of
autonomy, always depending on a simultaneous and inescapable heteronomy.
I will begin by analysing the significance of autonomy within philosophy of education
and then examine Levinas' s treatment of autonomy and heteronomy. I will compare
his emphasis on heteronomy with Kant's rejection of this, since Kant's approach to
autonomy can be seen as underlying much contemporary liberal thinking. Through
this, I hope to show that Levinas's writings are not the total rejection of autonomy
that they appear to be: a Levinasian approach to autonomy, founded on a prior
responsibility in heteronomy, would, in its mature state, maintain the tension between
the two. Such a view interrupts the primacy in philosophy of education of a self
1 For example Critchley, 1999 and 2007, Chalier 2002.
2 Kodelja himself rejects the idea that heteronomous morality could be an aim of education, since
education already depends on the condition of heteronomy, of being elected to responsibility through
the approach of the Other: 'responsibility is not an aim [of education] but rather a necessary condition
of subjectivity. For responsibility is constitutive of subjectivity and not the opposite. If it is so, then
heteronomous responsibility cannot be the aim of moral education' (Kodelja, 2008, p. 193). Kodelja
here appears to be running the notions of heteronomous subjectivity and heteronomous morality
together. However, if the former is a priori, it might be possible to retain the latter, a heteronomous
responsibility as a moral orientation, as an aim.
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primarily acting in relation to her own choices, deliberations and reasonings, while
allowing the possibility for education to be transformative and liberating, for the
subject to question what she is to do with the conditions and relations that have
formed her.
A Brief History of Autonomy and the Philosophy of Education
The importance of autonomy within moral philosophy cannot be overstated. Indeed,
as Harry Brighouse points out, many philosophers have seen it as the key to a good
life (Brighouse, 2006, p. 14). From Socrates via the Enlightenment to contemporary
political philosophy, the appeal of self-determination has not dimmed as an ideal.
The term autonomos was originally used in ancient Greece of 'self-governing' or
'self-ruling' independent city states. We can see the history of the importance of
autonomy in the realm of personal morality, even if the term is not itself used, in
Socrates's dictum that the unexamined life is not worth living. It was, however, with
Kant that the ideal ofpersonal autonomy came to be regarded as central to morality:
With the idea of freedom the concept of autonomy is now inseparably
combined, and with the concept of autonomy the universal principle of
morality, which in idea is the ground of all actions of rational beings.
(Kant, 1998, p. 57)
The essential relationship between autonomy, morality, rationality and freedom, for
which Kant argued, can be seen as the reason for the dominance the ideal came to
hold within education. The idea that education should be liberating has a provenance
that stretches back, at least, to Plato, and the importance of the ideal of personal
autonomy within education can be seen as part of this broader concern for freedom.
As well as a significant aim for the promotion of personal freedom, autonomy has
also been stressed within philosophy of education as a central, if not the central value,
for the promotion of liberal democracy. The extent of the dominance of the concept
is exemplified in the following comments by John White:
Since the 1960s one key role for British philosophy of education has been
to reflect on the educational prerequisites of autonomy for all, as well as
on the liberal framework itself... Examples, many known to have
influenced policy makers, are to be found in work on: child-centred
education; the school curriculum; aims; authority; competition;
indoctrination; moral education; children's and parents' rights; selection;
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privatisation; higher education; educational research; education for
democratic citizenship; assessment. (White, 2003, p. 148)
Robert Dearden's 'Autonomy and Education' is one of the most influential
examinations of autonomy within twentieth century philosophy of education. His
essay provides an analysis of what personal autonomy is, an argument for why it
should be seen as an important educational aim and fmally some of the practical
implications of this. Since many within philosophy of education who have argued for
the importance of autonomy have seen themselves as taking up Dearden's ideas from
this essay, it is worth exploring their central positions.
Dearden defines autonomy thus:
A person is autonomous, then, to the degree that what he thinks and does
in important areas of his life cannot be explained without reference to his
own activity of mind. That is to say, the explanation ofwhy he thinks and
acts as he does in these areas must include a reference to his own choices,
deliberations, decisions, reflections, judgments, plannings or reasonings.
This would not necessarily apply in every instance, since what a man
thinks now, and how he acts now, may reflect an activity of mind engaged
in hours, days or years previously, but without losing its force as the
explanation. (Dearden, 1972, pp. 453-54)3
This is a broadly Kantian definition: it is central to Kant's argument for autonomy
that a free action is an action that is mine, in which I am not a passive channel through
which external forces become enacted. For Kant, I am free when I am governed by
reason: the autonomous will is the will motivated by reason alone, rather than external
forces, desires or emotions. Dearden, following Kant, opposes autonomy to
heteronomy, and defmes two types ofheteronomy:
Firstly, a man's thoughts and actions may be governed by other people.
This would be so when, consciously or unconsciously, he is passive or
submissive towards compulsion, conditioning, indoctrination,
3 Space here precludes an examination of the theme of autonomy as it appears in a wide range of
contemporary political theorists, from Joseph Raz to Will Kymlicka, along with both Rawlsians and
Habermasians. The ideal of rational autonomy they provide and its link to freedom can be seen as in
many ways still broadly Kantian, and their various defmitions broadly similar to Dearden, for example
Joseph Raz writes: 'The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should make
their own lives. The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own life. The ideal of personal
autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through
successive decisions throughout their lives' (Raz, 1986, p. 369).
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expectations or an authority unfounded on his own recognition of its
entitlement. A second form of heteronomy would consist in a man's
being governed by factors which are, in a sense, in himself, but which are
nevertheless external to his activity of mind. Examples of this sort of
heteronomy might include the various forms of psychosis and perhaps
also neurosis, together with physiologically based addictions and
derangements. (ibid.)
Dearden goes on to insist, in a similarly Kantian vein, that there is a necessary
connection between autonomy and reason:
The various activities of mind earlier referred to as constitutive of
autonomy are all essentially linked to the idea of reason, or rather to the
idea of having reasons for what one thinks and does. Choosing,
deliberating, reflecting and so on are possible only because relevant
considerations can be brought to bear in these activities. (p. 456)
There is an important link between reason, experience and truth in this scheme:
Dearden argues that our beliefs are what we take to be true, on the evidence of past
experience and other 'independent criteria'. These 'independent criteria' that he sees
as determining what counts as good reasoning do not, however, threaten autonomy
because they come from 'outside', since it still 'remains to the agent to employ those
criteria and to govern his activity of mind by reference to them, and it is in this self-
government that his autonomy lies.' (p. 459)
In considering why personal autonomy should be given increased prominence in
education, Dearden states that autonomy allows us to ascribe responsibility to
individual agents, and also suggests that its exercise is satisfying and creates a sense
of personal worth and dignity. Ultimately, however, he suggests that perhaps it is not
possible or appropriate to justify autonomy, but that other ideals might or might not
be justified by reference to autonomy itself. Dearden then considers the practical
implications autonomy raises for education, arguing that a Hirstian 'forms of
understanding' approach to education is desirable for the development of autonomy,
and that self-knowledge is particularly important. He concludes by suggesting that
education should seek to generate 'motivational independence' (p. 464).
Following on from Dearden's classic treatment, the theme of autonomy in philosophy
of education has been so extensively covered that I will mention briefly only two of
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its most significant advocates: White and Brighouse. In Education and the Good Life,
John White goes further than Dearden in the centrality he gives autonomy among the
aims of education. For him, autonomy is linked to students' well-being, which he
argues should be the single over-arching aim of education. White's definition of
autonomy is similar to Dearden's, suggesting that what distinguishes autonomy from
heteronomy 'is that autonomous people choose their major ends themselves rather
than leaving them to tradition, religion, or others' domination' (White, 1990, p. 75).
The central argument of his book is that educating for personal autonomy will allow
students to live flourishing lives. He acknowledges that the autonomous life may not
be the best way of life in all circumstances: in some traditional societies, for example,
well-being consists in living a fulfilled life according to the customs of those societies
(p. 26). White develops Joseph Raz's argument" that autonomy is not necessarily an
intrinsic aspect of human flourishing, but he seems to go further than Raz in
suggesting that since we live in an autonomy-supporting society, it is difficult to
imagine an individual's well-being not involving autonomy (p. 103). Furthermore,
even though it might be possible to live a fulfilled life in a non-autonomy-supporting
society, White elsewhere argues that a life in which children can make decisions for
themselves about how to live their lives is preferable to a life in which those children
might flourish within a way of life that their parents choose for them (White, 2006, p.
386).
Brighouse likewise argues that although autonomy is not necessary for life to be
worth living, it nevertheless plays an important part in enabling people to live
flourishing lives (Brighouse, 2006, p. 15). He suggests that to live wen, one needs to
know what living well consists of; autonomy means educating children in the skills of
rational reflection and comparison which provide them with the opportunity to decide
what living well means. This rational reflection is elaborated as taking place within a
social context:
Autonomy has a deeply social aspect, not least because human beings are
deeply social beings. Individuals do not flourish separately from others;
their interests are bound up with those of other people, and their reflection
takes place within a given social context... Rational reflection can help us
to detect inconsistencies and fallacious argumentation, and to uncover
4 Raz, 1986, pp. 369 ff.
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misuse of evidence. It helps us to see whether a choice coheres with our
given judgements, including our judgements about what sort of person we
ought to be. (p. 20)
Personal autonomy is central enough a goal for Brighouse that it is the major theme of
his recent introduction to philosophy of education: On Education. This is a fair
reflection of the dominance of the concept of autonomy within contemporary
philosophy of education. Furthermore, while most philosophers of education suggest
that it is possible to conceive of flourishing without autonomy, and therefore limit
their discussion of autonomy to liberal societies, there are others who would go
further and suggest that the development of personal autonomy should be a goal of
education within all societies. Harvey Siegel, for example, writes:
Why limit the desirability of education for autonomy and critical
rationality to liberal ... societies? Are ideals like autonomy and critical
rationality society-relative? ... As is wen known, many theorists, myself
included, uphold particular ideals independent of society-type, and hold
that, philosophical niceties aside, particular ideals - in my case, critical
thinking - are in fact applicable to all societies and the people within
them, whether or not those ideals are in fact endorsed by particular
societies or their members. (Siegel, 2008, p. 182)
But how desirable is autonomy as an educational aim? There have been several
critiques of the dominance of autonomy within educational theory and before we
consider Levinas's heteronomous responsibility, let us first consider more familiar
criticisms that have been posed.
Is Autonomy Really So Desirable?
The questioning of autonomy's dominance within education has most significantly
come from those arguing from existentialist or communitarian positions. David
Cooper, for example, in Authenticity and Learning, examines Dearden's arguments
and concludes that apparent similarities between autonomy and authenticity as
educational ideals are superficial. The main difference between autonomy and
authenticity, he argues, is the importance given to rationality by advocates of
autonomy. Cooper instead uses Nietzsche's genealogical approach, interpreted via a
Foucauldian paradigm of reflexivity, to suggest that instead of focusing just on
rational justifications for beliefs and testing of opinions, education should encourage
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an examination of why individuals and societies come to hold the wide variety of
beliefs, values and attitudes that they do. Such an approach, encouraging the re-
examination of dogmas, will ultimately be liberating for the individual:
there is a sense in which this approach places the individual in a freer
relation to claims to knowledge. For it is in the individual's scope to
challenge and reformulate the guiding purposes, and hence the current
claims to truth and knowledge. If, as Foucault puts it, the instruments of
knowledge are not for putting us into contact with reality, but for cutting,
then like the engraver's art, like any art, the will to knowledge will
contain its own mixture of freedom and discipline. (Cooper, 1991, p. 145)
Stefaan Cuypers and Michael Bonnett likewise draw on existentialist as well as
communitarian perspectives to argue that autonomy is limited in its reach as an
educational ideal and should be coupled with authenticity. In'Autonomy and
Authenticity in Education', they draw attention to the existentialist notion of
authenticity, which they contrast with the emphasis on rational autonomy found in
Dearden. They describe authenticity as the recognition of both the freedom we
already find ourselves possessing and the importance of the will in deciding for
ourselves how best to live:
For the existentialist, we are always free ... in the sense of having a
choice as to how to respond to the situations in which we find ourselves.
As individuals, in many ways we are 'thrown' into life, but we must
decide - and take responsibility for - the commitments and projects that
we give ourselves. To live in this way is to be authentic - to be true to
ourselves. (Cuypers and Bonnett, 2003, p. 328)
Using Harry Frankfurt's idea ofthe person as 'volitional entity', Cuypers and Bonnett
suggest that the formation of the individual's will occurs in passivity. Our individual
cares and concerns are not necessarily part of our rationality in this account, but are
rather volitional necessities, so that personal identity is constituted by our unique
concerns. 'Authentic' freedom consists then in the process ofbecoming aware of and
acknowledging our concerns and 'accepting responsibility for their expression' so that
'we become the authors of our own lives - truly free' (p. 331). In relation to this, they
cite Charles Taylor's communitarian views to consider how the evaluative attitudes
we learn in the process of becoming free derive from 'the community's horizons of
significance.' Personal identity can only have meaning against the backdrop of the
community's horizons of significance. Thus becoming authentic for Taylor (and for
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Cuypers and Bonnett) means entering into dialogue and defining oneself in dialogue,
'while at the same time involving creation, originality and opposition to the rules of
society' (Taylor, cited p. 335).
Hanan Alexander also presents a critique of the dominance of rational autonomy
within education through a communitarian reading of value-pluralism. In'What is
Common about Common Schooling?' he criticises the account of rational autonomy
that conceives of liberalism as an ideal form of life, as in Brighouse and White's
accounts. Instead, Alexander argues that moral agency should be placed at the heart
of education in liberal societies. Rational autonomy, he suggests, implies an ideal of
neutrality and universal liberalism still entertains the 'view from nowhere'. Within
the pluralistic liberalism he sees as preferable to universal liberalism, those who are
initiated into different traditions and communities should be educated with a
proclivity to enter into dialogue with those holding differing and even
incommensurate views, as an intrinsic aspect of moral agency. This does not mean
that these discussions are necessarily without rationality, but that since the rules of
rational assessment may not be available to all within the dialogue, for example, those
for whom certain religious teachings claim greater legitimacy than rules of logic, the
requirement of rational autonomy is not as important as the requirement that all
groups within a liberal democracy are able to participate in the processes of
discussion and interpretation (Alexander, 2007, p. 619).
Alexander goes on to argue that the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy
assumed by those arguing for autonomy is not clear-cut. He points out that what we
know is not acquired 'objectively', but rather 'through personal encounters among
human subjects - husbands and wives, parents and children, teachers and students,
friends and lovers - and between those subjects and the data and ideals that inform
and give direction to their lives.' (p. 620) In such encounters, we are always already
within traditions and ways of life, which we receive into ourselves, rather than
standing outside of them:
Under these conditions, the distinction between autonomy and
heteronomy is a bit misleading, since the boundaries between inside and
outside the self are blurred. A way of life that on one account might have
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been perceived as external becomes the very content through which one
achieves self-definition. (p. 620)
Alexander's highlighting of the idea that the distinctions between autonomy and
heteronomy are blurred moves against the current of much philosophy of education.
Although the advocates of autonomy do allude to the fact that any personal autonomy
can only emerge through the individual's dependence on others, the recognition of
this is not seen as an essential element of autonomy as an educational ideal, and there
remains a privileging of the power of rational argumentation, understood in a
particular way, as the means by which autonomy can develop. Thus although
Brighouse saw autonomy as having a deeply social aspect, nevertheless it is rational
reflection, he emphasises, that 'helps us to see whether a choice coheres with our
given judgements' and facilitates 'autonomous decision-making' (2006, p. 20).5
Alexander's questioning of this ideal highlights how the privileging of autonomy
tends to neglect the way in which autonomy is always bound up with heteronomy.
Heteronomy must not be seen as a stage to be passed through en route to the
independent state of autonomy. Ifthe self is always being brought into being through
others, then the boundaries of what counts as 'my own activity of mind' are never
fixed, and what is 'mine' will always be a gift from an other, as we saw in relation to
Totality and Infinity.
Although Levinas's writing on autonomy and heteronomy seems at first sight, contra
Alexander, to highlight the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy,
scandalously privileging heteronomy over autonomy, I think it is possible to see
Levinas as also leading us to consider that heteronomy and autonomy are bound
together in an intricate relation, but he takes us further than Alexander in considering
the visceral nature of my exposure to otherness, on which my subjectivity depends,"
Having considered the prominence accorded to autonomy within philosophy of
education, let us turn to Levinas's account.
5 In his very clear examination of autonomy as an education aim, Christopher Winch also
acknowledges that autonomy can only develop through prior dependence on others (Winch, 2005, p.
67).
6 I would not wish to emphasise too far similarities between Alexander's account of the heteronomous
aspects of autonomy and that of Levinas. Alexander would perhaps be more comfortable with a
Deweyan formulation, to the effect that we are necessarily social, that does not capture the asymmetry
and vertiginous ethical force ofLevinas's articulation.
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Heteronomy before Autonomy: Levinas and the Kantian Tradition
There is a jarring effect in moving between the discourses on autonomy we have so
far been concerned with and Levinas's writing on the subject. While Dearden,
Brighouse and White appeal to reason to justify their defence of autonomy as an
educational aim, Levinas's writing on heteronomy sounds an entirely different note.
His most extended discussion of heteronomy and autonomy is found in the 1957
essay, 'Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity'. Autonomy, in this view, is rejected
because it is does violence to the alterity of the Other, reducing the Other to my
categories, the activity of my own mind:
Freedom, autonomy, the reduction of the other to the same, lead to this
formula: the conquest of being by man over the course of history. This
reduction does not represent some abstract schema; it is man's ego. The
existence of an ego takes place as an identification of the diverse... The
ego, the oneself, the ipseity (as it is called in our time), does not remain
invariable in the midst of change like a rock assailed by the waves (which
is anything but invariable); the ego remains the same by making of
disparate and diverse events a history - its history. And this is the original
event of the identification of the same, prior to the identity of a rock, and a
condition of that identity. (CP, p. 48)
Levinas here criticises autonomy as it conquers man, covering over the difference of
individuals. 'Ego' here is not a psychoanalytical construct, but refers to the idea of a
rational subject who seeks to bring disparate and diverse events and people within the
identification of its own terms and its own history. Thus autonomy, in this scheme,
aims to make alterity disappear.
This is also one of the major themes of the opening section of Totality and Infinity, in
which Levinas distinguishes between two types of knowledge: knowledge that aims at
bringing the other into the category of the same (which he terms comprehension and
ontology) and knowledge which allows the known to manifest its alterity. Of the
former, he writes:
theory. .. designates comprehension [intelligence] - the logos of being -
that is, a way of approaching the known being such that its alterity with
regard to the knowing being vanishes... This mode of depriving the
known being of its alterity can be accomplished only if it is aimed at
through a third term, a neutral term, which itself is not a being; in it the
103
third term may appear as a concept thought. Then the individual that
exists abdicates into the general that is thought. (TI, p. 42)
Levinas states that philosophy has sought to bring the other into the realm of the
same, reducing the other to a neutral, comprehensible third term. This he describes as
the essential approach of Greek philosophy, so that the self is not disturbed by the
approach of the Other, but rather, the Other is neutralised and the self is free in
relation to itself, as we have already seen: 'This primacy of the same was Socrates's
teaching: to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me, as though from all eternity
I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside - to receive nothing, or to
be free.' (p.43) Freedom here is the freedom ofreason, obliterating the alterity of the
other, since it cannot be limited or threatened by anything outside itself. The Other is
neutralised by becoming an object, thematised and comprehended only as the same:
'the neutralization of the other who becomes a theme or object - appearing, that is,
taking its place in the light- is precisely his reduction to the same.' (ibid.)
It is this idea of the freedom of the self, bringing the Other within the same, that
Levinas equates with autonomy. In 'Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity' he describes
this exclusion of alterity in polemical terms. Opinion makes of the self an other and,
to prevent this, philosophy aims to encompass every other in the same, bring it under
the rule of self government / autonomy:
Autonomy or heteronomy? The choice of Western philosophy has most
often been on the side of freedom and the same. Was not philosophy
born, on Greek soil, to dethrone opinion, in which all tyrannies lurk and
threaten? With opinion the most subtle and treacherous poison seeps into
the soul, altering it in its depths, making of it an other... Against the
turbid and disturbing participation opinion presupposes, philosophy willed
souls that are separate and in a sense, impenetrable. The idea of the same,
the idea of freedom, seemed to offer the most finn guarantee of such a
separation.
Thus Western thought very often seemed to exclude the transcendent,
encompass every other in the same, and proclaim the philosophical
birthright of autonomy. (CP, p. 48)
It is not difficult to see that the ideal of autonomy we have examined in philosophy of
education is laid open to Levinas's attack, particularly Brighouse's account,
suggesting a self who compares different opinions, beliefs, ways of life, from a
neutral standpoint, in order to decide the best, in rational terms. Education should, in
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this standard view, create individuals who are free to choose which of the different
options has most justification. This appears in almost direct opposition to Levinas's
description of the selfs relation with the Other, in which I am brought 'more than I
contain' and the complacency of my self-sufficiency is shattered. That Levinas's
description stands in such seemingly sharp opposition to the prominence given to the
rational, autonomous self in educational theory is not that surprising. Much
contemporary liberal thinking is indebted to Kant, and since Kant, or a Kantian
approach to knowledge, is one of Levinas's philosophical targets, it is natural that
there appears to be tension between in the different ideals of education." Given the
significant influence ofKant in the philosophical heritage of the concept of autonomy,
it is worth pausing to consider further the relation between his concept of autonomy
and Levinas's apparent rejection of it.
Levinas makes it very clear, in Otherwise than Being in particular, that Kantian
philosophy is in opposition to his own philosophical project. Paul Davies points out
that Levinas equates Kantianism with the ontology of which he is so critical within
philosophy:
One of the key subtexts of Otherwise than Being [is] ... a polemical
engagement with Kant, a polemic that reaches its harshest judgement in
the final chapter with the book's last reference to Kant and the claim that
'Kantianism is the basis of philosophy if philosophy is ontology' (OB, p.
179). (Davies, 2002, p. 164)
In Otherwise than Being, as we have seen, Levinas is questioning the conditions of
the possibility of knowledge. For Kant, it is possible to separate sensibility and
intuition, and cognitive understanding is derived from the pure intuition that separates
from the thing to be comprehended what sensibility attaches to it, making ontology
possible. For Levinas, it is impossible to separate sensibility from intuition and
knowledge in this way, and refuting this approach is a major concern of his
philosophical project. For Levinas, as we have seen, it is only through sensibility to
the Other that I could have language and knowledge. This is not to deny the
importance of knowledge or rationality, but rather to question the grounds of
knowledge that Kant's project had established. It is therefore the difference in their
7 We have already seen something of the Kantian influence on Dearden, and it can also be seen, for
example, in Brighouse, 2006, p. 14.
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attitudes towards sensibility and rationality that can be seen as underlying the major
divergence between Kant and Levinas on autonomy.
Levinas, in 'Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity', likens heteronomy to the encounter
with the Other beyond thought. Philosophy has rejected such an approach as
challenging the freedom of the self and has thus sought to overcome that Other and
bring it into the realm ofthe same, in autonomy:
When, in the philosophical life... , there arises a term foreign to the
philosophical life, other - the land that supports us and disappoints our
efforts, the sky that elevates us and ignores us, the forces ofnature that aid
us and kill us... , men who love us and enslave us - it becomes an
obstacle; it has to be surmounted and integrated into this life. (CP, p. 49)
Levinas reverses these terms, preferring heteronomy. 'Heteronomy' literally means,
as its etymology suggests, to be governed by the other, but it is important to clarify
what Levinas means by this, and why his use of the term is not exactly the same as
Kant's.
For Levinas, heteronomy is the state of subjection to the Other: I am indebted to the
Other and elected by them to a non-reciprocal responsibility. We have seen how
Levinas's whole project is an attempt to unsettle our tendency towards totalising ways
of thinking, challenging the complacency of the self-sufficient I. Rather than a
subject who chooses, autonomously, to accept responsibility for others, I am
responsible for and to the other person before I am capable of choice, and only
become a subject in heteronomy. Levinas suggests that this strand of thinking of
subjectivity as heteronomous does have a history within philosophy, even if
autonomy has more often been the preference. Unsurprisingly, he states that his
approach is opposed to Heideggerians, and neo-Hegelians, but he finds recognition of
alterity in Plato's vision of the good beyond Being and Descartes's analysis of the
idea of infinity. He describes this acceptance of alterity and transcendence within
philosophy as 'a tradition at least as ancient [as the tendency towards autonomy], that
which does not read right in might and does not reduce every other to the same' (CP,
p.53).
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Given Levinas's preference for heteronomy over autonomy, how does this relate to
freedom? And is he really so critical of the Kantian legacy as appears to be the case?
The most detailed commentary on autonomy as the major fracture between Kant and
Levinas is given by Catherine Chalier, in her excellent What Ought I to Do? Chalier
argues that freedom is important for both Kant and Levinas, but while Kant sees
autonomy as intrinsic to freedom, Levinas separates freedom from autonomy. She
explains:
Kant asserts that every form ofheteronomy without exception leads to the
destruction of ethics, whereas Levinas does not hesitate to reconsider the
case ... Is freedom a lost cause, then? No, says Levinas. Unlike Kant, he
distinguishes the concept of freedom from that of autonomy, conceiving
of the former as the subject's accession to its irreplaceable uniqueness or
as election. For Kant, the moral law appeals to the self as lawmaker -
hence the constitutive autonomy of ipseity. Conversely, for Levinas, it
entails the imperative of an exteriority - hence heteronomy. (Chalier,
2002, pp. 6-7)
This is an important point. Why is Levinas able to distinguish autonomy and
freedom, and link freedom to heteronomy, whereas for Kant, autonomy and freedom
are inextricably bound? Since the prominence of autonomy within education can be
traced to a broader concern for freedom, this question is significant. In Groundwork
ofthe Metaphysics ofMorals, Kant postulates freedom as the key to the autonomy of
the will, which he sees as a property belonging to rational beings only. Freedom of
the will is the possibility of its exercise without the coercion ofexternal forces:
Will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational, and
freedom would be that property of such causality that it can be efficient
independently of alien causes determining it, just as natural necessity is
the property of the causality of all nonrational beings to be determined to
activity by the influence ofalien causes. (Kant, 1998, p. 52)
Kant points out that this is a negative conception of freedom, but it entails a positive
conception 'which is richer and more fruitful'. Uncompelled by 'alien causes,' the
will is free to make its own choices according to reason, and therefore free to be a
moral agent.
For Kant, the moral subject is free to obey the dictates of reason without being
affected by anything else. By contrast, Levinas does not distrust the influence of the
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sensible. Indeed, the subject's ethicality for Levinas is rooted in the possibility of
being affected by the Other's suffering and vulnerability. It is, as I have already
emphasised, only through this condition of being susceptible to 'alien' causes that
language, reason and consciousness could follow. Chalier describes the implications
of this for how Levinas and Kant view freedom and responsibility:
The Kantian idea of a transcendental freedom and of a timeless choice
defends, to the limit of the conceivable, the idea that freedom is primary
and foundational. The subject's responsibility is deduced from it,
whatever the chance events of its existence. In supporting the thesis of
the moral subject's election, Levinas displaces the axis of that mode of
thought. Only the response to election or to that appeal - responsibility -
gives man a sense of freedom. In discovering that it alone is capable of
responding, the subject discovers its uniqueness and only then its
freedom. The subject - free, unique, and capable of response - knows it
is solicited from time immemorial. (Chalier, 2002, p. 7)
Chalier here emphasises how it is this notion of election, central to Levinas's
conception of subjectivity, that underscores the difference between his and Kant's
understandings of freedom. Levinas, as Chalier highlights, is challenging the idea
that freedom is primary, 'displacing that axis' by arguing that responsibility is what is
primary, and it is only following on from the condition of my responsibility that I
could be free.
Kant, as I have emphasised, rejects heteronomy as 'the source of all spunous
principles of morality' (Kant, 1998, p. 47). This is not to say that heteronomy does
not have an important place in Kant's thinking on education. Children, Kant
recognises, are heteronomously determined and not yet capable of choosing to submit
to the dictates of reason. The educator therefore has the role of either leading (or
forcing) the child to tame his urges and submit to the moral law. But heteronomy is
here a stage to be gone through, not a constituent of mature morality. As Kodelja
explains:
For Kant, heteronomy has a value only as a means for achieving
autonomy. At the beginning of the educational process a child is, due to
discipline and constraint, subjected to absolute obedience. But, step by
step, he desists from obeying someone who is not himself and starts to
obey himself or, if we prefer, reason. At this point, obedience becomes
voluntary, that is to say, an obedience which is no longer founded on the
authority of the other, but an obedience which is obedience to oneself. In
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this way a child passes on from heteronomy to autonomy. (Kodelja, 2008,
p. 188)
The moral moment, for Kant, happens when one has passed through the stage of
being determined by the other and comes to recognise that others are, like me, capable
of being autonomous authors of the same moral law. Humanity thus becomes an end
in itself for Kant when individuals respect the presence of the moral law / rational
autonomy, both within their own person and others (Kant, 1998, p. 66).
Whilst Kant rejects heteronomy as self-interested, Levinas rejects the reciprocity
implied in respecting others as ones potentially moral and rational like me as self-
interested. The Kantian emphasis on recognising and respecting the rationality of
others is rejected for the same reasons that underlie Levinas's rejection of ontology: if
the Other is not recognised as rational, like me, but is seen as non-rational, or lacking
rational capabilities, he is not a member of the kingdom of ends. Putnam explains the
fundamental significance of this pointedly: if ethics is grounded in the idea that we
are all 'fundamentally the same', then 'a door is opened for a Holocaust. One only
has to believe that some people are not "really" the same to destroy the force of such a
grounding.' Even if Kant is not necessarily presuming a fundamental sameness of
persons, by grounding ethics in common rationality, the question is raised of 'what
becomes of our obligations to those whose rationality we can more or less plausibly
deny?' (Putnam, 2002, p. 35).
It is important to note here that Levinas is just as opposed as Kant is to tyranny of the
Other or servile submission to the Other. In the 1953 essay, 'Freedom and
Command', Levinas describes how it is the self formed through its heteronomous
orientation towards exteriority, which makes freedom itself possible: 'We have sought
to set forth exteriority, the other, as that which is nowise tyrannical and makes
freedom possible' (CP, p. 23). Heteronomy is not straightforward obedience to the
Other, as implied by the etymology of the term. Levinas emphasises that freedom,
following on from this prior heteronomy, means the creation of a just order in which
there is no tyrannical rule and there can be peace rather than violence between
individuals: 'To conceive of and to bring about a human order is to set up ajust State,
which then is the possibility of surmounting the obstacles that threaten freedom. It is
the only way to preserve freedom from tyranny' (p. 17). Although his writing on the
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idea of a State, and the ways in which its institutions can become totalising, is
complicated as we will explore in Chapters 6 and 7, in this particular passage, there is
a sense that we are commanded from the outside to set up a just State to protect
freedom.
The commandment from outside is not a Kantian categorical imperative: 'it must be
an exterior command, not simply a rational law, not a categorical imperative, which is
defenceless against tyranny' (ibid.). It is a command heard from outside, from a
magisterial height, presented in Totality and Infinity in terms of the face, that forms
the basis of an ethical demand for justice. Chalier points out that Levinas admits of
the possibility of such a law being violent, and suggests that within Levinas's notion
of the command, 'the face intrudes on the subject's world as a weak and defenceless
appeal' that peacefully resists tyranny, whereas any law that disregards the face
remains violent (Chalier, 2002, p. 74). The approach of the face elects me to
responsibility and this is intimately linked with the question of freedom. This, then, is
the fundamental difference between Levinas and Kant on the idea of freedom. As
Chalier writes, 'Unlike Kant, Levinas does not think that the subject is moral and free
by reason of its autonomy but rather by reason of that election' (p. 79). This election
to responsibility shows the subject as unique in the way that it alone can respond to
the appeal of the other in heteronomy and this uniqueness, prior to identity, is
liberating.
Having considered the dominance of autonomy as an educational aim, how can this
reading of Levinas offer an opening into a reorientation of this aim? Let us now turn
to examine what Levinas's particular conception of the heteronomous subject means
for education and why it provides an alternative between the self-sufficient 'I' of the
Kantian autonomous subject and the subject completely subjected to systems of
control of some forms of poststructuralism.
Educating for Heteronomy?
The end ofhumanism, of metaphysics, the death ofman, the death of God
(or death to God!) - these are the apocalyptic ideas or slogans of
intellectual high society. Like all the manifestations of Parisian taste (or
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Parisian disgusts), these topics impose themselves with the tyranny of the
last word. (CP, p. 141)
These 'apocalyptic slogans' ofwhich Levinas is critical are taken for granted by many
today. Yet it was the anti-humanist critique ofpostmodernism that cleared the path
for Levinas's thinking of the subject in terms of subjection and substitution. Levinas
makes this clear in an early version of 'Substitution's:
Modem antihumanism, which denies the primacy that the human person,
a free end in itself, has for the signification of being, is true over and
above the reasons it gives itself. It makes a place for subjectivity positing
itself in abnegation, in sacrifice, and in substitution. Its great intuition is
to have abandoned the idea of person as an end in itself. The Other
(Autrui) is the end, and me, I am a hostage. (BW, p. 94)
Here we see that although Levinas criticises 'modem antihumanism', to the extent
that much of what he writes is an attempt to recover humanism as the 'humanism of
the other person,' the deconstruction of the subject as the product of social discourses
opened the way to thinking of the subject as never a self-sufficient I or end in itself.
In Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity, Critchley explains how, for Levinas, antihumanism
was not a threat to ethical subjectivity, but 'the former entails the latter by abandoning
the philosophical primacy of the free, autonomous subject' (Critchley, 1999, p. 67).
Humanism, he therefore suggests, should not begin with the human subject as end-in-
itself, and foundation for all knowledge, certainty and value, but should begin with
the 'humanity of the human defmed by its relation to the other' (ibid.). This space for
recognising the self as formed by the address of the Other was only made possible by
first conceiving of the self as dependent on other structures beyond its own conscious
control, be they linguistic, psychoanalytic, ontological, economic. In different modes
of poststructuralist discourse, from Lacan to Althusser, the self is overwhelmed by
and subjected to different forms of alterity it cannot master. Levinas's particular
distinction here, as Critchley points out, is his recognition of the subject's
responsibility as the source of its uniqueness. This election to responsibility is also
the source of freedom, rationality and consciousness. Freedom therefore plays an
important part in Levinas's thinking of the subject in a way that can appear somewhat
absent from the antihumanist discourses he criticises. Yet at the same time, his view
8 This was presented as a lecture in Brussels in 1967, before being revised for publication in La Revue
Philosophique de Louvain.
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of the subject as having no identity or subjectivity prior to its being addressed, admits
of the social construction of the subject in a way underemphasised in the 'old'
humanism of those who have given excessive emphasis to autonomy and the self-
sufficient, self-determining 1.
When considering the ideal of autonomy in education, Levinas's approach is
attractive, admitting of the structuralist and poststructuralist insights into the ways
that the human is always already a conditioned being. Yet there is an unconditionality
in the moment of responsibility, prior to and necessary for conditioning to happen.
Critchley expresses this well:
Although the human being is undoubtedly and massively determined by
the contexts - sociohistorical, psychobiological, linguistic, biological -
into which he or she is inserted, this is no way negates the unconditional
priority of the ethical moment which rends those contexts. Thus the
insights of anti-humanism and post-structuralism might well be necessary
conditions for the determination of subjectivity, but they are not sufficient
to explain the extraordinary event of my responsibility for another.
(Critchley, 1999, pp. 69-70)
The subject's responsibility that makes it possible for her to be acted upon socially,
psychologically, linguistically, and thus emerge as a human being is also the space of
the possibility ofher freedom and her autonomy. But that moment of responsibility is
transcendent and cannot be reduced to social conditioning. Thus Levinas's humanism
is not aimed at restoring the sovereignty of the subject as a free autonomous ego, but
recognising that the subject can have freedom and is unique in responsibility.
Levinas, therefore, successfully construes the human subject as heteronomous and
autonomous: it is only through being brought into being in heteronomy that I can have
autonomy, in choosing how to respond to the others and the social conditions that
have formed me. To restate the point: heteronomy is not just a stage to be passed
through, as in the Kantian view, but is always there, and the mature subject, for
Levinas, maintains the tension between her autonomy and heteronomy. She may not
necessarily be conscious of this tension: Iris Murdoch's idea of a good woman, the
simple person who busies herself with looking after her many children, illustrates that
this tension is felt in the living rather than as something that is necessarily thematised.
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It might be argued, as Slavoj Zizek does, that there is a certain sense in which the
Kantian moral subject is also simultaneously autonomous and heteronomous, in
submission to the moral law. He interprets an otherness at the heart of the Kantian
moral law in characteristically Lacanian terms, which challenges Levinas's critique of
Kant:
What we encounter here is the basic paradox of Kantian autonomy: I am a
free and autonomous subject, delivered form the constraints of my
pathological nature, precisely and only insofar as my feeling of self-
esteem is crushed down by the humiliating pressure of the moral Law.
(Zizek, 1993, p. 47)
Zitek here suggests that the Kantian subject is also always heteronomous, but this
meaning submission to the moral law which, as the superego, compels us to act in
ways that go against our own self-interest and drives. Yet while Zizek's interpretation
of Kant is provocative, it need not be seen as challenging Levinas's understanding of
Kantian autonomy. There is, clearly, a similarity between the experience of
conscience that Zizek sees as the heteronomy within Kantian autonomy, and what
Levinas describes as the heteronomous relation to the Other. However, the relation to
the Other that Levinas describes as heteronomy is before any experience of
conscience: I could only develop conscience, language and thought through my
condition of passivity and heteronomy. Furthermore, it is doubtful that Kant would
accept Zitek's description of the moral law coming from outside the self, as in the
Lacanian analysis of the development of conscience that underlies Zizek's argument.
Consider, for example, Kant's own description of the experience of conscience:
Conscience is not something to be acquired, and there is no duty to
provide oneself with a conscience; but insofar as every man is a moral
being, he has it originally within him... For conscience is practical reason,
holding up before a man his duty for acquittal or condemnation in every
case under a law. (Kant, 1964, p. 59)
We can see in this passage that the Kantian experience of the moral law in conscience
as innate to the individual himself, as a rational subject, is at odds with Zizek's
presentation. 9
9 This is not to say that Kant does not acknowledge the fact that we might have sense that is anterior to
reason. In section 23 of Critique ofJudgment, Kant's discussions of the analytic of the sublime, which
does violence to our imagination, has clear resonances with the way in which the Other shatters the
self-sufficiency ofthe I in Levinas (Kant, 1951, p. 83), and it is possible to see intimations ofothemess
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Kodelja has also argued, following Alain Renaut, that Kantian morality depends on
the Other, and that Levinas fails to see this, and instead presents something of a
caricature of Kantian individualism. Kantian autonomy, for Renaut, is not the same
as independence and presupposes:
that I am the 'source of myself only by raising myself, as the practical
subject, above the immediacy of the empirical subject and integrating the
presence of the other into my ipseity: the subject that gives itself its own
law must, in order to rise to the level of this auto-nomy, have transcended
the self-identity of the desiring subject (individuality) and opened itself up
to the otherness of the human species. Transcendence-in-immanence is
by definition what autonomy means. (Renaut cited in Kodelja, 2008, p.
192)
Perhaps this is true, and there is a sense in Kant of the autonomous self as only
becoming moral by accepting the 'otherness of the human species.' If we accept this
interpretation, there nevertheless remains the fundamental difference between Kantian
morality, seeing myself as part of the human species, even if that is conceived of as
'other', and Levinas's ethics, starting from my being called into question by the
vulnerability of the Other. Furthermore, for Kant, my duty to others remains
reciprocal and dependent on my recognition of them as potentially possessing reason,
like me. For Levinas, the claim that others make on me does not depend on either my
or their rationality, or any principles of morality. Putnam summarises what is distinct
in Levinas (in comparison with Kantian ethics) succinctly:
My awareness of my ethical obligation must not depend on any 'gesture'
of claiming (literally or figuratively) to 'comprehend' the other. I do not
know any other ethical philosopher who has so powerfully combined the
idea that ethics must be based on the perception of persons, not of
at work in his analysis of judgment and taste. In section 39, Kant also discusses the idea of how we
take pleasure in the beautiful, as a reflection that is not a form of rational contemplation, and he
describes the possibility of this as 'subjective conditions of the possibility of a cognition in general'.
Thus we can see that there is the elemental idea of a heteronomous self, even if I am using the term in a
rather more general way than in the Levinasian sense of heteronomy, and even if Kant himself would
be resistant to such terminology and reject any association between such an idea and morality. In the
following section of Critique ofJudgment, section 40, he goes on to specifically reject heteronomy on
the grounds that it leads to prejudice: 'The tendency to such passivity, and therefore to heteronomy of
the reason, is called prejudice; and the greatest prejudice of all is to represent nature as not subject to
the rules that the understanding places its basis by means of its own essential law, i.e. is superstition.
Deliverance from superstition is called enlightenment' (Kant 1951, pp. 136-37). Thus we can see that
although one might see some form of heteronomy implied in the Kantian subject, it is not an aspect that
Kant himself wishes to develop in relation to autonomy, morality or any kind of practical judgment.
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abstractions, with the idea that the ethical perception must fully respect
alterity. (Putnam, 2008, pp. 95-6)
If, therefore, Kodelja is right that Levinas misses or deliberately misconstrues the
sense of otherness that Renaut sees as intrinsic to Kantian ethics, there still remain
very significant differences between the ways in which they understand ethics,
autonomy and heteronomy.
But what does this mean for how we understand autonomy in education? Can we,
following our reading of Levinas, articulate a view of autonomy that is distinctive in
this idea of choosing to submit myself not just to the rule of the Other, since that is
prior to choice, but to rules that will bring about a more just state? Such a notion of
autonomy would always be already predicated on our heteronomy; someone who is
being educated therefore is always already heteronomous in the Levinasian sense.
We should therefore see ethical maturity not in the way it is traditionally conceived
within educational theory as the development of rational autonomy, but rather as
recognition of our heteronomy whilst at the same time becoming more autonomous,
developing the ability to question which rules and laws I will submit to in my own
life, and questioning which rules will enable us to bring about a better justice. Such a
notion of autonomy depends on heteronomy: these laws come from outside the self,
rather than any internal rationality (pace Zizek). By becoming autonomous in this
sense, we are choosing to protect ourselves against tyranny and violence through the
creation of a just State that aims to preserve freedom and enact a better justice and
peace.
There is also another sense of autonomy for Levinas we can see bound up with the
anarchic condition of responsibility. In 'Truth of Disclosure and Truth of Testimony"
an essay from 1972 that precedes and summarises the first sections of Otherwise than
Being, Levinas does describe the self as both autonomous and heteronomous:
The possibility of fmding, anachronously, the order within obedience
itself, and of receiving the order from oneself - this reversal of
heteronomy into autonomy is the very way in which the Infinite comes to
pass - all of which the metaphor of inscribing the law in consciousness
expresses in a remarkable manner, reconciling autonomy and heteronomy
(in an ambivalence, of which diachrony is the very meaning, and which,
in the present, is ambiguity). (BW, p. 105)
115
In passivity, the Other addresses me and I am heteronomous, yet the address invites
and founds my responsibility, and it is within myself that I find the order of
obedience. Thus the metaphor of the law inscribed to consciousness suggests this
duality of the sources of moral responsibility: both the Other and the self. Levinas
goes on to suggest that it is this ambiguous duality of the self as both heteronomous
and autonomous that makes ethics possible:
An ambivalence that is the exception and the subjectivity of what was,
without my knowledge, inspired in me - to have received, whence we
know not, that of which I am the author. The unheard-of saying is
enigmatic in its an-archie response, in my responsibility for the other.
This ambiguity within the subject is the trace of the infinite, alternately
beginning and intermediary, the diachronic ambivalence that makes ethics
possible. (ibid.)
Thus we can see that autonomy is part of what it is to be ethical for Levinas. When
Levinas appears elsewhere to be rejecting autonomy, he is rejecting a particular
notion of autonomy, associated with the idea of the self as an end-in-itself, for itself,
bringing the Other within the sphere of rationality. Levinas specifically equates the
state of being responsible as a type of autonomy, but autonomy envisioned as a state
of ultimate concern for the Other and awareness of this concern:
Is freedom not that which is most remarkable in the mortal, finite, and
interchangeable being who then raises himself to his unique identity as a
human being? This is the meaning of the notion of election. To be aware
of it, to be able to say 'I', is to be born to a new autonomy. (RB, pp. 192-
93)
We have seen then that for Levinas, the ethical subject is both autonomous and
heteronomous. Many interpreters of Levinas choose to focus almost exclusively on
the understanding the subject as heteronomous, neglecting this strain of autonomy
that is also to be found. I am keen to hold on to autonomy, but a sense of autonomy
that is deepened following this reading of Levinas. If therefore I want to agree with
most philosophers of education that one of the aims of education is the promotion of
autonomy, what does Levinas's understanding of autonomy mean for how we
conceive of this aim, so that it avoids the narrowly instrumentalist sense of ethics that
Todd warns of?
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The Ideal of Autonomy Restated
If autonomy is seen as the self's awareness of its election, fmding within itself the
order of responsibility that comes from outside, this displaces the emphasis on
rationality we considered in both Kant and in the standard theorisation of autonomy
within philosophy of education. It is also distinct from the critiques of autonomy we
have considered in Alexander's, Bonnett's and Cuypers's arguments, through the
emphasis on heteronomy as sensibility and responsibility to the need and address of
the Other that marks the beginning of my subjectivity. But what does this mean for
how we could consider the possibility ofautonomy as an educational ideal?
Perhaps Levinas leads us to consider that it is this state of 'being able to say "I"',
aware of the uniqueness of my responsibility, that should be seen as characteristic of
moral maturity. The autonomous self in this sense is aware that their subjectivity is
predicated on the discourses and relationships into which they were called, in
passivity, and aware of the choices they can make in responding to those addresses.
None of this is to diminish rationality. Levinas sees rationality as part of the political
order necessary for the protection of individuals. Levinas makes this clear in many
different writings, for example in an interview explaining substitution, he clarifies the
practical outworking of justice in relation to the state:
Judgment, comparison, are necessary... The State, general laws, are
necessary. Institutions are necessary to carry out decisions. Every work
of politics and justice is necessary. This order negates mercy, yet is called
into being by this very mercy with a concern to recognize all the others
who form the human multiplicity. This is the order that, perhaps, will be
able to reveal its charitable roots in democracy. Justice and the just State
constitute the forum enabling the existence of charity within the human
multiplicity. .. As the issue of a certain limitation of charity, yet still
grounded in love, the State can always review its law and its justice. Is
this concern for reconsideration - for amelioration - not in effect the
essence of democracy and of the liberal State, the sign of a mercy and
charity that breathe there? An effort in view of an always better law.
(RB, p. 230)
We see here that for Levinas, although subjectivity depends on asymmetric
responsibility, for us to live in society with others means that we must live in, and
continue to strive for, relations of equality and justice. It is therefore necessary to
make comparisons, to make rational and political judgements. Yet this conception of
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a justice and rationality founded in infinite responsibility means that the law can never
be static: we, as autonomous and heteronomous subjects of such a state, must be
striving for a better justice, and if the State is 'still grounded in love', its laws and
justice are always under review. Education should therefore be aiming at the
development of rationality, whilst also striving for autonomy in the sense of an
awareness of the infinite demands of responsibility that are already there as a
precondition of education. Such an idea of autonomy leads to a conception of
citizenship in which I, an inhabitant of the State, seek to work towards a better justice,
a state in which charity can breathe.
We might see Levinas as calling us to work in education towards an ideal of
autonomy founded on a sensibility prior to rationality. Butler, drawing on Levinas's
conception of ethical subjectivity, has suggested that we must conceive of autonomy
in relation to our physical proximity to others. In Precarious Life, she suggests that
our understanding of and struggle for autonomy must not privilege the rational at the
expense of recognising our embodiment and the demands that others make on us in
their physical vulnerability:
If I am struggling for autonomy, do I not also need to be struggling for
something else as well, a conception of myself as invariably in
community, impressed upon by others, impinging upon them as well, and
in ways that are not fully in my control or clearly predictable? (Butler,
2006, p. 27)
This is surely an important insight to consider when thinking of autonomy as an
educational aim. If we want to encourage students to recognise that they have
autonomy, it is also necessary to encourage awareness that autonomy is only possible
through the condition of existing in community, a community that makes demands on
us, impresses on us and forms us in ways we cannot always control. Butler goes on to
suggest:
Is there a way that we might struggle for autonomy in many spheres, yet
also consider the demands that are imposed upon us by living in a world
of beings who are, by definition, physically dependent on one another,
physically vulnerable to one another? Is this not another way of
imagining community, one in which we are alike only in having this
condition separately and so in having in common a condition that cannot
be thought without difference? (ibid.)
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This passage highlights why it is so important that we think very carefully about the
ideal of autonomy that we want to prioritise within education. The challenge of
Levinas is to recognise that there are never autonomous subjects that are not already
heteronomous. And heteronomy here means a condition of responsibility, of
sensibility and susceptibility to the vulnerability of others. The challenge for
educational theory, then, is not to turn away from the conception of rational autonomy
developed by Dearden, Brighouse, White and others, but to recognise that we can
only be autonomous because of the transcendent moment of responsibility, in which I
am, prior to identity and rationality, always already in community and acted upon, yet
at the same time with the possibility of acting upon and changing the situation in
which I find myself. The story of autonomy that has so far been told within
philosophy of education has not paid sufficient attention to the condition of
subjectivity as subjection to the Other and the importance of sensibility as
fundamental to both heteronomy and autonomy. Sensibility to the other's needs, in
Levinas's view, takes priority over the universal principles of Kantian autonomy,
which can become part of the closed circle of a totalising ontology. Before the fact of
another's distress, the condition of infinite responsibility is clear: I can never be
satisfied that I have done enough. In educating for autonomy, educationalists might
hope to draw attention to the precariousness of life, my life and that of my neighbour,
on which autonomy is founded. When I make choices, when I decide which rules to
obey, I am doing so in a community of different and vulnerable others. In responding
to the needs and addresses of others, I fmd that I am free, a unique subject, alone able
to meet those particular needs.
If we want to allow students to become more autonomous, as is the aim of most
liberal approaches to education, therefore, we need to enable them to become aware
of the social discourses and relationships that have formed them uniquely, but also
help them to see that while being acted upon, they are also acting, responding to those
who address them in multiple situations, contexts and relations. Butler poses the
following questions to the reader of Precarious Life: 'We are at once acted upon and
acting, and our 'responsibility' lies in the juncture between the two. What can I do
with the conditions that form me? What do they constrain me to do? What can I do
to transform them?' (p. 16). These are questions that formal education should enable
students to consider if they are to be autonomous. This requires careful thought on the
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part of educators as to how, through the contents of the curriculum, different stories
and histories are presented to young people, revealing something of the conditions
that have formed them. Levinas himself attends to how allowing students to become
aware of such conditions places responsibility on educators. In addressing the
pressing question of how Jewish youth were to be taught about the history of Jews in
Europe, and remembrance and mourning of the Shoah, Levinas, as Caygill point out,
draws attention to the need for remembrance of victories against anti-Semitism, the
defeat and punishment of Nazism, and the eventual victory in the Dreyfus affair.
Caygill draws attention to how presenting the events of history in a particular light
can have violent consequences for how young people come to understand their
identity:
Is the politics of Zionism - before and after the Shoah - marked by an
exclusively negative presentiment and memory, one made up of violence
and injustice? If this is so, then the memory of murder will mark Jewish
identity more than the eventual victory over the murderers. What political
identity will emerge from being the victim of a Germany that had become
a 'metaphysics' in Nazism, or a Russia that had become a 'messianism'
with world socialism? The danger, barely intimated here, is that a wholly
negative memory might so scar Jewish identity that its State, too, might
embody a messianic metaphysics and abandon the prophetic mission of
Israel to realise truth and justice and instead to recommence the cycle of
violence and injustice. (Caygill, 2002, pp. 82-3)
Of course, this relates to the difficult and pressing question of the remembering of
political horror at a particular moment when the identity of those involved in the
remembrance was very much at stake. Yet we see here how if students are to become
more attentive to the conditions of their heteronomy, there is a need for educators to
reflect carefully upon how those conditions are presented in ways that do not serve to
further reinforce cycles of violence and injustice. In an essay on Leon Brunschvicg in
which he addresses the question of Zionist youth, and to which Caygill draws
attention, Levinas states his hope 'that today's Jewish youth, when it sets off for a
new spiritual and sometimes geographical horizon, does not simply shake the dust of
the world it is leaving off its feet. There is gold in that dust.' (DF, p. 45) Clearly
many educators are already attentive to how gold and dust are intermingled in the
histories, narratives and subject traditions they teach. The challenge is for them to
consider how they are to hand over that gold to students in such a way that will enable
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them to see how what gleams is part of a broader culture that has helped form them,
and for which they are in the process of taking on responsibility.
As students are in the process of becoming subjects formed through subjection to
social conditions, discourses and the needs of others who make concrete demands,
there remains nevertheless the choice of how to respond to the condition of
responsibility. Butler articulates this powerfully: 'The self at issue is clearly "formed"
within a set of social conventions that raise the question whether a good life can be
conducted within a bad one, and whether we might, in recrafting ourselves with and
for another, participate in the remaking of social conditions' (Butler, 2005, pp. 134-
35). This, I would argue, is the condition of autonomy that education should be
striving for: a remaking of the self with and for others, and in doing so, participating
in changing society to bring about a justice that is never satisfied.
How this might be done cannot be neatly prescribed, as much depends on the personal
relationships at stake in the recrafting. I will, however, consider in Chapter 5 how this
disturbs the way that religious education is currently theorised and taught in British
schools. The approach to ethics that this implies is certainly not something that could
be taught within moral education classes. It entails a different metaphysics to the
dominant utilitarian ideologies underlying current education policies, and is not about
particular interpersonal relationships, but about our relations to everything. We have
seen in the preceding two chapters how Levinas challenges us to see education not in
any instrumentalist sense, but as part of an ongoing condition of response and
responsibility, to which he invites us to be vigilant, continuing both within and
beyond formal education. Thus the idea that education should be the site from which
rational, autonomous individuals emerge, as implied by some philosophers of
education, is challenged by this richer notion of autonomy. This process of becoming
more aware of the condition of heteronomy, as part of the process of becoming
autonomous, is something that could never be finished. The challenge is to recognise
this richer notion of autonomy that extends beyond rational capabilities and consider
how as teachers we might lead students into an awareness of the conditions of their
autonomy, intimately bound up with the recognition of the conditions of heteronomy.
Recognising the condition of vulnerability and sensibility as the basis for autonomy
has profound implications for our understanding of dialogue and community, which
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we will consider further in relation to the idea of 'the neighbour' in Levinas's
presentation, in Chapter 6.
Although this conception of autonomy is not an ideal for which we can
straightforwardly plan, it is already implied within education, even if it is not attended
to and tends to be covered over in the more usual understanding of autonomy. To
attend to this approach challenges us, as Morgan suggests, to recognise the way in
which the heteronomous relation to the other in sensibility and vulnerability is
ignored in standard accounts of autonomy, whereas it should be treated 'prior or
determinative or fundamental' (Morgan, 2007,90). It is easy to see why there would
be resistance to this. Jacqueline Rose, in The Last Resistance, suggests that it is
precisely because of our failure to admit of the condition of our subjectivity as
vulnerability, and the responsibility we have to others, that we build walls and close
down the possibility of a just and equal state. We seek to put up walls against others
because we do not wish to see ourselves as vulnerable, our lives as precarious, our
desires impinged upon by the demands of others. The challenge, then, is to allow our
perspective on what autonomy might mean within education to be enriched by
Levinas's understanding, so that we come to see the Other as determinative and
fundamental, and we relate to things, our neighbours differently, as the awareness of
heteronomous responsibility deepens.
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Chapter 4
The Obliteration of Truth by Management:
Badiou, Levinas and Economies of
Education
Let me review where we have got to in the argument of this thesis thus far. I began
by laying out how Levinas conceives of teaching as the relation to the Other, in which
the illusion of the self-sufficiency of the subject is exposed: I only exist as a subject
through the address of the Other, 'bringing me more than I contain'. This teaching is
never a completed process but always there, the trace of an immemorial past that is
the condition through which I am a subject, subjected to the Other. I am passive in
my state of being addressed by the Other, hostage to them, and it is only as one
concerned for the Other, answering to the infinite, impossible demand they address to
me, that I am. As a subject, I am therefore always already heteronomous, and it is
only through the condition of that heteronomy that my consciousness, rationality and
autonomy are possible. This understanding of teaching disturbs the emphasis placed
by many educational theorists on the educational aim of the development of rational,
autonomously-deliberating subjects. We have seen, however, that following Levinas
leads us to an alternative, enriched understanding of the possibility of autonomy
within education.
In this chapter, we will tum to consider a dominant thread of neoliberal discourse
about education: the idea of education as the site where individuals with measurable
skills, ready to enter waged work, are produced. Clearly, many who would argue for
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autonomy as an aim might also be opposed to the way in which educational discourse
is increasingly determined by the rhetoric of the market and the demands of business,
but here I will argue that Levinas and Badiou provide us with a language and a way of
thinking about education that offers a more provocative interruption of approaches
that treat education as a service, which can be delivered and straightforwardly
assessed for quality of provision. There has already been some consideration within
philosophy of education of the way in which Levinas challenges trends towards the
customerisation of education (Standish, 2005; Love, 2008). My aim here is to build
on this through reading the challenge of Levinas we have considered in the preceding
three chapters together with Badiou's critique of the way in which truth can become
obliterated by management, since Badiou articulates a critique of neoliberalism and
late capitalism in a direct manner that is, for historical reasons, lacking in Levinas' s
philosophy. In Badiou's account of subjectivity, he explicitly addresses the extension
of the automatisms of capitalism in managerialist approaches and other techniques
and rejects the potential of the politics of identity to provide a solution to this.
Therefore his understanding of education and subjectivity is very pertinent to debates
about the current dominance of managerialism, performativity and marketisation in
education. Although, as I emphasised in Chapter 2, the philosophical projects of
Levinas and Badiou are incommensurable in a sense, here I will show that Badiou' s
understanding of education, as only possible through grace, has similarities with
Levinas' s, and that both, read together, challenge the current dominance of particular
ways of thinking about education. Both, I will argue, disrupt the closed thinking about
the nature of education that is characteristic of an economy of exchange, and allow us
to re-envision the very nature of educational practice as at odds with instrumentalist
discourses. At a seminar entitled Education and Neoliberalism in Crisis that took
place at Marxism 2009, held in London 2nd_6th July,' a lecturer from London
Metropolitan University argued that in order to resist the forces of a neoliberal
hypercapitalism in education, theorists need to start with a defence of education, a
consideration of what education is for. In this chapter, I show that this way of thinking
about 'what is education f or' reflects a utilitarian attitude towards education that is
itself part of the problem. Here I suggest that we must start with thinking about what
education is, what it could and should be. I have already outlined how Levinas
1 http://www.marxismfestival.org.uk/, accessed 14.08.09
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describes the scene of teaching. But how does Badiou describe education? The
following gives some indication:
The only education is an education by truths. (HI, p. 14)
truth is a process, and not an illumination. In order to think it, one
requires three concepts: one that names the subject at the point of
declaration tpistis generally translated as 'faith,' but which is more
appropriately rendered as 'conviction'); one that names the subject at the
point of his conviction's militant address (agape, generally translated as
'charity,' but more appropriately rendered as 'love'); lastly, one that
names the subject according to the force of displacement conferred upon
him through the assumption of the truth's procedure's completed character
(elpis, generally translated as 'hope,' but more appropriately rendered as
'certainty'). (SP, p. 15)
We have already seen how theological terms, which sound strange, unfamiliar,
scandalous even within contemporary educational theory, reverberate in Levinas's
articulation of the nature of subjectivity and teaching. Here we also see that despite
Badiou's critique of the religious piety he finds within Levinas's ethics, theological
concepts - pistis, agape, elpis - also assume fundamental significance in his
presentation of subjectivity, fundamental to his conception of education. Education,
for Badiou, is an education by truths, but, as we saw in Chapter 2, to think what truth
is, he suggests we need the concepts 'conviction', 'love' and 'certainty'. In
Handbook ofInaesthetics, Badiou describes education as the process of arranging 'the
forms of knowledge in such a way that truth may come to pierce a hole in them' (HI,
p. 9). In this chapter, I will begin by exploring this conceptualisation of education as
it relates to subjectivity, and consider how, read with Levinas, Badiou allows us to
think beyond current frameworks that emphasise managerialism, performance and
assessment. After considering these frameworks, I will outline some of the critiques
that have been raised against them, for example from the Critical Theory and
postcolonial discussion of exclusions and marginalisation and consider why Badiou's
and Levinas's understandings of subjectivity are better able than these critiques to
breach the intellectual closure represented by the approaches of managerialism and
marketisation, leading us to an enriched understanding of the ethical and political
possibilities of education. Let us start by turning to Badiou's Saint Paul.
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Why Paul? Weaving New Fabric out ora Ripped Yarn
Given that it is unusual to find reference to a religious saint within educational theory,
why does Saint Paul: The Foundation ofUniversalism have significance for thinking
about issues of managerialism and performativity? In arguably his most vivid
exploration of subjectivity, Badiou shows how Christ's resurrection was for Paul an
'event.' Through the paradigmatic figure of Paul, Badiou considers how the event and
the subject's fidelity to it emerge against a background state of a situation. Through
comparing Paul's position with our current situation, Badiou reveals the ways in
which late capitalism's exchange system is without capacity for truth. This is vital for
our understanding of how Badiou's notion of education - as an education by truths -
challenges the pedagogical problems related to the dominance of performativity and
managerialism. Badiou allows us to consider what truth procedures and an idea of
education following on from this might mean within a situation of education
dominated by the discourses of the market, whereas this is not so directly addressed
by Levinas. If these are my reasons for choosing, in this chapter, to question the
dominant educational discourses through Badiou's examination of Paul, why does
Badiou himself choose to examine Paul?
We have already explored Badiou's rejection of theology in Chapter 2, but it is worth
emphasising that Badiou is not interested in Paul in relation to religion: 'For me, truth
be told, Paul is not an apostle or a saint. I care nothing for the Good News he
declares' (SP, p. 1). What he finds of interest is Paul the 'poet-thinker' reflecting
upon what it is to become subject to an event that has ruptured his former ways of
thinking and being, his epistles representing the struggle to work out what fidelity to
that truth-event means for him and for all. Precisely because Paul's faith in the Christ-
event is alien to Badiou himself, it allows Badiou to demonstrate that the meaning of
the event may only be recognised as constituted by the subject for whom it becomes
an event. Critchley puts this point clearly:
Badiou's choice of Paul as paradigm for the event is all the more
compelling because his act of faith is so strange to the modem atheist ...
The choice ofPaul is intended to show the extreme subject-dependency of
the event, that is, that the event is not reducible to the act of a subject, but
that the event is only visible as such to the subject who acts in such a way
as to pledge themselves to the event. (2005, p. 226)
126
It is precisely because the resurrection is a 'fable' for Badiou that it draws attention to
the question of belief / faith, 'or that which is presupposed beneath the word pistis'
(SP, p. 5). It is through exploring what pistis means for Paul that Badiou is able to
demonstrate that the Pauline figure of the subject offers genuine revolutionary
potential, a potential actualised through his refusal to submit to the order of the
existing situation and, in fidelity to the event, his struggle to work and live for a new
world. Why, however, does Badiou claim that Paul speaks particularly to our
contemporary situation?
In 'Paul: Our Contemporary', Badiou provides his answer. The significance of Paul
is found in his unprecedented gesture of 'subtracting truth from a communitarian
grasp, be that of a people, a city, an empire, a territory, or a social class' (SP, p. 5).
Truth as universal singularity for Badiou is manifest within a world of difference, but
cuts through difference and claims of identity: 'What matters, man or woman, Jew or
Greek, slave or free man, is that differences carry the universal that happens to them
like a grace' (p. 106). Truth as universal singularity, entirely subjective, ruptures and
necessitates a reappropriation of prevailing abstractions and particularist protests. For
Paul, these were the legal abstractions of being a Roman citizen and the various
identities asserted within that realm (even those using identities to protest against that
realm). Badiou explains the prevailing abstraction that operates for us today in terms
of the (false) universality of the rule of the market, subsuming within it even
discourses that might appear to subvert it. Ray Brassier puts this point well:
Integrated global capitalism is a machine - and a machine is nothing other
than an automated axiomatic system - but an astonishingly supple and
adaptive one, singularized by its fluidity, its metamorphic plasticity.
Whenever confronted by a limit or anomaly, capitalism has the
wherewithal - the intelligence? - to invent a new axiom in order to
incorporate the unexpected, constantly reconfiguring its parameters by
adding a supplementary axiom through which it can continue expanding
its own frontiers. (Brassier, 2004, p. 53)
For Badiou, the purely abstracted quantitative universality of monetary exchange is
without potential for truths in the realm ofpolitical thinking:
No, we will not allow the rights of true-thought to have as their only
instance monetarist free exchange and its mediocre political appendage,
127
capitalist-parliamentarianism, whose squalor is ever more poorly
dissimulated behind the fme word 'democracy.' (SP, p. 7)
Badiou also describes the ways in which the politics of identity and particularist
protests are subsumed under the universality of the market. His notion of truth as
universal singularity aims at exposing what he sees as the deficiency of the cultural
and historical relativisations of the question of truth. This he sees as part of the
current state of the situation, comparable to the state of the situation for Paul. Truth,
and thus thought, he argues, have been reduced 'to a linguistic form, judgment',
which rejects this universalism. In this situation, Badiou argues that all forms of the
cultural and historical relativisations of the question of truth operate under the
abstraction ofmonetary exchange and the rule of the market, a process he describes as
without truth:
What is the real unifying factor behind this attempt to promote the cultural
virtue of oppressed subsets, this invocation of language in order to extol
communitarian particularisms (which, besides language, always
ultimately refer back to race, religion, or gender)? It is, evidently,
monetary abstraction, whose false universality has absolutely no difficulty
accommodating the kaleidoscope of communitarianisms. (SP, pp. 6-7)
The pervasiveness of the rule of the market in the current situation, comparable to
Paul's, is all-encompassing. This rule of exchange, a system seeking to liquidate
'everything substantial according to a rule of universal exchangeability' appears to
know no limits, to constantly redefine its boundaries:
there is an extension of the automatisms of capital, fulfilling one of
Marx's inspired predictions: the world finally configured, but as a market,
as a world-market. This configuration imposes the rule of an abstract
homogenization. Everything that circulates falls under the unity of a
count, while inversely, only what lets itself be counted in this way can
circulate. (SP, pp. 9-10)
Badiou considers at length the way in which the abstract rule of circulation - 'only
what counts win be counted: only what can be counted counts' - absorbs within itself
the relativist ideology accompanying the process of fragmentation and differentiation
of identity. The creation of differing identities 'creates a figure that provides a
material for investment by the market' (p. 10). Indeed, the market requires the
appearance of difference or non-equivalence so that the equivalence of exchange can
constitute a process:
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What inexhaustible potential for mercantile investments in this upsurge -
taking the form of communities demanding recognition and so-called
cultural singularities - of women, homosexuals, the disabled, Arabs! And
these infinite combinations of predicative traits, what a god-send! Black
homosexuals, disabled Serbs, Catholic pedophiles, moderate Muslims,
married priests, ecologist yuppies, the submissive unemployed,
prematurely aged youth! Each time, a social image authorizes new
products, specialized magazines, improved shopping malls, 'free' radio
stations ... Deleuze put it perfectly: capitalist deterritorialization requires
a constant reterritorialization. (SP, p.l0)
It is important to note that Badiou is not in any way 'against' difference or the
creation of different identities. His criticism of the politics of identity relates to the
ways in which it can lead to particularism, and the privileging of some groups over
others. As discussed in Chapter 2, he clearly states that difference is the inevitable
state of the world: 'in the situation (call it: the world), there are differences. One can
even maintain that there is nothing else.' (p. 98) However, in relation to capitalism,
his main contention is that the politics of identity feeds the system of global exchange
on the one hand and thereby denies any possibility for the critique of the system on
the other. As he asserts, the identities that are configured 'never demand anything but
the right to be exposed in the same way as others to the uniform prerogatives of the
market.' (p. 11)
This interplay of the homogenisation of the global market and the permanent process
of the creation of (new) cultural and territorial identities is, for Badiou, without the
potential for truths. Indeed, they are hostile to truth procedures and this is
demonstrated by 'nominal occlusions':
The name 'culture' comes to obliterate that of 'art.' The word
'technology' obliterates the word 'science.' The word 'management'
obliterates the word 'politics.' The word 'sexuality' obliterates love. The
'culture-technology-management-sexuality' system, which has the
immense merit of being homogenous to the market, and all of whose
terms designate a category of commercial presentation, constitutes the
modern nominal occlusion ofthe 'art-science-politics-Iove' system, which
identifies truth procedures typologically. (p. 12)
How then is it possible to step outside of this?
129
Badiou provides us with the example of Paul as a 'becoming subject' to truth and
shows us how for Paul, the truth of the resurrection, experienced as a universal
singularity, pierced through the prevailing abstractions (i.e. Roman Empire) and
particularisms of his situation (i.e. Citizen, Jew, Gentile). A truth, according to
Badiou, is not structural, axiomatic or legal. And significantly and controversially in
the current situation in which the question of truth is relativised, Badiou argues that a
truth cuts through every communitarian subset as a universality:
Truth is diagonal relative to every communitarian subset; it neither claims
authority from, nor (this is obviously the most delicate point) constitutes
any identity. It is offered to all, or addressed to everyone, without a
condition of belonging being able to limit this offer, or this address. (SP,
p.14)
Conditions of identity clearly do exist, but, as Badiou states, truths are universal,
belonging neither to any particularist subset of identity nor to the false universalism of
economic exchange, and indeed interrupt these: 'ultimately it is a case of mobilizing a
universal singularity both against the prevailing abstractions (legal then [in Paul's
time], economic now), and against communitarian or particularist protest.' (ibid) For
Paul, prior conditions of particularist identity and the categories of knowledge were
called into question by the universality of the Christ-event. This radical interruption
is comparable to the way that Levinas describes the address of the Other, with which
my subjectivity begins, as both prior to and suspending the conditions of identity,
identity only emerging through processes of thematisation. For Badiou, this is why
Paul can proclaim in Galatians 3: 28 'There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free,
male nor female, for you are all one in Jesus Christ.' The truth of the event and the
practical working out of fidelity to that event as the process of subjectivity, displaces
the subject from legal abstractions, particularisms of identity and the apparatus of
opinion.
In our contemporary situation, truth as universal singularity cannot belong to the
count of capitalism. The truth of the event is here 'entirely subjective' (SP, p. 14): for
Paul, the truth of the resurrection is not established through what would have been for
him the 'objective' categories of Jewish Law or Greek Logos. So, it is not Paul's
message that Badiou sees as harbouring potential for delineating the nature of
subjectivity, but rather Paul the subject who has experienced the Christ-event as
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entirely subjective, exceeding what can be known within the current situation and yet
universal in its appeal; an event that necessitates a radical break from within the
structures ofknowledge and identity that define existing situations. The emergence of
Paul as subject to a demand that exceeds him in the Christ-event is only possible
through his fidelity to that truth-procedure and through his hope as conviction that
carries on in response to the infinite demand of the event. His exceptional singularity
as an ethical subject is confirmed by his working for all, taken out of his self-
sufficiency, by the event that has ruptured his former knowledge, understanding of
identity, and way of being as etre-pour-soi. In the event he is suspended, broken, dis-
interested and constituted in fidelity, love and hope to what has broken him, revealing
the void of the current situation.
What does this mean for education? In Handbook of Inaesthetics, Badiou links
education to truths disrupting the established forms of knowledge and the state of the
situation: 'education (save in its oppressive or perverted expressions) has never
meant anything but this: to arrange the forms of knowledge in such a way that truth
may come to pierce a hole in them' (HI, p. 9). He elaborates further: 'the only
education is an education by truths' (p. 14). In other words, education references a
process of subjectivity: it involves truth piercing through established forms of
knowledges and the subject's subsequent reappropriation of those structures of
knowledge in light of the event. Here, truth and, by implication, education, are
processes rather than illuminations. A truth-procedure is the practical working out of
what fidelity to the event means, a process both instituted in the event and yet still
being worked out. It is fidelity to the event that is the process of subjectivity. The
event itself is not something that can be known, but rather a gift, 'a kind of laicized
grace' (Hallward, 2003, p. 115).
The subject is thus, for Badiou, 'constituted by evental grace' (SP, p. 63): the event
and its truth cannot be contained within the rule of exchange and grace bursts asunder
the economy of monetary exchange. The event is pure contingent gift and could
neither be demanded nor result from my own action. It cannot be contained even by
thought: 'Thought can be raised up from its powerlessness only through something
that exceeds the order of thought' (pp. 84-5). In Chapter 1, we considered how
Levinas describes subjectivity as also given, by the Other interrupting the closed
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system of totality. Let us reconsider this point: Levinas argues that speech is a
teaching, and that it 'first founds community by giving, by presenting the
phenomenon as given; and it gives by thematizing' (TI, p. 98). The Other, who
remains outside of my knowledge, gives me knowledge in their addressing me and
looking for my response to their gift. Phenomena, experience as mediated by
concepts, and language itself are given to me by their being offered to me in language,
this offering, the saying at the same time exceeding language itself. The process of
offering, through which I am taught, is what holds language in place, in that a
common world is founded between me and the others, with objects set in place.
While Badiou himself does not describe the event as a teaching, nevertheless, it can
be compared to this condition of being addressed and made responsible that we have
seen in Levinas's presentation. Read together, both ideas of subjectivity and
education depend on the idea of a grace, a giving, that is beyond thematisation and
comes to the subject from outside, rupturing and exposing the limitations of the ways
knowledge and education are often thought of as deliverable and measurable.
It is important to note that Badiou's conception oftruths emerging through the fidelity
of the subject to event, in laicised grace, is not simply a secular colonisation of the
Christian tradition in terms of the old 'true/false consciousness' debate in Marxism:
'Know the truth and the truth will set you free.' No: Paul is paradigmatic for Badiou
because he illustrates the entirely subjective nature of the event as both a singularity
and a universal. It is a singularity because it could only occur in particular
circumstances, but universal in that an event is a potential for all. Badiou's discussion
of Paul's articulation of the meaning of the event shows that truth-procedures involve
the radical reassessment of our inherited forms of knowledge. Subjectivity - as the
working out of the conditions of fidelity to an event - cannot simply be reduced to a
true/false dichotomy. Neither is the event in Badiou's thinking the reification of some
sort of epiphany, comparable to a road to Emmaus type experience. Let us remind
ourselves of the ways that Badiou uses the terms 'event', 'fidelity' and 'truth', as
already discussed briefly in Chapter 2. In Ethics (2001), Badiou provides a useful
clarification ofthese terms:
The three major dimensions ofa truth-process are as follows:
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It the event, which brings to pass 'something other' than the situation,
opinions, instituted knowledges; the event is a hazardous, unpredictable
supplement, which vanishes as soon as it appears;
It the fidelity, which is the name of the process: it amounts to a sustained
investigation of the situation, under the imperative of the event itself; it is
an immanent and continuing break;
.. the truth as such, that is, the multiple, internal to the situation, that the
fidelity constructs, bit by bit; it is what the fidelity gathers together and
produces. (E, pp. 67-8)
Badiou goes on to discuss the Haydn-event in classical music as a concrete example
of these terms, useful for thinking through their relation to education. The event is
ontologically situated: with the Haydn-event, the emergence of the classical style
takes place in a situation governed by the baroque style. The event reveals the void at
the heart of the current situation, a void that could not be perceived within the state of
the situation prior to the event. Within the baroque style, the void, according to
Badiou, was 'the absence [vide] of a genuine conception of musical architectonics.
The Haydn-event occurs as a kind of naming of this absence' (E, p.68). The event
then necessitates the reordering of the knowledges that have been disrupted by the
event, which is the construction of truth. Following the Haydn-event, new musical
knowledge was organised around the classical style. This reorganisation of
knowledges subsequent to the event Badiou describes as the forcing of knowledges:
A truth punches a 'hole' in knowledges, it is heterogenous to them, but it
is also the sole known source of new knowledges. We shall say that the
truthforees knowledges. The verb to foree indicates that since the power
of a truth is that of a break, it is by violating established and circulating
knowledges that a truth returns to the immediacy of the situation, or
reworks that sort of portable encyclopaedia from which opinions,
communications and sociality draw their meaning. (E, p. 70)
Although knowledges are forced by the event, and truth procedures take place through
the reworking ofnew knowledges in the immediacy of the situation, the event itself is
a grace that could not be forced. Responding to this gift by working out the
conditions of fidelity to the event in which I become a subject, I am an agent of
change. The subject emerges in the process of subjectivisation, the transformation
that takes place through the actions of the individual in response to the event that took
place, which was, for them, a gift. The investigation by the subject of the
consequences of the event that occurred and disrupted the economy of exchange, as
Feltham and Clemens note, 'entails not only the active transformation of the situation
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in which the event occurs but also the active transformation of the situation of the
human being' (cited in Badiou, 2003c, p. 7). Thus education, in this view, entails this
process of a transformation that necessarily breaks the closed totality of the economy
of monetary exchange.
Within this conception, the subject needs to re-appropriate the meaning of the
structures that have been disrupted by the truth procedure in 'not. .. but' articulation.
This is to weave a new fabric out of the ripped yarn of the situation. Eric Santner
describes this idea clearly:
human subjects undergo tears in the fabric of their lives, tears that, in
principle, allow not simply for new choices of objects of desire, but rather
for the radical restructuring of the coordinates of desire, for genuine
changes of direction in life. Ethical consistency will mean something like
the creation of new fabric out ofa tear. (2005, p. 110)
This idea raises the question of the extent to which current neoliberal systems of
education, woven with the yarns of economic managerialism, performativity and
marketisation, might allow truth to break through and subjects to weave new fabrics
with their lives. If education, according to Badiou's definition, involves the tearing
and breaking of the current coordinates of the state of the situation, to what extent is
this actually possible within the current environment?
The Economy of Exchange and the Markerisation and Customerisation of
Education
I'm only here [at school] to get good enough grades to go a good
university, so that I can get a good job and earn decent money one day.
And it's the teacher's job to make sure I get those grades.
These words, spoken to me by a 17 year-old student at a school in an affluent area of
west London several years ago now, reflect the pervasiveness of the 'customerisation'
of teaching and learning, stemming from the prevailing ideologies of marketisation
and managerialism within education. This student saw his school as the provider of
his education, reflected in the 'good grades' he desired that would enable him to
achieve his career goal of 'earning decent money.' The application of business
models leading to a managerialistic approach to the organisation of formal education,
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with an emphasis on production-oriented service delivery is already well documented
(Clarke, Gewirtz and McLaughlin, 2000; Apple, 2001; Preston, 2001; Bridges and
Jonathan, 2003; Love, 2008). Even if such language sits uneasily with many, it is
now commonplace for students or their parents to be described as the 'consumers' of
education (the product), which is 'delivered' by the 'providers' (schools, universities).
Bridges and Jonathan give several examples to demonstrate how in the UK, for
example, the Labour government has shown just as great an enthusiasm for the
application ofmarket principles to education as its Tory predecessors:
extending rather than limiting parental choice of schools and the
assessment and league tables that are supposed to inform such choice;
enabling popular schools to expand; introducing student fees in the
context of higher education, and showing some favor toward universities
that wish to introduce differential charging; and taking on teachers'
unions in a battle over performance-related pay. (Bridges and Jonathan,
2003, p. 126)
They describe the conditions for this 'marketisation' of education as the creation of
diversity and choice and the placing of information and purchasing power in the
hands of the 'consumer'. This process of the marketisation of education has been
widely documented across North America and Britain, but is no longer solely a
feature of the Anglo-American liberal conservatism that has held sway across North
America, the UK and Australasia: 'regimes in such diverse political environments as
Russia, Ethiopia and Vietnam are all sending government ministers and officials on
courses in market economics and wrestling with the application of market principles
to social policy' (Bridges and Jonathan, p. 127), and a number of international bodies,
such as Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International
Monetary Fund and World Bank have all supported policies associated with
managerialism. The application of market principles has led to the widespread
dominance of economic managerialism within education. The term 'rnanagerialism'
is often used to imply the over-use of managers and management techniques,
particularly in the public services. The notion depends on the idea that social,
economic, political and cultural issues can be solved through better management,
according to certain key principles of management technique, such as emphasis on
target setting and achievement. Thus, management is seen to lead to value for money,
efficiency and improved customer service.
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Essential to managerialism, as Preston (2001) outlines, is the ability to meet quality /
performance targets, as part of an 'Audit Society' or surveillance society (Foucault,
1991), in which all activities that can be measured and assessed ought to be measured
and assessed. So, in Britain, schools routinely use 'value-added' scores, to assess the
quality of a student's grades relative to the initial 'input' of the student's ability. As
Preston writes, 'the accuracy of the word processor and the health of our school
children are reduced to the same Ethic of Effectiveness, a Quality good with value-
added components' (Preston, 2001, p. 348). The desire for information and norms
against which to assess quality within education reflects a wider desire for
information and feedback by which to judge the quality of service provision within
society. In Britain, we have league table rankings of just about every 'service' in
which 'consumer' choice is possible, from restaurants and hotels, to hospitals, schools
and universities. Within British schools, the 'performance' of individual teachers is
assessed through spreadsheets of their students' exam grades and observations by
external examining bodies, while in some British schools, teachers are required to
enter all their lesson plans into the school network so that the senior management can
monitor that they are planned to meet the criteria of 'the model lesson' . All of these
factors have a significant impact on the degree to which teachers feel they can
exercise curricular autonomy and many feel stifled by this rhetoric of the market. I do
not mean to imply that the practice of auditing in itself, through examination and
other means of assessment, is necessarily forbidding. But the problem outlined by
Preston and others is that audit as an idea overreaches its originally fmancial aim of
ensuring that the money spent on education is delivering quality. Thus the process of
audit becomes institutionalised as an entire principle of social organisation, leading to
a state of constant surveillance within educational systems, to the extent that the very
meaning of 'education' itself is covered over.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the complex reasons lying behind the
rise of managerialism, performativity and marketisation within education and how
these relate to neoliberalism. Although a shared concern for value for money and
efficiency might explain the application of market principles in different educational
contexts, it is worth noting that educational theorists have outlined different
ideological reasons underlying the rise ofmanagerial models. In Britain, for example,
studies of the use of the managerial model within public services by New Labour
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have suggested that this can be linked to a desire to bring about greater democracy
and inclusion. Jenny Ozga outlines this position:
New Labour's modernization of education, which uses managerialism as
its vehicle... [seeks] to create an enterprising culture of the system, the
institution and the self. It privileges waged work as the passport to
inclusion, as well as the creation of wealth (common and individual) and
in so doing it seeks to remove the need for separate recognition of the
social and cultural work that education does, because that is now
encompassed within programmes that promote achievement. (Ozga, 2000,
pp.222-23)
The emphasis here on the deployment of a managerial model of education in order to
seek fuller inclusion differs from what Michael Apple sees as the ideology lying
behind similar practices and discourses in the US, which he links to a shift to the right
in education policy, guided by a neoliberal vision of the weak state:
What is private is necessarily good and what is public is necessarily bad.
Public institutions such as schools are 'black holes' into which money is
poured - and then seemingly disappears - but which do not provide
anywhere near adequate results. For neoliberals, one form ofrationality is
more powerful than any other - economic rationality. Efficiency and an
'ethic' of cost-benefit analysis are the dominant norms. (Apple, 2001, p.
38)
However, both Apple's and Ozga's analyses of British and American systems of
education - driven by the rhetoric of efficiency - imply a shared underlying aim of
education: to prepare students for economic participation in society. Students are thus
seen as human capital: 'The world is intensely competitive economically, and
students - as future workers - must be given the requisite skills and dispositions to
compete efficiently and effectively' (Apple, 2001, p. 38). The marketisation of
education is seen by neoliberals, according to Apple, as necessary to prevent schools
from 'sucking the financial life out of society' and ensuring that students as human
capital are prepared for paid work. Crucial to this, Apple argues, is the idea of the
'consumer' :
For neoliberals, the world in essence is a vast supermarket. 'Consumer
choice' is the guarantor of democracy. In effect, education is seen as
simply one more product like bread, cars, and television. By turning it
over to the market through voucher and choice plans, education will be
largely self-regulating. Thus, democracy is turned into consumption
practices. (p. 39)
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Underlying both these ideologies of managerialism is the view that education should
be conceived instrumentally as a vehicle for participation in waged work and
reproducing the current state of the situation, ruled by the principle of monetary
exchange. This is achieved through the application of models of performativity and
auditing in order to ensure that value for money is being achieved in the provision of
education and that students emerge from education ready to earn capital. The various
negative consequences of these processes have been documented as often leading to
social and economic exclusion for those who do not succeed within the standardised
testing system, while also leading to dissatisfaction among teachers and strangling
thought. Fred Inglis writes of the emphasis on auditing within the managerial
structures of British schools and universities:
The preposterous edifice of auditing, the mad rout of acronyms - HEFCE,
TQM, OFSTED, ITA - blinds vision and stifles thought. Their most
certain consequence is to make inquiry servile, knowledge instrumental,
and, above all, to make all of us, teachers at whatever level, boring,
exhausted and hating the job. (Inglis, 2000, p. 429)
Before we turn to examine how the notions of education and subjectivity offered by
Levinas and Badiou can help us think outside of these prevailing ideologies and re-
envision the potential of education, let us first briefly consider the standard responses
to the management problematic from educational theorists working within the
discourses of Critical Theory and, linked to this, the so-called 'politics of identity'.
The Rule of the Market Under Attack
Given the history of Critical Theory related to Marxism, albeit having travelled a
significant distance from its roots, it is not surprising to find analyses of capitalist
schooling as instruments of corporate power and domination coming from those
working within this tradition. Within such approaches, there remains a commitment
from Marxism to liberation from 'false consciousness', although not in the original
Marxist formulation. In examining current hegemonic discourses within education,
those who have been influenced by Critical Theory tend to have a transformative
vision of the potential of an education that does not seek to reproduce existing
inequalities and social divisions, but rather one that might empower groups who are
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marginalised within society and thereby lead to greater democracy. This approach is
exemplified in Apple's attack on US education policy. He places race at the centre of
his attempted interruption of the hegemony of the marketisation of education,
focusing on how existing schooling systems with their emphasis on standardised
testing have the result of excluding those with least access to economic, social and
cultural capital. His argument is for a politics of recognition that will challenge the
inequalities that are reproduced within the current systems of education: it is 'not
possible to be color-blind... only by noticing race can we challenge it... By placing
race squarely in front of us,' we can challenge 'the state, the institutions of civil
society, and ourselves as individuals to combat the legacy of inequality and injustice
inherited from the past' (Apple, 2001, pp. 203-4). Education, in this view, could and
should offer up a space for considering key issues involved in the politics of
representation and diversity. Apple describes his critique as part of the politics of
identity, but is critical of previous theorists of identity for not going far enough in
attacking the conservative policies he describes as underlying the emphasis on
marketisation and performativity within education:
This is partly an issue of the politics of 'identity,' and increasing attention
has been paid over the past decade to questions of identity in education
and cultural studies. However, one of the major failures of research on
identity is its failure to adequately address the hegemonic politics of the
right. As I have been at pains to show here and elsewhere, the
conservative restoration has been more than a little successful in creating
active subject positions that incorporate varied groups under the umbrella
of a new hegemonic alliance. It has been able to engage in a politics
inside and outside of education in which a fear of the racialized Other is
connected to fears of nation, culture, control and decline - and to
intensely personal fears about the future of one's children in an economy
in crisis. (p. 211)
Critiques drawn from Critical Theory that include multiculturalist problematics in the
interests of democracy have been put forward by several other prominent educational
theorists, such as Carlos Torres (1998) and Henry Giroux (2001). Giroux has,
however, stressed the importance of moving from critique to a discourse of hope:
hope that there are ways of resisting the imposition of market and business models
within education by emphasising the role that schools potentially playas spaces in
which a false consciousness might be dissolved, leading to a positively formulated
vision of democracy, a theme I will explore in the final chapter.
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Another type of criticism that has been posed to the cultures of managerialism and
marketisation in education comes from those theorists who emphasise the importance
of personal well-being. John White is an exponent of such a position. In 'Education,
the Market and the Nature of Personal Well-Being' (2005), he identifies a key aim of
education as enabling students to lead personally fulfilling lives, capable of
autonomous decision-making. He points out that the market can bring with it goods
that help an individual to flourish:
The market, in opening up its own range of options to meet the
consumer's autonomous preferences, reinforces the implicit messages
about personal well-being that the educational bodies have been
transmitting. (White, 2005, p. 100)
Here we see how the rule of the market can be linked with the ideal of autonomy that
Levinas attacked, both operating under the same logic of the freedom and choice of
the self-sufficient, rational subject / consumer. However, the values of the market
must always, according to White, be seen 'in the light ofwisdom already accumulated
within the culture about what makes for a flourishing life' (p. 107). Thus, the rule of
the market within education might be challenged if it does not tie in with what White
describes as collective wisdom about what contributes to human flourishing.
Given then that there have already been critical responses to the rule of market within
educational theory, what does Badiou, read with Levinas, add to our understanding?
It is clear that we can recognise what Badiou describes as our current state of the
situation in Saint Paul as also the state of the situation in education. Let us briefly
remind ourselves ofhow Badiou summarised the state of our situation:
Our world is in no way as 'complex' as those who wish to ensure its
perpetuation claim. It is even, in its broad outline, perfectly simple. On
the one hand, there is an extension of the automatisms of capital, fulfilling
one of Marx's inspired predictions: the world finally configured, but as a
market, as a world-market .. , On the other side, there is a process of
fragmentation into closed identities, and the culturalist and relativist
ideology that accompanies this fragmentation. (SP, p. 9-10)
It is easy to recognise this as the state of the situation in education, subsumed within
the abstract homogenisation of monetary exchange through the imposition of market
principles as I have outlined. Although Badiou does not extensively discuss
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education policies, in an interview he does comment on how the French have
followed British policy in applying the principles of the market to education which
the State defends using the 'propaganda' of economic necessity:
every State uses propaganda to convince us that all the decisions they take
are necessary. Let us take for instance the French government (although
the same could be said about the British government). What is the French
government saying to us? As the British government before, it is
destroying public hospitals, public schools etc. It follows the British and
follow it will ... It is explaining that specific policies must be
implemented ... [T]hey claim that such policies are mandatory. But is
this truly the case? It is his policy to say that it is necessary, it is the State
policy. This is the government's way of situating this State policy in an
economical context that is part of State decisions. (2003b, p. 189)
Badiou himself seems here to suggest that the politics of decision-making In
education have been replaced by management: education policy comes to be defended
by reference to economic 'necessity' rather than any other criteria. Thus, education is
absorbed by the totalising rule of the market in order to facilitate its better
functioning. The structures of management do not allow the question of truth into
discussions about how formal education should be organised or about what education
is or should be: all can only be explained with reference to economic necessity. In
this way, the very meaning of education is obliterated by management, premised on
an alleged requirement of necessity.
What becomes evident is that the responses from Critical Theory and secular
liberalism as represented by White also fall within this state of necessity requiring
managerial approaches that deny the discussion of truths - one that accepts
identifications as the problem to be solved via access to the count of the market, a
problem that can rectified by 'proper' economic distributions and recognitions. We
have already discussed how Badiou sees this situation and its allegedly critical
contestations as without the potential for truths: 'The capitalist logic of the general
equivalent and the identitarian and cultural logic of communities or minorities form
an articulated whole' (SP, p. 11). Thus we might say that both the imposition of
economic managerialism within education and the responses from Critical Theory
form part ofwhat Badiou has outlined as our contemporary situation.
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What is particularly significant therefore about Badiou's challenge for education, and
why he adds to the picture provided by Levinas, is that he alerts our attention to and
steers us between the Scylla of economic management and the Charybdis of an
identitarian politics that can lead to bigotry. As Peter Hallward argues:
We live in supremely reactionary times. Ours is a moment in which
inventive politics has been replaced with economic management, in which
the global market has emerged as the exclusive mechanism of social
coordination. Ours is a moment in which effective alternatives to this
mechanism find expression almost exclusively in the bigotries of
culturally specified groups or identities, from ultranationalism in Germany
and France to competing fundamentalisms in Israel and Algeria. Among
contemporary thinkers, Badiou stands alone in the uncompromising rigor
of his confrontation with these twin phenomena (Hallward, 2003, p.
xxxvi)
Having shown that Badiou's outline of the state of the situation is a situation we
recognise within current educational discourses and institutions, how does his notion
of education as an education by truths, read with Levinas, help us to re-envision the
nature of education in a way that can be mobilised against its current distortion? And
what could this mean in practical terms?
Is Education Possible in Schools?
In a recent interview with Oliver Feltham, Badiou makes the following comment
upon the organisation of schooling:
Junior high school should be abolished: between eleven and fifteen years
old all young people without exception should be integrated into
productive work, with perhaps half the time spent studying, or a quarter.
They will come back to full-time study once they are sixteen years old,
having all acquired a tenacious 'worker' configuration. These later
studies win not decide their future but provide an initiation to truth
procedures. (Badiou,2008,p. 138)
This point is worth pondering, particularly given that Badiou, like Levinas, has
worked within institutions of education, as both school teacher and then as university
lecturer and professor, throughout his career. Is Badiou serious, and if so, what would
be the purpose of such a radical rethinking of education policy? Furthermore, how
does this relate to Badiou's theorisation of the nature of education? Before we answer
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these questions, we should note a criticism made by Nigel Blake and Jan Masschelein
about the use ofCritical Theory within educational theory:
Like its European counterparts, American critical pedagogy remains
attached to a strongly instrumental and functional concept of educational
practice, because it has not questioned the very concept of educational
praxis itself but conceived it as an instrument for liberation or repression.
Educational praxis still receives its meaning from the goal or end at which
it should aim... Critical pedagogy thus formulates essentially and
fundamentally a technological project. Its first step is the formulation of
an ideal or utopia, which it uncritically supposes both possible and
necessary. It thus remains itself subject to the same instrumental logic
that it deplores at the heart of the capitalist system. (Blake and
Masschelein, 2003, p. 50)
The same criticism could clearly be directed against the managerial model of
education (aiming to reproduce the dominant hegemony and to maximise the creation
of capital) and the personal well-being model (aiming at a utopian vision of human
flourishing). I do not wish, in saying this, to disparage the ideal of a utopian inclusive
democratic state, or the aim of enhancing students' flourishing. But Blake and
Masschelein's criticism of critical pedagogy serves to highlight what is particularly
distinctive in both Levinas's and Badiou's presentations: their anti-instrumentalism.
We might say that this idea of an education by truths is anti-instrumentalist at its core.
The challenge of Badiou is therefore radical: to see structures of education not as sites
for preparing people for work and economic participation, but rather as spaces of
'initiation into truth procedures', enabling the beginning of the processes of
subjectivity, introducing students to past events and enabling them to begin to work
out what fidelity to past events might mean. It would be impossible to plan for events
within education. As Badiou states: 'it is of the essence of the event not to be
preceded by any sign, and to catch us unawares with its grace' (SP, p. 111).
However, even ifwe cannot wait for events to happen, we can still be working out the
conditions of fidelity to past events: 'Many events, even very distant ones, still require
us to be faithful to them. Thought does not wait, and it has never exhausted its
reserve of power, unless it be for him who succumbs to the profound desire to
conform, which is the path of death' (ibid.). Feltham provides a helpful example to
illustrate this idea:
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There are high-school teachers in France who try to educate students in
line with the maxim inscribed over the front door of every public school:
liberte, egalite, fraternite. These teachers are still trying to work out just
what the French revolution is, and what it entails, in the field of education.
The French revolution is not yet closed. Aux armes citoyens! The
revolution is not yet over. (Feltham, 2008, p. 103)
Badiou's call for us to be faithful to past events in the current situation requires that
the current situation be read in the light of such events, a reflection difficult to read
given the invisible abstract universalisation of the market count to which education is
accountable in contemporary situations.
Badiou's challenge is to recover education as a space for 'true-thought' that has not
been colonised by the processes of managerialism and performativity, and therefore
might allow us to think at a distance from and challenge these discourses. The current
state of the situation in education does not count students as capable of thought.
Hallward puts this point well:
Badiou's presumption is that by itself no ordinary situation ever really
counts its members as thinking beings, i.e. in terms that respect those
indefinable or inconsistent qualities that allow them to think, precisely -
their immeasurable potential, their affirmative intensity, their infinite
capacity for inspiration, and so on. Only rarely does it happen that people
act not as objects evaluated by an employer, an educator or a friend, but as
participants in one of the few possible fields in which pure affirmation is
possible (in the fields of politics, art, science or love). For a truth to
proceed in an employment situation, for instance, the criteria normally
deployed to distinguish employers from employees, and profitable
employees from unprofitable ones, would somehow have to be suspended
in an affirmation or generic equality. (Hallward, 2004, p.?)
Badiou's radical proposal for sites of education divorced from preparing students for
waged work might allow students to be initiated into truth-procedures and to
recognise and respect them as thinking beings. There is not space here to consider
what this would mean in terms of curriculum planning for this later stage of education
that Badiou proposes. However his comments that truth procedures within the fields
of art, politics, science and love have been obliterated by the 'culture-technology-
management-sexuality' system might help us to think about what would and what
would not be desirable when planning educational curricula (SP, p. 12).
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Badiou's proposals are perhaps likely to be dismissed by most educational theorists as
unworkable. Joseph Dunne explains clearly why it is so difficult to divorce education
from utilitarian economic concerns, as Badiou seems to advocate:
The relationship between education and the economy has become a
reciprocal one, with dependency running in both directions. On the one
hand, the productiveness of the economy depends on the educational
system for the supply of a skilled workforce (what is increasingly called
'human capital'). On the other hand, the educational system depends on a
productive economy for funding on the scale which is required by a
modem democratic system of schooling ... This interlocking of education
with the productive and economic sphere circumscribes the autonomy of
education, rendering problematic the ideal of a humanistic education
without utilitarian purpose. (Dunne, 2005, p. 149)
Given then that the rule of economic necessity dictates that it is highly unlikely that
Badiou's proposal will come to pass, and there may be other reasons for opposition to
his proposal, what can be done within the current state of the situation to enable
institutions of formal education to become sites for the open and infinite possibilities
for education suggested by Badiou and Levinas?
As a teacher, I feel challenged by Badiou to create situations for my students to
encounter past events and consider what it would mean to be faithful to those events
today. I want to allow them the opportunity to see the universality of the rule of the
market as a situation without capacity for truths, and consider Badiou's challenge that
the truth domains of art, science, politics and love are occluded and indeed obliterated
by the culture-technology-management-sexuality system. And so, as I reflect upon
my experience as a teacher, Badiou's writing speaks to me of the urgent need for the
recovery of the following concepts within education: space and grace. I do not choose
these terms because of a convenient assonance. 'Space' is a familiar term to be
considering within education, while 'grace' sounds scandalous within prevailing
secular discourses of education. Badiou, when read with Levinas, encourages us to
think of both terms within education in quite specific ways, so that their meaning
exceeds how the terms have been conventionally used. I will outline each only
briefly, but both invite further consideration.
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Space
In discussing his own struggle against the State apparatus, Badiou suggests that in
order to oppose the ever-extending forces of the global capitalist machine, what is
needed is space within which to think and develop one's own methods of opposition:
'We need a strategy that allows us to create our own space, to develop our own
strategies and political decisions. The question of space is fundamental to politics...
And political independence is to be able to choose your own space' (2003b, p. 189).
This can be compared with the way Levinas describes messianic politics interrupting
the totalising logic of capitalist accumulation. In the Talmudic essay, 'The Nations
and the Presence of Israel' , Levinas describes 'rays ofmessianic light', which
break the spell of having by which being insists on being. They offer a
glimpse at a future suspension of the heaping up, the amassing, the
accumulation by which, for being-in the advent of its being - it is ever and
again a question of its own being. A forgetting, a failing to recognize the
other! A piling up, amassing, unending totalization of the objects and
money that mark the rhythm and essential structure of the perseverance of
being in its being. Its concrete modes: stock-piling and banks. (TN, p.
108)
In this late essay, we see Levinas also concerned at the totalising tendencies of
capitalist accumulation, failing to attend to the other. But the messianic rays of light
that interrupt this totalising logic provide a suspension and a space to be vigilant
against this 'unending totalization'. What is needed, following our reading ofBadiou
and Levinas, is space to question the totalisation of the market. The current culture of
economic managerialism, seeking to preserve and extend the capitalist hegemony,
provides little opportunity for teachers to deviate from the accepted norms of
discourse or space to question those norms. My teacher training followed, as is
customary, an apprenticeship model, in which I learnt to make model lesson plans, to
write schemes of work, and the overriding importance ofassessment. All of these are
important, but there was no space given to questioning or exploring the political
implications and ideologies behind the systems into which we were being initiated.
And in my subsequent experience of teaching, I have seen too little opportunity
afforded to teachers to reflect upon their place within the prevailing abstractions that
dominate educational discourses. In short, many teachers are initiated into and live in
common places without space to access their potentials to engage in truth-processes.
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In a sense, as we will explore in Chapter 7, teachers and students are already political
subjects, but reading Badiou and Levinas leads me to consider that space within
education needs to be further opened up for the possibility of thinking and acting that
cannot be contained within logics derived from the economy of exchange, for both
teachers and students. Each require space to think at a distance from the prevailing
abstractions of the state of the situation, to consider, for example, the nature of past
events and how these emerged against and disrupted previous situations and
discourses. This is, therefore, not just a space that is required to think and reflect on
one's practice, but rather space as the condition for the initiation into truth-procedures
and for the possibility oflive-thought I will take up this question ofhow space relates
to the possibility of distance from the State in my final chapter.
Grace
Thought can be raised up from its powerlessness only through something
that exceeds the order of thought. 'Grace' names the event as condition
for an active thought. The condition is itself inevitably in excess of what
it conditions. (SP, pp. 84-5)
The significance of grace within Badiou's conception of truth-procedures exposes the
impoverishment of the type of thinking that can be contained, packaged, delivered
and its quality assessed within current educational systems. Thought can only become
powerful through what exceeds the nature of thought. This can be compared to the
way that Levinas's understanding of subjectivity, as a condition in which I am taught
through a relation that exceeds thought, also challenges the idea of an education
system premised on the type of thinking that can be easily planned for, delivered and
measured. The way in which the process of subjectivity begins in Badiou's thinking
in response to the infinite demand of fidelity to the event, and in Levinas' s thinking in
response to the infinite demand of the Other, interrupts the idea that an education
could ever be completed. A subject is always becoming in response to these
demands, and this not understood in any developmental sense, but as the deepening
awareness of the demand that fidelity or responsibility requires. The formation of
subjectivity involves a fidelity to an event that continually overreaches the demands
of a particular situation, a responsibility that can never be satisfied that it has done
enough.
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In 'Towards an Economy of Higher Education', Standish (2005) has argued that what
is missing within the currently dominant economy of exchange is any understanding
of the idea of an 'economy of excess'. What he describes as the 'economy of
exchange,' currently operative within education, can be compared with how Badiou
describes the state of the situation as dominated by the culture-technology-
management-sexuality system, obliterating the truth domains of art-politics-science-
love:
Instrumental reason and managerialism, as it were, stage-manage the
curriculum in what have become its rituals of presentation,
communication, assessment and accounting. The ideal product of such an
education is a being with a portfolio of transferable skills, a being with a
set ofmasks to put on, appropriately listed in a record of achievement and
instantly recognisable to employers. (Standish, 2005, p. 63)
The instrumental commodification of education is a reflection of the commodification
of all types of knowledge, experience and truth within an economy of exchange.i just
as in Badiou's outline of late capitalism's appropriation of the world through its
continual expansion of its frontiers:
Multiculturalism is thematised as a series of spectacles, foreign travel a
collection of packaged experiences. Modem epistemology grasps
knowledge, containing it in the concept, so that the knowledge economy
can then turn it into a commodity fit for exchange. Criticism is the
business of the student's crib, of book reviews in the Sunday papers, and
of late night television arts magazines. The plundering and display divert
attention from the vacuousness of the culture in which such ideas thrive
... Hence, the economy of exchange in education - that is, in 'the well-run
university' - involves a 'bourgeois theatricalisation of standards, quality
and excellence.' Practice becomes contrived and self-conscious, staged
and presented as the object of accountability's gaze. (pp. 63-4)
In contrast, Standish develops the idea of an economy of excess, explored in relation
to the significance of alterity and infinity for Levinas. Standish highlights the idea of
the pure gift, which seems an impossibility in the economy of exchange. Despite the
seeming impossibility of giving without any expectation ofreturn, we should not give
up on this idea, and the perfectionism implied here is the opposite of the closed
2 This exemplified in New Labour rhetoric of the importance of building a productive knowledge
economy, with the UK as 'a world leader in.. turning that knowledge into new products and services',
HM Treasury, Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004-2014, July 2004, para 1.1, p. 5,
cited in Callinicos, 2006, p. 12.
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totality of the economy of exchange. In Levinas's account of the scene of teaching as
depending upon an orientation of openness and infinite responsibility towards the
Other, there is a sense of the impossible, unfulfillable demand that ruptures the closed
circle of the economy of exchange. Such a teaching is never complete: the more I am
taught, the more I realise how much I have yet to learn, my subject matter always
exceeding my thought. As Standish highlights, however much the language of the
economy of exchange hides this infinite possibility of grace, that grace, 'by its very
nature, breaches those forms of closure' (p. 61).
Within an economy of excess, education takes on a different character from the closed
totality of exchange in which an learning can be planned for and assessed, according
to the dictate of managerial approaches. Rather than focusing on acquiring and
developing transferable skins, acquiring subject matter content is best achieved in the
service of what the subject seeks to know more of. In an economy ofexcess,
a subject of study comes be to understood as deepening and expanding the
more one pursues it: as with the vista that extends as one ascends the
mountainside, one progresses towards a greater understanding of what
there is still to learn... There is nothing fanciful about this: this is the
familiar experience of people who love their subjects; and against it so
many aspects of current policy and practice, and of the prevailing
discourse of teaching, learning and research methods, look palely
narcissistic. (Standish, 2005, p. 52)
While limited by dominant logics, those moments of experiencing the subject under
study deepening and extending, as Standish describes, do happen within education. I
have seen my students, and indeed myself, become absorbed and changed by texts
and ideas under study. The truth of a play, a novel, a song, can be manifest in the
setting of formal education. Indeed, in the task of writing this thesis, within the
setting of an institution of higher education, I am all too aware of the richness of
Levinas's writing deepening the more I attend to it. This deepening is such that the
demands of opening my educational home to welcome this reading, in the manner
suggested by Todd (2008, pp. 180-83) are ever extending. And so I feel, as anyone
writing about Levinas has surely likewise experienced, and as Levinas's son Michael
describes, an 'enormous vertigo of incompleteness', that the reading I have engaged
in has revealed further avenues for reflection and interrogation that I have not pursued
and that therefore this work is incomplete. Michael Levinas describes how his father
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helped him to see that it is, however, 'necessary to accept incompleteness... He
[Levinas] said to me, "Sometimes, the thing suffices in its incompleteness'" (cited in
Malka, 2006, p. 164). And it is to this attitude towards texts and subject disciplines
that Levinas and Badiou lead us: to a sense that what we offer in our readings will
necessarily be incomplete, as the teaching that takes place in an economy of excess
could never be contained or neatly closed.
Badiou challenges his reader to consider the humility of the subject affected by such a
manifested encounter:
Whoever is the subject of a truth ... knows that, in effect, he bears a
treasure, that he is traversed by an infinite power. Whether or not this
truth, so precarious, continues to deploy itself depends solely on his
subjective weakness. Thus, one may justifiably say that he bears it only in
an earthen vessel, day after day enduring the imperative - delicacy and
subtle thought - to ensure that nothing shatters it. (SP, p. 54)
As teachers, if we are to see our role as helping students to encounter the infinite
demands of truth-procedures and of responsibility, we are challenged to assist them to
see the truths they encounter in their readings as precious, fragile and dependent on
those who recognise past events as continuing to lead to new possibilities. All of this
raises questions about curricular autonomy and the role of the teacher in these
procedures, which demand further attention in the light of how these accounts of
subjectivity offered by Badiou and Levinas challenge the dominance of current
discourses. In the following chapter I will consider how this reading of education
challenges the dominant approaches to religious education that I have encountered as
a teacher, which treat religions as options, each of which can be rationally assessed
and evaluated, in much the same way as the whole of education is treated as
measurable in the neoliberal frameworks we have been considering here.
Both the event for Badiou and the scene of teaching for Levinas, as pure gifts, could
never be bought or exchanged. Despite the tendency of managerialistic approaches to
abduct truth from the proceedings of education, it is still there, even if occluded, in
the subjectivity of those who are working out fidelity to past events in such a way that
new events might take place. The challenge of both Badiou and Levinas is to be
vigilant and resist the tendency of the law of the count and the principle of the
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economy of exchange to foreclose the possibility of thought and the awareness of the
conditions of responsibility, both our students' and our own. As educators we must
be aware that the current configuration of education as measurable and deliverable
misses the richness of education as the possible site of grace. The one who is
educated is not learning only in order to get good enough grades to get a good job.
They are also potentially in the process of becoming subjects to the demands of truths
and responsibility, subjects therefore to infinite demands and, in the process, agents of
change. As educationalists, we must not allow the seeming obliteration of truth and
grace by management to hide this.
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Chapter 5
A Religious Education Otherwise?
Having considered how reading Levinas disturbs the dominance of a certain
understanding of autonomy, predicated on rational argumentation and evaluation,
enabling us to choose the best way of life, and how he and Badiou expose the
limitations of the way in which education is conceived in managerialist discourses
that place excessive emphasis on deliverable, assessable outcomes, let us now turn to
consider what this interruption might mean in practical terms. Having been a teacher
of religious education in a variety of secondary schools for the last eight years, whilst
simultaneously reading Levinas's writings on the nature of both teaching and religion,
I have become increasingly aware of how the theoretical frameworks of this subject
discipline reflect the dominance of the ideal of rational autonomy leading the
individual to be able to make choices about the best way of life, and the trend towards
measurable, attainable outcomes. The overwhelming majority of my time as a teacher
has been spent preparing students to sit public exams, so that students' performances
can be graded and the 'skills' they have acquired compared. The content of these
exams is derived from an underlying philosophy that emphasises the importance of
RE as linked to students being able to develop the 'skills' of critical thinking and
analysis, and so ultimately to be able decide for themselves, as rational autonomous
agents, which religions, if any, offer truth.
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The following questions, taken from GCSE Religious Studies examinations (OCR and
AQA syllabuses) exemplify this approach:'
'God is not real.' Do you agree? Give reasons for your answer, showing
that you have thought about more than one point of view. (5 marks)
'Religious experiences prove that God exists.' Do you agree? Give
reasons for your answer, showing that you have thought about more than
one point ofview. (5 marks)
'Suffering makes it impossible to believe in God.' Do you agree? Give
reasons for your answer, showing that you have thought about more than
one point ofview. (5 marks)
'A Christian life is a good life, but it is too strict for most people.' Do
you agree? Give reasons for your answer, showing that you have thought
about more than one point ofview. (5 marks)
These questions, from the 'Philosophy and Ethics' strand of the RE GCSE syllabus,
the most popular option for both GCSE and A Level courses, reflect the tum towards
the use of critical thinking, philosophy of religion and ethics within the study of
religion in British schools. Is there a God? Why is there suffering in the world?
What is religious truth based on? These are the sorts of questions that the majority of
young people will encounter when studying RE in secondary schools in Britain today.
The ways in which religious education specifications thematise religion as the object
of a type of critical thinking, whose truth or falsity can be described and known
through rational argumentation and evaluation is a symptom of the educational
ideologies we have described as problematic in the preceding two chapters. In this
chapter I will suggest that reading Levinas and Badiou helps us to consider how it
might be possible to teach this subject otherwise, but let us begin by turning to
consider the current place of the subject in the British curriculum, with particular
reference to the subject at GCSE and A Level.
1 These examples are mostly of what are termed A03 questions, sources AQA Religious Studies,
Specification B, Unit 1, June 2003, May 2007, May 2008; OCR Religious Studies A (World Religions)
specimen paper 2003. Some examples of AOI and A02 questions, from AQA Specification B, Unit 4,
June 2008, are:
• Give two types of evidence on which scientific truth is based. (2 marks)
• Explain religious attitudes towards cloning. You should refer to the beliefs and teachings
from either two religions or two Christian denominations in your answer. (8 marks)
• Explain two reasons why some religious people support hospices. (4 marks)
• Explain two reasons why some religious people use caffeine. (4 marks)
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Religious Education in Britain today: A Snapshot
In British schools, religious education is a compulsory subject, part of the basic
curriculum. Although RE has no prescribed syllabus, QCA2 has set out what schools
should aim to achieve in RE:
RE aims to help pupils to: acquire and develop knowledge and
understanding of Christianity and other principal religions represented in
Great Britain; develop an understanding of the influence of beliefs, values
and traditions on individuals, communities, society and cultures; develop
the ability to make reasoned and informed judgments about religious and
moral issues with reference to principal religions represented in Great
Britain; enhance their spiritual, moral, social and cultural development;
develop positive attitudes towards other people, respecting their right to
hold different religious beliefs from their own, and towards living in a
society of diverse religions (SCAA, 1994a, p. 3).
Religious Education actively promotes the values of truth, justice, respect
for all and care of the environment (QCA, 2004, p. 8).
All sound worthy aims. Who would not want to see the values of 'truth, justice and
respect for all' promoted? However the emphasis has shifted profoundly towards the
specific target of 'developing the ability to make reasoned and informed judgments
about religious and moral issues' . This has meant that philosophy of religion and
ethics have enjoyed new found prominence, with many religious education
departments re-branding themselves departments of 'Religion and Philosophy' or
'Philosophy, Ethics and Religion,' and schools increasingly opting for philosophy of
religion and ethics papers within the RE GCSE and A level. This has led to the
increased popularity of the subject: it is among the fastest growing subjects in the
curriculum at both GCSE and A level.3 The result of this is that students emerge from
their religious education able to give a reasoned justification of whether or not there is
a God, whether or not drugs should be legalised, whether or not women should be
allowed abortion on demand, but with little awareness of the complex, rich and
troubling histories and myths at the heart of religious traditions, and therefore a
distorted picture of what 'being religious' means.
2 The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority , formerly SCAA
3 In 2008, for example, it was the fastest growing subject at GCSE. See
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknewsI2598289/GCSEs-Pupils-taking-fewer-exams.html for a
discussion of recent trends in GCSE exam entries in relation to this, and also
http://www.gca.org.uk /libraryAssets /media/gca-05-2176-re-report .pdf, both accessed 14.08.09
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Why is it that RE has moved in this direction? The answer to this lies not just with
the ideologies of education we have considered in the previous two chapters, but also
with the history of the subject itself. Let us examine briefly the different aims of RE
that have dominated the profession in Britain, and in particular the phenomenological
and critical realist models that have been most prominent in recent years", before we
consider how Levinas's writing exposes some ofthe limitations of these approaches.
The Phenomenological Approach
The move away from confessional religious education began in the mid 1960s, with
the rise of Religious Studies in universities. Ninian Smart set up a major curriculum
development project on RE in 1969, which was to be very influential on the way
religious education has been taught in this country since. The project pioneered what
has become termed the 'phenomenological approach'5, which it described thus:
the aim of religious education [is] the promotion of understanding. It uses
the tools of scholarship in order to enter into an empathetic experience of
the faith of individuals and groups. It does not seek to promote anyone
religious viewpoint but it recognizes that the study of religion must
transcend the purely informative (Schools Council 1971, 21 quoted in
Jackson, 1997, p. 8).
Whereas with the confessional model, the aim was subtle indoctrination into
Christianity, phenomenological religious education reacted strongly against this: six
world faiths were to be studied, and tolerance of difference and empathy replaced
nurture into Christianity as the aim of religious education. The phenomenological
model is dialogical in that it places importance on collaboration with religious
communities in constructing curricula for study and in the preparation of texts for
4 I am aware that these are not the only two approaches to RE that have been used in Britain in recent
years, but I am focusing on these two as those that appear to have had the most significant impact upon
the way the subject as been taught. For a comprehensive overview of alternative approaches, see Stem
2006.
5 'Phenomenological' is here being used in a technical sense, distinct from the way Levinas describes
his own indebtedness to phenomenology.
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analysis. As Robert Jackson, a prominent researcher influenced by the
phenomenological school" describes:
A key element in a 'conversational' view of religious education is a clear
acknowledgement that voices from inside the traditions . . . need to be
taken very seriously . . . Members of religious groups and traditions are
not simply 'objects of study', but are writers of resource material, pupils,
colleagues, parents and others whose voices are relevant to the processes
of education. (Jackson, 1997, p. 134)
This emphasis on conversation in the phenomenological model is rooted in the ideal
of interfaith dialogue. This is not surprising since Smart, the pioneer of this method in
religious education, was also a researcher and practitioner of interfaith dialogue
within religious studies.
However, there are problems with this approach. While tolerance and empathy are
desirable aims in many respects, one might object to empathy as suggesting a
transparency of the other person, the view that we could understand her and her
religious lifeworld. Jackson himself questions whether empathy is possible, although
he does retain it as a fundamental aim of RE: 'The interpretive approach reveals how
problematic empathy is, and how easy it is to convince ourselves that we have
empathized with another when in reality we have not done so' (Jackson, 1997, p. 46).
Todd, in a chapter examining empathy in Learning from the Other outlines how,
following Levinas, empathy is limited in the possibilities it offers for ethical
relationality in education (Todd, 2003a, pp. 43-63). While openness to the otherness
of different religious traditions and ways of life is desirable, we cannot see empathy
as an aim in itself, since it implies a problematic transparency of the Other.
Tolerance is more desirable. Levinas draws attention to the notion of tolerance as
'bearing the weight of others', an idea which can be traced to the etymology of
'tolerance' in the Latin 'tolerare', which implies bearing, or supporting, as well as
suffering or enduring (DF, p. 173). The more common understanding of tolerance
6 The religious education label with which Robert Jackson is most usually associated is 'interpretive
pedagogy', which has much in common with the phenomenological approach, but places great
emphasis on interpretation. Julian Stem summarises the approach thus: 'In religious terms, the focus is
on internal diversity as wen as religious plurality, and on a serious engagement with the layering of
religion, culture and philosophy. In terms of learners, the key skill is interpretation' (Stem, 2006,
p.77).
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implies a sense ofputting up with a belief or practice that you find disagreeable. This
is more problematic, since it implies an attitude of superiority in the one who is
tolerant, placing the self above the other. Is this what we should be aiming for in
religious education? On one level, it would be a step forward if we could achieve
greater tolerance, yet clarification is needed on what tolerance means and how this
could be promoted within RE, for example in how tolerance might be related to
concepts ofhospitality.
In recent years, the emphasis has shifted away from these models within the
phenomenological school to the 'critical realist' model, which has led to the rise of
philosophy of religion and ethics within the subject. To this let us now tum.
The Critical Realist Model
The pioneer of the critical realist approach is Andrew Wright, whose Religious
Education in the Secondary School: Prospects for Religious Literacy (1993) has had a
great influence in shifting the emphasis of the subject away from phenomenological
approaches towards the evaluation of the truth claims of the different religious
traditions. In this, Wright criticised the phenomenological approach, described as
'liberal religious education', as leading to relativisation of religious truth through the
implication that all religions offer an equally valid path to truth:
the truth claims of individual religions were seen as private issues that
were not to be dealt with in the classroom, ignoring the reality that at the
heart of each of the religions being dealt with lies a claim to the
possession of the unique and ultimate truth about reality. Thus... the
demand for openness and neutrality became in reality a claim that each, in
its own way, offers an equally valid path to truth. Yet this is precisely
what the world's faiths, in their own self-understanding as opposed to the
liberal interpretation, do not claim. (Wright, 1993, p. 40)
Wright therefore advocated what he terms a 'critical realist' model, in which students
are enabled to critique different truth claims, to evaluate autonomously and rationally
the best way to live one's life, to question, as he writes, 'are the things that I am
ultimately concerned about in harmony with the way reality ultimately is? Or am I
living a life grounded in a false illusion?' (p. 45). He went on to propose an agenda
for RE, which has largely been taken up in British secondary schools:
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To enable our pupils to reach a depth of understanding of the moral and
social dilemmas before humanity we must allow them to see what these
dilemmas and questions look like in the light of the question of ultimate
truth. (ibid.)
The aim of this approach is for each student to be able to evaluate for herself what
Wright calls questions of 'ultimate truth', on a range ofreligious and ethical issues.
Philip Barnes, in Taking Religious Difference Seriously, has also insisted on the
importance of religious education grappling with the truth claims that he sees lying at
the heart of the different religious traditions. For him, religions are essentially
concerned with 'ultimate truths', which he sees as mostly mutually exclusive:
the religions endorse different and wen-nigh contradictory systems of
belief. For example, Christians believe that the divine is personal and
Trinitarian in form; Jews and Muslims deny this, although they agree that
God is personal", in contrast with Advaita Vedanta Hindus, who believe
that the divine is an impersonal principle ... It is not just that the religions
differ, it is that they differ in fundamental ways. Each version of religion,
moreover, believes its beliefs and doctrines faithfully represent and
picture the true nature of reality. Simply, the different religions each
claim to be true, while affirming different doctrinal systems of belief.
(Barnes, 2009, p. 40)
Although Barnes does not here use the term 'critical realism', we can see the same
emphasis on RE evaluating questions of 'ultimate truth', which he sees as the most
important aspect of each religious tradition. Barnes, like Wright, is keen that RE
avoids imposing any 'relativist religious identity that follows from liberal theological
assumptions' (p. 42). The agenda he proposes for the subject is that rather than
looking for similarities between religious traditions, religious educators must take
religious difference seriously, and to do this means 'to acknowledge the importance of
beliefs and doctrines' (ibid.). He argues that religions themselves see belief as
central, and that any responsible education must acknowledge this. The task therefore
for religious educators is to enable students to evaluate, differentiate and choose,
using rational argumentation, between the truth claims made by the different
religions. He suggests that liberal religious education has attended to the question of
7 This leads me to wonder about his sources of information on this. The long history of Jewish atheism
is well documented. Zizek, in Violence, points out that 'according to some polls, Israelis are the most
atheistic nation in the world: around 70 per cent of them do not believe in any kind of divinity' (2009,
p.l05).
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truth by the tacit assumption that there is truth in all religious traditions, but he is
critical of such an approach, arguing that 'such a conviction actually fails both to
engage critically with the issue of truth in religion and to equip pupils with knowledge
and skills to enable them to choose wisely from the rich variety of religious options
that are culturally available' (p.50). He concludes that what is needed for students to
be able to choose wisely, is an element of philosophy within RE, 'for it is this
discipline that traditionally provides the skills and the framework for assessing and
evaluating competing truth claims' (ibid.), an ideology we can see as largely similar
to that underlying the emphasis on rational autonomy we considered earlier.
Wright has, in more recent work, developed a more nuanced form of critical realism,
'read in partnership with alteristic forms of post-modernity' (Wright, 2004, p.63),
including Levinas. In Religion, Education and Post-Modernity he sets out an agenda
for a critical realist pedagogy, emphasising that critical realism should approach the
question of reality in a way that admits of some degree of subjective truth and keen to
avoid the perception that critical realism could claim any kind of view from nowhere.
He outlines the following as the basic truth claims affirmed by critical realism:
That there is a reality existing independently of our ability to perceive or
understand it; that our comprehension of the world must take account of
our own subjective engagement with reality; and that the complexity of
reality requires an appropriate level of critical thinking and self-criticism
ifwe are to penetrate beneath surface appearances. (p. 55)
Wright acknowledges a sense of the contingency in the critical realist approach to the
knowledge we could gain of such reality, and argues that together with some
postmodernist approaches, this critical realist approach suggests 'a way of progressing
towards deeper and more truthful knowledge of ourselves, and of our place in the
ultimate order-of-things' (p. 64). This phrasing, and the way that the language of
'ultimate truth' and 'ultimate reality' continues to reverberate through Religion,
Education and Post-Modernity suggests that this modified version of critical realism,
still holds to the belief that there is an ultimate order of things, and this informs
Wright's understanding of religion.
It is interesting to see how Wright has worked Levinas into his more recent work on
critical religious education. Central to his interpretation of Levinas is his
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understanding of alterity as a form of mystery, which might lead to are/enchantment
with the world and of theology. He sees the centrality of goodness in Levinas's
writing as the recognition of the difference and space between I and Other. Wright
describes this sense of goodness in Levinas's writing as follows:
Goodness, Levinas insists, is dependent on my learning to gaze into the
face of the Other and recognising the space between us as a sacred space.
True morality lies not in the overcoming of difference, but rather in the
celebratory vision ofdifference. (p. 50)
What Wright seems to find most significant in Levinas is this idea of difference,
'Levinas's vision of humanity flourishing through its celebratory encounters with
alterity, difference and otherness' (ibid.). He goes on to describe alterity as
foundational - the 'bed-rock' for both Levinas and Derrida's thinking about 'the
order-of-things' (p. 123). Wright links this to a virtue of receptivity, which he
describes as one of four virtues within a critical realist framework (the others being
honesty, wisdom and truthfulness). This more nuanced version of critical reason
provides a corrective to the excessive dominance of instrumental critical reasoning in
Wright's earlier model. However, it is open to debate whether the main insight that
we should draw from Levinas in relation to RE is this idea of a 'celebration of
difference and alterity'. Whilst this balances earlier versions of critical realism that
sought to bring all within the sphere of my understanding, the problem with
emphasising this celebration of difference, and seeing goodness as the recognition of
difference, is that it appears to neutralise both the infinite demand out of which
subjectivity emerges, and the troubling nature of the confrontation with the Other, that
Levinas emphasises, which is far from a celebration of difference.
Wright's interpretation is easily open to the critique of interpretations of Levinas,
offered by Badiou. We have already discussed the grounds of Badiou' s critique, but
in relation to Wright's reading, it is worth noting that a celebration of difference is
insufficient as an ethical grounding for religious education, or as any kind of
educational aim. It seems, as Badiou writes, to be a given that in any classroom, or in
any curriculum, students will encounter difference, because that is just what there is.
What is missing then in this reading of Levinas is the traumatic and troubling nature
of the approach and demand of the Other, which stands at a significant distance from
the 'celebratory encounters with difference' that Wright advocates, and the curvature
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of intersubjective space, which is what Levinas calls 'the very presence of God' (TI,
p. 291), signifying the Other as my teacher, always higher than me, and to whom I am
always already responsible.
This outline of ideology shifts within religious education has been necessarily brief,
focusing on the two most dominant trajectories of thinking within the subject. Before
turning to Levinas, let us address briefly the impact critical realism has had on the
way that the subject is taught and assessed.
The Influence of Critical Realism
Although Wright's more recent work has been open to Levinasian perspectives on
alterity, the clarity and persuasive force of his earlier work, emphasising the
instrumentality of reason allowing us to autonomously grasp, or at least to move
towards, 'ultimate truth' , has had a significant influence on RE curricula at secondary
level. Because of this desire inherent within critical realism to enable students to
evaluate what constitutes ultimate truth, RE teachers spend much of their time
teaching GCSE students to evaluate the various arguments that have been put forward
by philosophers for and against the existence of God, the ethical debates surrounding
such issues as abortion, voluntary euthanasia and genetic engineering, and students
are assessed on their ability to present rational arguments to the sort of questions
listed at the beginning of the paper, carefully supported by examples and evidence.
I do not wish to suggest that students should not learn to employ critical reasoning
within religious education. I would agree with Wright that some examination of
religious truth claims enables students to stand in critical engagement with the
religious and non-religious traditions into which they have been raised. But there
must be greater attention given to the situatedness of the critical reasoner, to the fact
that they stand within a certain epistemic community with its own assumptions.
Although his later work does pay more attention to this (Wright, 2004, p. 54), exam
specifications, influence by his earlier work, pay insufficient attention to this
emphasis. Furthermore, I would argue that the critical realist model indoctrinates
students into a distorted understanding of what it is to be religious. The centrality of
the philosophy of religion within RE leads students to view being religious as
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believing that certain statements of knowledge are true. Thus exam specifications,
determining to a large extent the content of the curriculum, for the reasons we
considered in the previous chapter, tend to present religion in too simplistic terms as
assent to religious propositions. So, for example, students might read in a GCSE
textbook:
If you belong to a religion, you are likely to say that your religion is true.
It must be true for you, otherwise you would not believe in it. As you
believe your religion to be true, you would probably go on to say that it
possesses the truth ... There are, however, many religions and most people
believe that only one view can be right. This means that religions often
make conflicting claims to the truth. Buddhism says there is no God.
Other religions believe that God exists. (Beck and Warden, 2002, p. 6)
As a discussion of religious truth, this is inadequate and a picture of religious truth
that many members of religious traditions would disagree with.
A further problem, tangentially related to the dominance of the critical realist model,
is the way contemporary issues with only marginal relevance to religious traditions
have become established on RE curricula. This is related to the desire to see some
aspects of PSHE and citizenship covered within RE. However, the examination of
such issues borrows critical realist methodologies and is linked to the emphasis within
critical realism that students should evaluate religious responses to ethical issues.
Given the decline in the percentage of the British population involved with organised
religion, this might be linked to a desire on the part of religious educators to make the
issues covered in RE seem relevant to students. The result is that we have such topics
in the GCSE syllabus as 'drug abuse' and 'the media.' The following are some GCSE
questions from the 'drug abuse' topic:
Explain two reasons why some religious people use caffeine. (4 marks)
How might the teachings of the religion you have studied affect the
attitudes of believers towards drug taking in sport? (10 marksj'
Admittedly, it is of fundamental importance that students learn about the effects and
debates surrounding drug abuse, but given that no religious tradition that I am aware
of prioritises the issue of performance-enhancing drugs in sport in its moral teachings,
8 Both questions from AQA Religious Studies, Specification B, Unit 3, June 2008.
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should it be a topic that we should devote time and attention to within religious
education? Surely trying to make the subject appealing through focusing on
contemporary issues in this way undermines the integrity of the subject?
Although this overview of current approaches dominating RE at GCSE and A Level
has been brief, we can seen that conceptually and ideologically, the subject is not
fulfilling its potential. Indeed OFSTED, in a recent report on the state of RE in
British schools, has pointed out problems with the dominance of philosophy of
religion and ethics within current RE teaching:
RE cannot ignore the social reality of religion. Most of the issues in the
RE curriculum for secondary pupils have been about ethical or
philosophical matters, such as arguments about the existence of God, or
debates, from a religious perspective, about medical ethics or the
environment. It has been unusual to find questions about religion's role in
society, changing patterns of religion in the local community, or the rise
and decline of religious practice. It now needs to embrace the study of
religion and society. (OFSTED 20071 070045)
As a teacher of RE, over the last eight years, I have seen in my school and others, a
very decisive shift towards the philosophy of religion in RE, reflected in the exam
syllabuses at GCSE and A Level and this OFSTED report indicates that I am not
alone in my unease at the growing dominance of philosophical approaches towards
religion within the subject.
There is work to be done, therefore, in clarifying the aims ofRE. At the heart ofboth
the phenomenological and critical realist models is a desire to avoid religious
indoctrination. The phenomenological model was a reaction against indoctrination
within the confessional form of RE, in which students were instructed in the Christian
faith, rooted in study of the Bible. The critical realist model likewise aims against
indoctrination, by enabling students to develop rational autonomy through critique
and evaluation. It also aims against the form of indoctrination that Wright sees in
operation in the phenomenological approach: a liberal religious indoctrination that
approaches all religions as reducible to a shared set of social structures, beliefs and
practices, such as rites of passage and founding myths. Clearly, this desire to protect
students against religious indoctrination is important; however, it is my contention
that the dominant critical realist model nevertheless might lead to a more subtle
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indoctrination into students seeing religious and ethical truths as matters open to
evaluation and justification.
So, following on from our readings of Levinas and Badiou, is it possible to think
about how this subject might be conceived otherwise?
A Religious Education Otherwise?
In a recent sixth form lesson, I asked students who were thinking of applying for
theology at university to write down and then discuss their understanding of what the
subject involved. One of my students, himself a Christian, described Theology as,
'the study of the transcendent and inarticulable Good, through examining how people
from different religious traditions and faith communities have responded to and
attempted to articulate this transcendent.' Whilst I would disagree with his definition
of the subject, given that many students of theology do not believe there to be any
'transcendent and inarticulable Good', his definition of what the study of theology
involves nevertheless highlights the currently impoverished state of RE in contrast.
The problem perhaps lies with the disputed concept of 'religion' itself. While the
phenomenological model is problematic, paying insufficient attention to the otherness
and opacity of the object of study, and tending to domesticate all religions as broadly
similar, the critical realist model distorts religion into a matter of true v. false
knowledge (the question of what really is the 'ultimate truth', to use Wright's
terminology). Both approaches tend to imply a transparency of religion, either in
terms of religious belief or in terms of its lifeworlds, belying the complexity of
religiosity, which as my student suggested, for those within religious traditions is
founded on what is beyond articulation and, arguably, rational justification.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop a definition of religion that could be
used as a basis for clarifying the aims of religious education: the very attempt to give
a definition of religion is itself contested, with interpreters of religion offering
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variously lexical, empirical and stipulative theories of religion." What I wish to do in
the remainder of this chapter is to consider the ways in which Levinas's descriptions
of transcendence, illeity and religion, related to his use of theological terminology that
we considered earlier, open up an alternative approach to religious education that
breaches the intellectual closure of the phenomenological and critical realist
approaches. Before doing so, it is worth noting that the claims that Barnes and
Wright, in his earlier work, make about religions being primarily about truth claims is
not an understanding of religion that would fmd ready acceptance amongst many
theorists of religion. Consider, for example, William James's classic defmition of
religion in The Varieties of Religious Experience. James acknowledges that any
definition of religion will be oversimplified, because of the very diversity of
religiosity, but seems to point towards ritual as at one level the most basic element of
religion: 'Worship and sacrifice, procedures for working on the dispositions of the
deity, theology and ceremony and ecclesiastical organization, are the essentials of
religion in the institutional sense' (James, 2002, p. 28). On another level, James sees
the basis of religion as relating to what he describes as 'the inner dispositions ofman':
'his conscience, his deserts, his helplessness, his incompleteness' (ibid.). Friedrich
Schleiermacher would likewise have disagreed with the idea of religion primarily
pertaining to truth claims, doctrines and beliefs, describing religion as 'the sensibility
and taste for the infmite' (1996, p.23). Whilst both Schleiermacher and James's
'definitions' are problematic - it is, as we have seen in Chapter 1, problematic to posit
'feeling' as in some way separable from the frameworks of language and
interpretation within which we make sense of feeling - they nevertheless highlight
that the claim that religion is a matter of 'ultimate truth' that could be established
through rational evaluation is already contested. Wright himself acknowledges this
and does admittedly want in his later work to stress that 'ultimate truth' / 'ultimate
reality' might always lie beyond rational argument. But his theological critique of
Schleiermacher does seem to posit a theory of truth at odds with what Levinas will
wish to claim, for example arguing that 'the major problem for romantic forms of
9 Thomas Tweed highlights the lack of agreement amongst sociologists of religion as to the nature of
religion: "'It was once a tactic of students of religion," Jonathan Z. Smith argued... , "to cite the
appendix of James H. Leuba's Psychological Study of Religion (1912), which lists more than fifty
definitions of religion, to demonstrate that the effort clearly to define religion in short compass is a
hopeless task.'" (Tweed, 2006, p. 41)
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theology was how to distinguish between subjective experience of the inner self and
objective experience of the divine' (2004, p. 77).
Let us tum then to consider how Levinas allows us to conceive of the possibility of a
religious education otherwise. I will outline how Levinas's understanding of religion
is in some ways (uncharacteristically) similar to Zizek's writing on the nature of
belief, and show how their understandings provide a stark contrast and challenge to
the implicit theorisations of religion at the heart of the currently dominant models of
RE we have considered.
In his essay on Franz Rosenzweig in DifJicuZt Freedom, Levinas describes religion as
follows:
Religion, before being a confession, is the very pulsation of life in which
God enters into a relationship with Man, and Man with the World.
Religion, like the web of life, is anterior to the philosopher's totality.
Life or religion is simultaneously posterior and anterior to philosophy and
reason, reason itself appearing as a moment in life. I insist on this fact:
unity is not here the formal unity of God, Man and the World, which
would be produced beneath the gaze that adds something even as it
reduces, through the synthetic thought of a philosopher who remains
outside the elements. (DF, p. 189)
Here we see that for Levinas, religion, and indeed life itself, might be concerned with
truth, but if so, this is a very different notion of truth than the idea of an 'ultimate
truth' glimpsed through rational argument as in the critical realist model. For
Levinas, religion concerns the transcendent in 'relationship with Man, and Man with
the World.' The transcendent, as Levinas insists, does not fall within the
philosopher's totality, and therefore the attempt to study religion through critical
evaluation of its truth or falsity, appears nonsensical. We have seen how examination
specifications in RE are much preoccupied with attempts to prove or disprove God's
existence. Yet this misses the very nature of religion, as emphasised by Levinas.
Peperzak puts this point well:
We must understand that God is neither a phenomenon nor a being, and
that neither God nor human subjectivity, freedom nor speaking can be
understood as themes or topics of thematization. They precede any
possible logic, as not only Levinas, but the entire tradition of Western
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onto-theology knew. A God that could be proven would certainly not be
Godly enough to be "fl." He would fit our categories - and thus, perhaps,
give us satisfaction - but this would disqualify him from being God.
(Peperzak, 1997, p. 107)
In 'God and Philosophy,' Levinas suggests that God is what bursts open the
'omnipotence of the logos, of the logos of system and simultaneity' and instead
manifests 'transcendence as signification, and signification as the signification of an
order given to subjectivity before any statement: a pure one-for-the-other.' (GM, p.
78) Levinas makes it clear that God, like the infinitude of the ethical demand, cannot
be thematised and indeed is revealed as what could never be brought to presence in
language in iUeity. The term illeity, as Michael B. Smith points out, is linked to the
Latin demonstrative ille, illa, illud and as with this pronoun, designates something
brought to my attention, yet at a distance. Smith suggests that this term is then used
by Levinas in contrast with the notion of reciprocity in a dialogical relationship:
The dialogical relationship brings with it elements that make it an
inadequate structure for transcendence because of the reciprocity and
eventual play of gratitude and psychological interplay to which both
parties of the dialogue are open. The otherness of the other person is
preserved and his or her stature as 'greater than myself' safeguarded only
if the face ofthe other is 'in the trace' ofilleity. (Smith, 2005, p. 89)
This dense concept of illeity is used by Levinas to invoke the refusal of reciprocity
and totalisation and means that slipping into a relation of equality is impossible,
which means that neither I, nor my neighbour, nor the third party, can be reduced to
essence or identity. Levinas uses theological terms to signify the transcendence
bound up in the concept of illeity:
This saying belongs to the very glory of which it bears witness. This way
for the order to come from I know not where, this coming that is not a
recalling, is not the return of a present modified or aged into a past, this
non-phenomenality of the order which, beyond representation affects me
unbeknownst to myself, 'slipping into me like a thief,' we have called
illeity .. ..
The word God is an overwhelming semantic event that subdues the
subversion worked by illeity. (OB, pp. 150-51)
Illeity is what allows the word God to be said, without allowing it to be thematised:
'Illeity overflows both cognition and the enigma through which the Infinite leaves a
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trace in cognition ... It makes the word God be pronounced, without letting "divinity"
be said... It is non-thematizable' (p. 162).
The idea of religion is used by Levinas to describe both religion, in a prophetic mode
of voice, and the condition of subjectivity: responding to the need of my neighbour
who approaches me yet remains ultimately unknowable in illeity, bearing the trace of
God in the appeal they present to me to respond to their address. We will explore this
further in the following chapter in relation to the idea of the neighbour. This is in
some senses not so far from my sixth form student's implicit understanding of
religion in his description of theology as the study of 'the transcendent and
inarticulable Good'. This view of religion is ethical at its core and as such cannot be
reduced to knowledge. Levinas states: 'Ethics is not the corollary of the vision of
God, it is that very vision' (DF, p. 17) and 'The ethical order does not prepare us for
the Divinity; it is the very accession to the Divinity. All the rest is a dream' (p. 102).
The magnitude of the ethical demand from which my subjectivity, and any sense of
divinity, emerges is rather more than any 'celebratory encounter with alterity' as in
Wright's interpretation of Levinas. Towards the end of Totality and Infinity, Levinas
describes how subjectivity depends upon the 'curvature of the intersubjective space',
in which the Other, higher than me, addresses me and looks for my response. This
Levinas describes as 'perhaps the very presence of God' (TI, p. 291). Strikingly, and
at odds with Wright's interpretation, the possibility of violence and hostility are
always there within the approach in which the divinity is to be found, emphasising the
difficulty implicit in all our relations with alterity:
The true essence of man is presented in his face, in which he is infinitely
other than a violence like unto mine, opposed to mine and hostile, already
at grips with mine in a historical world where we participate in the same
system. He arrests and paralyzes my violence by his call (TI, pp. 290-91).
Thus we can see that for Levinas, religion stands beyond ontology and cannot be
grasped by comprehension. He is critical of those versions of theology that treat
transcendence or God as something that could be understood conceptually, as is the
implicit theorisation of God within critical realist frameworks:
Theology imprudently treats the idea of the relation between God and the
creature in terms of ontology. It presupposes the logical privilege of
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totality, as a concept adequate to being ... But transcendence precisely
refuses totality, does not lend itself to a view that would encompass it
from outside. Every 'comprehension' of transcendence leaves the
transcendent outside ... The transcendent is what cannot be encompassed.
This is an essential precision of the notion of transcendence, utilizing no
theological notion. (TI, p, 293)
Current models of RE, emphasising the importance of conceptual transparency and
the ability to logically, autonomously evaluate and critique the rival truth claims of
religions are already misconstruing the nature of religion, ifwe follow Levinas.
Perhaps surprisingly, given his critique of Levinas elsewhere, Zitek's theorization of
belief also emphasises that it cannot be reduced to knowledge. In How to Read
Lacan, he suggests that it is characteristic of both religious fundamentalists and
religious sceptics to reduce religious truths to knowledge: 'For both liberal cynics and
religious fundamentalists, religious statements are quasi-empirical statements of direct
knowledge: fundamentalists accept them as such, while sceptical cynics mock them.'
(Zizek, 2006, p. 117) This view, for Zizek, misses the groundless nature of belief,
which is about commitment and ethical to its core, an ethics that cannot be reduced to
or justified in terms ofknowledge:
A fundamentalist does not believe, he knows it directly. Both liberal-
sceptical cynics and fundamentalists share a basic feature: the loss of the
ability to believe, in the proper sense ofthe term. What is unthinkable for
them is the groundless decision that installs all authentic beliefs, a
decision that cannot be based on a chain of reasonings, on positive
knowledge. Think ofAnne Frank... in a true act of credo quia absurdum,
asserted her belief that there is a divine spark of goodness in every human
being, no matter how depraved he or she is. This statement does not
concern facts, it is posited as a pure ethical axiom.. . At its most
fundamental, authentic belief does not concern facts, but gives expression
to an unconditional ethical commitment. (ibid.)
Current models of RE, assessing students ability to present a reasoned and justified
evaluation of religion are then missing the point, and indeed encouraging a
polarisation between 'liberal-sceptical cynics', Richard Dawkins as their figurehead,
and more conservative forms of religion, which do see religion as something that can
be known.
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This is, as I have emphasised, not to say that critical reason is not an important aspect
of RE. As Grace Jantzen writes in her critique of the dominance of an objective
notion of critical reasoning in the philosophy ofreligion
Critical reason need not be replaced by a sardine can opener, but it could
very beneficially be supplemented by ... a wider understanding of reason
that includes sensitivity and attentiveness, wen-trained intuition and
discernment, creative imagination, and lateral as wen as linear thinking.
(Jantzen, 1998, p. 69)
The problem lies not only, however, with the dominance of critical reason, but with
the language of 'ultimate truth' and 'ultimate reality' that resounds throughout the
critical realist frameworks. Why is 'truth' not enough? A better language of truth
might be Badiou's, in which the subjective truth of religion as a universal singularity
would imply the ethical commitment to a truth that ruptures former knowledges and
forces new knowledges to be produced." Truth here, as in the Levinasian notion of
the transcendent, exceeds any knowledge of the current situation and refuses to be
contained by conceptual thinking or rational argument: it is experienced as radically
subjective. This is, admittedly, rather a different notion of truth than that of critical
realism: what is true, for Levinas, is not just a matter of personal taste or whim, but of
being called to account by the Other and an the others.
Given these alternative theorisations of the nature of religion opened up by our
reading of Levinas, is it possible to say what religious education is, or rather, what it
should be today? Perhaps surprisingly, the recent OFSTED report on RE offers some
clues as to a possible way forward:
RE cannot ignore its role in fostering community cohesion and in
educating for diversity. This goal has never been far from good RE
teaching but the current changes in society give this renewed urgency.
Pupils have opinions, attitudes, feelings, prejudices and stereotypes.
Developing respect for the commitments of others while retaining the
right to question, criticise and evaluate different viewpoints is not just an
academic exercise: it involves creating opportunities for children and
young people to meet those with different viewpoints. They need to grasp
10 Although Badiou is resistant to seeing events as taking place within the realm of religion, it is
possible to criticise him on this, since clearly those within religious traditions do constitute certain
occurrences as 'events' and might perceive themselves as working out the conditions of fidelity to that
event in their lives. Badiou's own work on 81. Paul further supports this idea that it is possible to
understand religion in this way.
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how powerful religion is in people's lives. RE should engage pupils'
feelings and emotions, as well as their intellect. (OFSTED 20071 070045)
An understanding of religion as founded on an ethical sensibility that is irreducible to
knowledge, following Levinas, might provide a conceptual framework to support
these recommendations of the OFSTED report. There is an urgent need, therefore, for
more work to be done to tidy up the conceptual confusion about what the study of
religion should involve in British schools and why it is so important, given the rise of
religious fundamentalisms and violent reactions to them in Britain and elsewhere. As
OFSTED suggests, students need to meet those with different viewpoints, to engage
with them in a dialogue of openness in order to work together for a more just
community.
It may be that the discussion has been proceeding at what some may fmd too abstract
a level. Let me take a more personal tum at this point in order to reflect on ways in
which some of these matters are shown in relief in my own experience. The school
where I have taught for the last five years has students from predominantly secular
liberal and Christian backgrounds, with a sizeable minority of Jewish, Muslim and
Hindu students. Last term a colleague invited a number of girls from a Muslim
school in East London to spend the day with students at our school, for them to
compare their experiences of studying religion and discuss the different ways in
which religion impacts on their experiences of being teenagers in London. This was
the first time that this had happened in our school, and such experiences are
comparatively rare. I I But it provided a valuable opportunity to meet and engage with
those from a very different background, and for our students, from largely secular
households, it provided an invaluable insight into what it might be like to live as a
teenager whose religious identity is very important to them. Yet clearly within school
communities themselves, difference is also already there, as are the opportunities for
attending to this. In my school, one of the design technology teachers, a prominent
figure within his local synagogue, was invited to a Year 7 RE class to explain how
and why he prayed. Significantly, when asked why he prayed, he replied, 'I do not
pray because I believe in God. I do this because my father did it, and his father, and
his father before him. Doing this is for me holy because it carries on that tradition.'
II Julian Stem also outlines a helpful approach to facilitating face-to-face dialogue between those of
different faith traditions (2006, p. 33).
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His own description here ofhis place within his religious tradition seems at odds with
what Wright and Barnes identify as the essence of religion as being about truth
claims. For this teacher, his religiosity appears to me to be bound up in an ethical
demand he has experienced to carry on the tradition of his father, and his religious
subjectivity seems clearly dependent upon the performance of ritual. Prayer is usually
presented in RE textbooks as primarily a conversation between the religious believer
and God, but in the experience of this teacher, it is the performance of the ritual,
which has come to him as a gift from the outside, from those that he loved, that comes
to defme his beliefs about the ritual.
In addition to having more opportunities to meet with those of different religious
traditions, what is also required is a different attitude towards texts, artefacts, and
other objects of study. I did not take RE for GCSE or A level- the phenomenological
model in operation at the time was unattractive - but pursued literary subjects. In my
experience of these subjects at school, we were not encouraged to engage with each
text as closed and complete enough for a thoroughgoing critique, but rather read each
in such a way that new meanings would emerge as we turned back to them again and
again, so that I would never have claimed to have fully understood or exhausted the
meaning of King Lear, for example. This is in striking contrast with the demands of
the RE A level, in which students have so many philosophers of religion and ethics
that they need to cover, that they are able to spend barely a week on each philosopher
(little more than two hours of teaching), in which time they are expected to
understand his or her theory and be able to critique it. Thus teachers have little time
to give students primary texts to engage with, and if they do, there is barely time to
read them, and most students rely on potted versions of philosophers from textbooks.
Thus, I always feel slightly shocked when I encounter a Year 13 student who can
declare 'Descartes's crap', not having read anything by Descartes, but feels that since
all that he needs to know of Descartes to get an A is to be able to critique the
ontological argument for the existence of God, he is justified in making such a claim.
It is not the student's fault that he feels satisfied and qualified with such a superficial
knowledge; it is rather the fault of those who have devised such assessment criteria,
and who have focused on the overriding importance on measurable outcomes within
education as a whole, as explored in the previous chapter, that in RE have had the
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effect of privileging the ability to set up a philosopher's argument only to be able to
knock it down again.
What would lead to a better religious literacy and engagement with the stories at the
heart of each religious tradition might therefore be a more literary approach, where
the aim is a deep insight into the different levels at which stories can be read and
interpreted, rather than an approach focused on mastery and critical points-scoring. In
a recent article in The Guardian, Andrew Motion expressed his regret that students
are unable to enter into our literary heritage because of their lack of understanding of
the Bible and other religious texts. Although not describing himself as religious, he
nevertheless sees these stories as enormously important to our cultural heritage.
When asked why he is so passionate about the importance of children studying the
Bible, he replied:
Simply because it is full of terrific stories. These stories are primitive.
They speak to us about human nature and the recurring patterns of human
behaviour .. . Many of my students stumble into vaguely mythological
stories in their writing. When I ask them anything about the Bible, they
frankly don't know.... I do think there is a real problem with the education
system that has allowed these great stories to disappear, to fade out of the
diet everyone gets at school. It' s an essential piece of cultural Iuggage.v'
Perhaps what I am advocating, therefore, is a move in the subject more towards the
approach of theology as it has more usually been taught within liberal universities,
involving a multidisciplinary approach: philosophical, yes, but also involving literary,
historical, sociological and psychological approaches towards the study of religion,
but with more emphasis given to attentiveness to the subjects of study, rather than just
setting every belief or truth up as an object of critique.
I do not wish to suggest that students should not study philosophy of religion and
ethics. Indeed, I would wish to see philosophy established as a discrete subject of
study alongside religious education on the curriculum. But, the complexity of the
social reality of religion is something that must be prioritised within RE, in a way that
is not supported by the current framework. Indeed, as the OFSTED report tells of the
need to encourage respect for others, we might extend this to speak of the need to
12 From http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2009/feb/17/bibIe-rei igion-andrew-motion, accessed
17.02.09
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teach 'a religion for adults' (DF, pp. 11-24) in the sense that Levinas describes, a
religion ofhumanity that 'does not mystify the notion of the divine; it realizes that the
language of God arises for us when we are aware of our responsibility to others and of
the demands ofjustice' (Morgan, 2007, p. 345). Indeed, teaching RE in the way that I
am suggesting might itself be seen as the practice of this type of religiosity. I do not,
unlike Wright, think it possible to insist on a virtue of receptivity, in either teachers or
students. But if assessment criteria and the content of the curriculum were to be
changed, it might be possible to move away from the dominance of seeing religion as
primarily concerned with philosophical questions about the existence of God. It is
true that not all members of religious traditions would agree with my alternative
theorisation of religion: it is a trait of fundamentalism, both atheist and religious, to
see religious truth as knowledge that can be argued for and justified. But it is vital
that religious education also presents a picture of religion otherwise, a religion for
adults. Such a religious education might constitute an interruption of approaches to
education that have the effect of instrumentalising the curriculum towards goals that
can become totalising, as we have considered in the preceding chapters. It would also
lead to a different understanding of community, challenging the individualism
underlying the current framework of RE with its emphasis on the individual making
rational, autonomous choices between the religions they study and emerging from
their education with demonstrable skills of argumentation and critique. A religious
education otherwise would also lead us to see how our attitudes towards religion are
always in a sense heteronomously constructed, but enable us to take responsibility for
how we engage in dialogue with those who hold radically different positions from our
own, so that we do not build walls to further separate us, as has increasingly been the
case within the context of extending processes of global securitization following 9/11.
To this significant question of interfaith dialogue, and the possibility of a community
in education that might seek to resist the building of new walls, let us now turn.
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Chapter 6
And Who •IS my Neighbour? Community,
Dialo ue and the Commandment to Love
On 11 September 2001 the Twin Towers were hit. Twelve years earlier, on 9
November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. That date heralded ' the happy '90s,'
the Francis Fukuyama dream of the ' end of history' - the belief that liberal
democracy had, in principle, won; that the search was over; that the advent of
a global historical world community lurked just around the comer; that the
obstacles to this ultra-Hollywood happy ending were merely empirical and
contingent (local pockets of resistance where the leaders did not yet grasp that
their time was up). In contrast, 9/11 is the main symbol of the end of the
Clintonite happy ' 90s. This is the era in which new walls emerge
everywhere, between Israel and the West Bank, around the European Union,
on the US-Mexico border. The rise of the populist New Right is just the most
prominent example of the urge to raise new walls. (Zizek, 2009, pp. 86-7)
This urge to raise new walls that Zizek describes as symptomatic of our current situation,
he sees as arising from the dialectics of globalisation leading to segregation, with new
walls raised most fundamentally between ' those included in the sphere of (relative)
economic prosperity and those excluded from it' (ibid.). This can be seen in the way that,
following the global financial crisis of 08/09, instability and fear have led to the desire to
build walls to protect 'our' economic interests, Gordon Brown' s slogan 'British jobs for
British workers' exemplifying this attitude.' Following on from this diagnosis, Zifek
poses a stark challenge: 'to tear down the true wall, not the Immigration Department one,
1 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/ l/hi/uk politicsI7097837.stm, accessed on 12.08.09
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but the socio-economic one: to change society so that people will no longer desperately
try to escape their own world.' (p. 88) Yet I find Zizek's economic explanation and
solution too simplistic. His own example of the wall between Israel and the West Bank
cannot be explained purely in economic terms, but must also be seen as bound up with
memories and histories of violence and the failure to face up to conditions of
vulnerability, the 'attempt to promote omnipotence as the answer to historical pain'
(Rose, 2007, pp. 55-6).
How might it be possible to tear down the walls Zizek speaks of? It is beyond the scope
of this thesis to address all the walls Zizek mentions. In any case, I would argue that to
attempt to think through how we might better attend to the possibility of communities
without such walls, it is necessary to consider specific 'walls' that can pose barriers to
community and dialogue. Zizek frequently draws attention to religion as a wall, pointing
to lack of understanding between secular liberals and Christians, Jews and Muslims in
particular as examples of the failure of multiculturalist tolerance (for example, 2009, p.
89 ff; 2006, p. 105 ff):
in our secular, choice-based societies, people who maintain a substantial
religious belonging are in a subordinate position. Even if they are allowed to
maintain their belief, this belief is 'tolerated' as their idiosyncratic personal
choice or opinion. The moment they present it publicly as what it is for them,
say a matter of substantial belonging, they are accused of 'fundamentalism'.
What this means is that the 'subject of free choice' in the Western 'tolerant'
multicultural sense can emerge only as the result of the extremely violent
process of being tom out of a particular lifeworld, of being cut off from one's
roots. (Zizek, 2009, p. 124)
In the previous chapter, we saw how the privileging of a certain conception of rational
autonomy can lead to lack of understanding of what it is to be religious. It is easy to see
that the attitude of critique and evaluation towards religious beliefs advocated by critical
realism could be linked with suspicion of forms ofreligion that do not conform within the
secular choice-based societies that Zitek speaks of. In this chapter, I propose to examine
how Levinas's understanding of 'the neighbour' helps us to reflect on the possibilities for
community and dialogue in education, referring to interreligious dialogue in particular.
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The question of interfaith dialogue is an important consideration for those working within
education to attend to, since, post 9/11, religious difference has been for many a
particularly worrying example of the kind of wall that Zizek referred to, and the need for
dialogue and more peaceful understandings between members of religious traditions
more pressing. I will take as my starting point for considering dialogue recent moves
towards greater understanding between the Abrahamic faiths exemplified in the interfaith
initiative opened up by A Common Word, since this has been seen as marking an
important step forward in interreligious dialogue.' A Common Word is the name that has
been given to an open letter sent on 13th October 2007 to the Pope, the patriarchs of the
Orthodox churches and leaders of all the larger Christian denominations, from 138
prominent Muslim scholars and leaders, representing every significant branch of Islam.
A Common Word Between Us and You
'The most important [commandment],' answered Jesus, ' is this: "Hear, 0
Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One. Love the Lord your God with all
your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength." The second is
this: "Love your neighbour as yourself." There is no commandment greater
than these.' (Mark 12: 28-30)
The contemporary significance of this most famous ethical imperative can be seen in the
Common Word letter, which emphasised the ideal of loving the neighbour as 'a common
word between us and you' . This open letter was written in response to Pope Benedict
XVI' s Regensburg address of September 13th 2006, 'Faith, Reason and The University',
which cited an inflammatory passage from the Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus:
'Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things
only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he
preached' 3. In this letter, the shared obligation ofloving the neighbour is presented as a
starting point in attempting to build meaningful dialogue between the two religions:
2 For the full text of the letter and responses to it, see http://www.acommonword.com/. accessed on
12.08.09
3 The text of this lecture is on the Vatican website,
http://www.vatican.valholy fatherlbenedict xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf ben-
xvi spe 20060912 universitv-regensburg en.html, accessed on 21.08.09, however, the text of this
document is amended from the version that the Pope originally delivered, in response to the outpouring of
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Muslims and Christians together make up well over half the world's
population. Without peace and justice between these two religious
communities, there can be no meaningful peace in the world...
The basis for this peace and understanding already exists. It is part of the
very foundational principles of both faiths: love of the One God, and love of
the neighbour. These principles are found over and over again in the sacred
texts of Islam and Christianity. The Unity of God, the necessity of love for
Him, and the necessity of love of the neighbour is thus the common ground
between Islam and Christianity. (Open letter sent on the occasion of the Eid
al-Fitr al-Mubarak 1428 A. H from 138 Muslim leaders to His Holiness Pope
Benedict and other Christian leaders, hereafter referred to as A Common
Word)
A Common Word has been widely seen as representing a turning point in Christian-
Muslim relations and opening new possibilities for interfaith dialogue. In a paper given
at the Faith and Public Policy Forum at King's College, London, in April 2009, Tim
Winter spoke ofthe unprecedented significance ofthe document
whose extraordinary trajectory is still unfolding, and which in many ways is
calming tensions which the ongoing securitization of the world may only
sharpen. Last July, the Common Word process reached Yale Divinity School,
which had already coordinated a response by over three hundred evangelical
thinkers. The final communique of the conference saw the evangelicals
present endorsing language about a common 'Judeo-Christian-Islamic
monotheistic heritage' , rooted in the two commandments of love of God and
love ofneighbour. (Winter, 2009)
Winter also spoke of the possibilities within education for building a more meaningful
peace between Christians and Muslims opened up by A Common Word.
Given the prominence of the figure of the neighbour in A Common Word, it seems
appropriate to explore this question of dialogue through interrogating the relationship
between this commandment, as one way of working towards peaceful relations, and
Levinas's presentation of the idea of the neighbour, since Levinas's writing also offers a
way of deepening our sense of obligation towards neighbours, inviting us to attend to a
criticism following the original lecture, so that it is slightly clearer that the Pope distances himself from the
comments of the emperor he cites.
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responsibility towards the neighbour that is present in every address from one to another,
that moves beyond the three Abrahamic faiths.
It is worth noting at the outset that many responses to the idea of obligat ion to the
neighbour have been unwelcoming. In the introduction to Zizek, Santner and Reinhard ' s
The Neighbor, Freud ' s rejection of the command to love from Civilisation and Its
Discontents is noted. Freud questions, ' Why would we do it? What good will it do us?'
and is even more dismissive when the neighbour is a stranger:
Not merely is the stranger in general unworthy of my love: I must honestly
confess that he has more claim to my hostility and even my hatred. He seems
not to have the least trace of love for me... If it will do him any good he has
no hesitation in injuring me... Indeed, he need not even obtain an advantage;
if he can satisfy any sort of desire by it, he thinks nothing of jeering at me,
insulting me, slandering me and showing his superior power. (Freud cited in
Zizek, Santner and Reinhard, 2005, p. 2)
For Freud, the relationship with the neighbour is characterised by mutual hostility and he
rejects the ideal of love. But could we consider the obligation to our neighbours in a way
that is unsentimentalised, acknowledging the fundamental risk of hostility in the relation,
yet also holding open the possibility of peace?
In responding to A Common Word, the Archbi shop of Canterbury emphasised the need
for further reflection on what loving the neighbour means :
We support the clear affirmation in your letter, through texts from the Qur'an
and the Bible, of the importance of love for the neighbour. Indeed, your letter
can be considered an encouraging example of this love. We endorse the
emphasis on generosity and self-sacrifice, and trust that these might be
mutual marks of our continuing relationship with each other. The section in
your letter on love for the neighbour is relatively brief, so we look forward to
developing further the ways in which the theme is worked out within our
traditions. We believe we have much to learn from each other in this matter,
drawing on resources of wisdom, law, prophecy, poetry and narrative, both
within and beyond our canonical scriptures to help each other come to a
richer vision of being loving neighbours today."
4 Taken from http ://www.archbi shopofcanterbury.org/ 1892, accessed 12.08.09
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In what follows I will explore how Levinas' s presentation of the relation to the neighbour
provides us with a way of moving towards this richer vision, but also responds to the
challenge of Freud: this is not a sentimentalised vision, but recognises the possibility of
war and hostility as constant risks. After exploring how Levinas addresses the idea of the
neighbour, and some critiques that have been addressed to thi s, I will consider how this
opens up debate about the nature of our relations with others and the possibility of
dialogue within education, particularly between those of different and no religious
traditions. But let us turn first to consider the ways in which our obligations to our
neighbours have been seen within Christianity and Islanr' .
Love of the Neighbour in Christianity and Islam
Within the Abrahamic faiths, love of God and love of the neighbour are foundational
principles. A Common Word drew attention to this and the responses to this letter further
stressed this as a deep connection between these religions. A letter written in response
from over three hundred Christian theologians exemplifies this:
We fmd deep affinities with our Christian faith when A Common Word
Between Us and You insists that love is the pinnacle of our duties towards our
neighbors. 'None of you has faith until you love for your neighbour what you
love for yourself,' the Prophet Muhammad said. In the New Testament we
similarly read, 'Whoever does not love [the neighbor] does not know God' (1
John 4:8) and 'whoever does not love his brother who he has seen cannot love
God whom he has not seen' (I John 4:20). God is love and our highest
calling as human beings is to imitate the One whom we worship. (' A
Christian Response to A Common Word', signed by over three hundred
Christian theologians and leadersj"
There is not scope here to examine fully the commandment to love one's neighbour in
Judaism, Christianity and Islam. I will therefore limit myself to a brief consideration of
the command within Christianity and Islam in order to consider what is distinctive in how
5 With the intention that some of the more specifically Jewish features of this commandment might become
apparent when examining Levinas' s presentation of the relation with the neighbour, but it is, of course,
significant that the letter 'A Common Word' was originally addressed to Christian leaders, and not to
Christian and Jewish leaders.
6 Published in The New York Times, 18th November 2007, and on the Common Word website,
http://www.acommonword.comllib/downloads/fullpageadbold 18.pdf, accessed 12.08.09
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Levinas extends our understanding of this. In Islam, the importance of loving the
neighbour is emphasised in the command to love for our neighbour what we ourselves
cherish. This is the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad in the Hadith referred to by the
Christian leaders above", In the Qur'an, this ideal of self-sacrifice is also emphasised:
It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces to the East and the West; but
righteous is he who believeth in God and the Last Day and the angels and the
Scripture and the prophets; and giveth wealth, for love of Him, to kinsfolk
and to orphans and the needy and the wayfarer and to those who ask, and to
set slaves free; and observeth proper worship and payeth the poor-due. And
those who keep their treaty when they make one, and the patient in tribulation
and adversity and time of stress. Such are they who are sincere. Such are the
pious (Al-Baqarab 2:177).
And:
Ye will not attain unto righteousness until ye expend of that which ye love.
(Aal 'Imran 3:92, both passages cited in A Common Word)
Loving the neighbour means serving those in need, specifically the vulnerable. In
relation to political forms of Islam, it is worth highlighting that loving the neighbour
means allowing their freedom of religion. It is stated in the Qur'an: 'Let there by no
compulsion in religion... ' (Al-Baqarah, 2:256). Difference between faiths is intended by
God:
Had God willed He could have made you one community. But that He may
try you by that which He had given you (He hath made you as ye are). So vie
one with another in good works. Unto God ye will all return, and He will
then inform you of that wherein ye differ. (Al-Ma'idah, 5:48)
Thus difference between self and neighbour is seen as good, not something to be
overcome in totalising proselytism.
Within Christianity, the commandments to love God and the neighbour are the fulfilment
of the Law (Matthew 22: 40). The verb used for love here is ayaTfOw}, usually
translated as charity, implying a commitment to help the other. The dualism that creeps
7 Sahih Al-Bukhari, Kitab al-Imam, Hadith no.13 and also Sahib Muslim, Kitab al-Imam, 67-7, Hadith
noA5
8 This verb is used by Paul in the famous passage on love in 1 Corinthians 13
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into western strands of Christianity early within its history and is in evidence in much
patristic theology complicates the ideal of love. Hannah Arendt highlights the
complication within Augustine's view of the ideal, in Love and Saint Augustine. There
are two notions of love operative in his writing: love for worldly things, termed cupiditas,
which is a wrong love, compared with caritas, 'right love' which seeks 'eternity and the
absolute future' (Arendt, 1996, p. 17). Love for the temporal order is seen as an obstacle
and opposed to desire for an eternal God. As Arendt writes, 'an absolute futurity can be
anticipated only through the annihilation of the mortal, temporal present, that is through
hating the existing self' (p. 27). Thus we see the central contradiction emphasised by
Arendt at the heart ofAugustine's command to love one's neighbour:
The greatest difficulty this self-forgetfulness and complete denial of human
existence raises for Augustine is that it makes the central Christian command
to love one's neighbour as oneself well nigh impossible. The difficulty arises
from the definition of love as desire and from the definition of man as one
who remains always wanting and forever isolated from what gives him
happiness, that is, his proper being. Even caritas. . . is no manifestation of an
original inter-connectedness of either man and God or man and the world.
(Arendt, 1996, p. 30)
Arendt goes on to examine Augustine's 'order oflove' outlined in City ofGod. Here we
see that a 'man's proper attitude to the world is not "enjoyment" ifrui) but "use" (uti)' (p.
37). According to Augustine's conceptual framework, there can be no reason to love the
neighbour, as belonging to the world, other than the divine command: 'The love of my
neighbour is at best a secondary consideration for a desire whose aim transcends mankind
and the world' (p. 41).
This dualism has tended to dominate Christian interpretations of neighbourly love and
can be seen in a recent papal encyclical:
Love of the neighbour is ... shown to be possible in the way proclaimed by
the Bible, by Jesus. It consists in the very fact that, in God and with God, I
love even the person I do not like or even know. This can only take place on
the basis of an intimate encounter with God, an encounter which has become
a communion of will, even affecting my feelings. Then I learn to look on the
other person not simply with my eyes and my feelings, but from the
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perspective of Jesus Christ. His friend is my friend. .. (Papal Encyclical
Letter, 'Deus Caritas Est, )9
There are many theories of Christian love that have attempted to redress this dualistic
emphasis. I" Don Cupitt, for example, has argued that to say that God is love is to say
nothing more than love is God, suggesting that loving the neighbour is loving God,
nothing more, nothing less. For Cupitt, loving the neighbour is the manifestation of the
divine: God is nothing more than the transcendence and grace of this love (Cupitt, 2003).
In A Common Word, this shared ideal of loving the neighbour is seen as a starting point
for dialogue and it has clearly had significant impact.II But given that a barrier to
dialogue is the suspicion with which religious sensibilities are regarded by those outside
religious traditions, if we are to consider the possibility of interreligious dialogue within
education, we must consider how this idea of an obligation towards our neighbour might
have broader resonance beyond the Abrahamic faiths. It is here that Levinas enables us
to think of how the possibilities for interfaith dialogue and community in religion extend
beyond religious boundaries, in a way that troubles how community itself tends to be
theorised in education as a space of commonality, or the site of production of (individuals
within) a rational community. Let us turn now to examine how Levinas considers the
idea of the neighbour.
The Neighbour
In Otherwise than Being, Levinas explores the idea of the neighbour through the
language of proximity. This concept of proximity is used by Levinas for what is between
self and neighbour, not denoting a ' space' or state of relation between self and neighbour,
but rather the movement of self towards the neighbour outside of the objective character
of relations:
9 From hnp://www.vatican.va/holy father/benedict xvi/encyclica ls/documents /hf ben-
xvi enc 2005 1225 deus-caritas-est en.html, accessed 28.08.09
10 And it should also be noted that this dualism is not equally present in all forms of Christianity, for
example eastern Orthodox Christianity tends to place less emphasis on dualistic oppositions.
11 See, for example, a list of initiatives that have followed at hnp://www.acommonword.com/en/a-
common-wordl2-genera I1l6 1-qa-common-wordq-accomplishments-2007-2008.html, accessed 12.08.09
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Proximity is not a state, a repose, but, a restlessness, null site, outside of the
place of rest. It overwhelms the calm of the non-ubiquity of a being which
becomes a rest in a site. No site then, is ever sufficiently a proximity, like an
embrace. Never close enough, proximity does not congeal into a structure...
Proximity, as the 'closer and closer,' becomes the subject. (OB, p. 82)
As a subject, I am constituted by this 'null site' of proximity, yet this is prior to identity,
so that 'one can no longer say what the ego or I is' (ibid). Proximity exceeds the order of
the rational, in a non-reciprocal obsession by the neighbour. Because it is never close
enough, I am always moving towards the neighbour, extending as a subject:
Proximity is to be described as extending the subject in its very subjectivity,
which is both a relationship and a term ofthis relationship... As signification,
the-one-for-the-other, proximity is not a configuration produced in the soul.
It is an immediacy older than the abstractness of nature. Nor is it fusion; it is
contact with the other... In contact itself the touching and the touched
separate, as though the touched moved off, was always already other, did not
have anything in common with me. (p. 86)
Robert Gibbs examines the themes of height and nearness, conceived in terms of
transcendence, in relation to proximity. I never reach the place of my neighbour, even if
I substitute myself for him, and this perpetual motion towards him denotes the infinite
responsibility received in passivity:
Ethics notes that the more I draw near the further away I am. The more I see
the other as the one for whom I must answer, the greater my responsibility
will become. As I step closer, my obligations grow, the task of approaching
becomes more arduous, and responsibility increases., , This infinition of
responsibility occurs in nearness to the other. (Gibbs, 1995, p. 17)
The neighbour to whom I am responsible is my brother, to whom I exist in a relation of
fraternity without reciprocity (OB, p. 87). All fraternity and community start from my
debt of obligation, assigned to me in passivity: 'The neighbor assigns me before I
designate him. This is a modality not of a knowing, but of an obsession, a shuddering of
the human quite different from cognition' (ibid).
Some have criticised this notion of infinite obligation as groundless, just as Freud
questions the Judaeo-Christian commandment of 'loving the neighbour': why should I
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have this onerous responsibility? Levinas suggests, as we have explored in relation to
Totality and Infinity, that the source of this asymmetrical responsibility cannot be
consciously known or understood: we could not represent the authority of this command
to ourselves, it is found prior to experience or knowledge:
In an approach I am first a servant of a neighbor, already late and guilty for
being late. I am as it were ordered from the outside, traumatically
commanded, without interiorizing by representation and concepts the
authority that commands me. Without asking myself: What then is it to me?
Where does he get his right to command? (ibid)
To ask the question, 'Why am I my brother's keeper?' is to misunderstand the nature of
the obligation, seeking an origin and justification for what accuses me prior to
consciousness, lying beyond thematisation and conceptualisation. Morgan provides a
helpful explanation of how that infinite obligation to my neighbour is always inescapably
there:
whenever I am engaged with another person or persons, whatever I am doing,
my relationships and my actions are ultimately of significance, in a sense
before I am and before my capacity to think or act, precisely because of the
capacity I have and the necessity that falls on me to respond to that other
person's needs and very existence. I may be blind to this capacity and
necessity to respond - my responsibility as responsivity - but it is always
there, an aspect of me and my relationship with each and every other person,
whether I realize it or not. Hence, in a sense, I am always, in whatever I do,
satisfying its directions or failing to do so, unavoidably. I am responsible for
and to the other person 'before' I am a person... [This] is Levinas's attempt
to unsettle us into seeing our ordinary, everyday life in a different way.
(Morgan, 2007, p. 160)
This obligation to my neighbour from which I cannot escape, although I am frequently
blind to it, is uncomfortable, even if it brings the possibility ofpeace.
We have already explored some of the differences in vocabulary between Totality and
Infinity and Otherwise than Being. It is worth noting that, as Bernasconi points out,
between Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, the language shifts significantly
towards the language ofcontestation:
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Whereas according to the earlier analysis I found myself put in question in
the face of the stranger, in the later analysis I am 'like a stranger'. My home
is no longer the site of inwardness and hospitality; it has become the site of
contestation. Furthermore, the introduction of persecution alters the status
accorded to apology. (Bernasconi, 1995, p. 79)
Bernasconi links this language of persecution to the dedication of Otherwise than Being
to 'those who were closest among the six million assassinated by the national Socialists,
and of the millions on millions of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same
hatred of the other man, the same anti-Semitism.' Elisabeth Weber suggests that the
resounding of concepts like 'trauma' and 'psychosis' to evoke the persecution by the
neighbour may refer to the real 'psychosis' and 'trauma' suffered by survivors of the
Shoah in the 'anamnesis' of the other's death, the impossibility of forgetting the other's
impossible death (Weber 1995). But the language of persecution to describe the
responsibility for the neighbour is neither solely rooted in the 'guilt' of the survivor, nor
used as some formal structure, but evokes the trauma of real persecution: the 'fate
suffered by the persecuted - the Jewish people and all those who are victims of the same
anti-Semitism - underwrites Levinas's philosophy in a rigorous sense ... It is more even
than an ontic fundament.' (Bernasconi, 1995, p. 83) To see the notion of persecution as
linked to the Shoah does not limit this conceptualisation of responsibility. While opening
up some of the political implications of proximity between self and neighbour, it also
serves to remind me of my obligation to 'the millions on millions of all confessions and
all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man', to all who persecute me with the
knowledge that I am always more responsible and can never absolve myself of this bond
of ever-deepening responsibility.
The neighbour cannot be defined, as to do so would be to bring them within my
understanding: their proximity is prior to identity. Michael Smith draws attention to
linguistic features ofLevinas's use of the term 'neighbour':
There is a link between Levinas's decision to use the word neighbor
(prochain) alongside the earlier word Stranger (Etranger) and the ascendancy
of the notion of proximity (proximitey ... French has two words that
correspond to the English word neighbor. Levinas is not discussing the term
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voisin, which is the normal term for the person who lives close by, but the
term prochain, which is used in the Bible to indicate one's neighbor in the
sense of one's fellow man (or woman). (Smith, 2005, pp. 91-2)
Levinas's use of the term prochain suggests the intention to evoke the term's biblical
resonances,12 recalling the commandment to love one's neighbour. Here the command is
not to love them 'as myself, as this would bring them into my domain, with love
conditional on a prior sense of self: I am bound as responsible before I love myself. This
is not to say that Levinas would necessarily reject the idea of reciprocal responsibilities;
his point is rather that any reciprocity stems from a prior asymmetric responsibility for
my neighbour.
The neighbour approaches and summons me to responsibility. I am thus myself a
singular subject in my unique responsibility. But the approach of the third party,
disrupting the asymmetry of obligation to my neighbour, is also present in the proximity
ofmy neighbour, and it is with this that society begins.
Justice, Society, the Third and Fraternity
I have mentioned the idea of the third party in earlier chapters. In Totality and Infinity,
we have seen how the third party is already present in the approach of the Other, but this
is a theme that is significantly more developed in Otherwise than Being in relation to the
idea of the neighbour. It is with this idea that Levinas explains the concepts of justice,
society and philosophy: 'The fact that the other, my neighbor, is also a third party with
respect to another, who is also a neighbor, is the birth of thought, consciousness, justice
and philosophy' (OB, p. 128). The third party is neither an empirical fact nor a specific
other: 'In the proximity of the other, all the others than the other obsess me, and already
12 Prochain is the term used for 'the neighbour' most commonly in French translations ofthe biblical Greek
term 1tAll<nO~ (of which term the closest English translation would be near / hard by / close to). Regarding
the Hebrew term which 'neighbour' translates in Leviticus and Deuteronomy (and which 1tAll<no~ translates
in the Septuagint), there is some disagreement amongst scholars as to whether the term was used to refer
more to 'fellow Israelite' or 'alien' living nearby (see, for example, the discussion between Morton Smith
and J. M Cameron in 'Love Which Neighbor?' in the New York Review ofBooks, Volume 27, Number 12,
July 1980), but Levinas's emphasis on alterity and use of the term 'stranger' would suggest that the
resonances of the translation 'fellow Israelite' are not quite fitting.
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this obsession cries out for justice' (p. 158). Thus it is the approach of the third party that
in Otherwise than Being brings about justice, since justice appears with the coexistence
that comes in the approach of the others through proximity to the neighbour:
The third party is other than the neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also
a neighbor of the other, and not simply his fellow ... The third party
introduces a contradiction in the saying whose signification before the other
until then went in one direction. It is ... the birth of the question: What do I
have to do with justice? A question of consciousness. Justice is necessary,
that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order,
thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the intellect,
and in intentionality and the intellect, the intelligibility of a system, and
thence also a copresence on an equal footing as before a court of justice. (p.
157)
Levinas describes the relationship with the third as 'an incessant correction of the
asymmetry of proximity in which the face is looked at' (p. 158). The third party
interrupts the asymmetry of responsibility between self and neighbour by revealing the
existence of other subjects who are neighbours to my neighbour. Through the third's
approach, I question my place in these relations of responsibility, my 'own place in the
sun', and with this consciousness begins. The third demands justice, justification and
ultimately weighing up, calculating, judgement about how I take up the responsibilities I
have for all the others. Thus, society is not founded on equality or commonality, but on a
community of others, as Davis writes: 'a multiplicity of others, in which each subject is
unique, recalcitrant to classification' (Davis, 1996, p. 83). Levinas emphasises that
justice is not meant here as juridical, but arises only out ofproximity:
justice is not a legality regulating human masses, from which a technique of
social equilibrium is drawn, harmonizing antagonistic forces.... Justice is
impossible without the one that renders it finding himself in proximity. His
function is not limited to the 'function of judgment,' the subsuming of
particular cases under a general rule. The judge is not outside the conflict,
but the law is in the midst of proximity. Justice, society, the State and its
institutions, exchanges and work are comprehensible out of proximity. This
means that nothing is outside of the control of the responsibility of the one for
the other. (OB, p. 159)
For Levinas, justice entails consciousness and thematisation, but these are not possible
without proximity. ,Proximity here is seen as a control on the implicit violence that must
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take place within the work and mechanisms of the state, which must necessarily involve
equality and thematisation, This notion of justice associated with the approach of the
third is seen by Levinas as maintaining infinite responsibility, balanced against, or in
tension with, working out what justice for all the others means in the web of relations in
which I find myself. But does this idea of the third successfully maintain this tension of
holding together infinite obligation to my neighbour and the equalising operations of the
State within this notion ofjustice, or does it actually strain the tension to breaking point?
Let us consider some objections that have been posed to these ideas of the neighbour and
the third party.
One of the most prominent recent critics of Levinas's idea of the neighbour has been
Zizek who, in 'Neighbours and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence', questions
Levinas's presentation of the relation to the neighbour. He suggests that love, in
Levinas's account, privileges the neighbour over the 'faceless' third and instead calls for
a justice that acts in favour of the 'inhuman' third:
We should therefore assume the risk of countering Levinas's position with a
more radical one: others are primordially an (ethically) indifferent multitude,
and love is a violent gesture of cutting into this multitude and privileging a
One as the neighbor, thus introducing a radical imbalance into the whole. In
contrast to love, justice begins when I remember the faceless many left in the
shadow in this privileging of the One. Justice and love are thus structurally
incompatible: justice, not love, has to be blind; it must disregard the
privileged One whom I 'really understand.' What this means is that the Third
is not secondary: it is always-already here, and the primordial ethical
obligation is toward this Third who is not here in the face-to-face
relationship, the one in the shadow, like the absent child of a love-couple.
(ZiZek, 2005, p. 182)
Zizek goes on to argue that this leads to 'the radical anti-Levinasian conclusion: the true
ethical step is... the one ofchoosing against the face, for the third' (p. 183).
How fair is this charge against Levinas, of unjustly privileging the neighbour over the
third? Zizek describes the 'inhuman' third as 'inhuman Otherness itself: the Otherness of
a human being reduced to inhumanity, the Otherness exemplified by the terrifying figure
of the Muse/mann, the "living dead" in the concentration camps' (p. 160), a term he has
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borrowed from Primo Levi, via Agamben's provocative discussion of Levi in Remnants
ofAuschwitz (1999). He suggests that Levinas's notion of the face and the neighbour
gentrify and domesticate 'inhuman' faces, concealing their monstrosity. But surely
Levinas, in articulating the approach of the third, also argues for a justice that balances
my responsibility to my neighbour with responsibility to all the others, as all the others
are already present in the proximity of the neighbour, and the Otherness of both the
neighbour and all the others is maintained through the idea of illeity.
Zizek's pays little attention in 'Neighbors and Other Monsters' to the way in which the
introduction of the third party in Totality and Infinity already preempts his criticism, or to
the language of traumatic responsibility in Otherwise than Being, which implies
inescapable responsibility not just for my neighbour, but for all the others who demand
justice. We see this idea of the extent of my responsibility to all the others, those whose
'faces' are not present to me in my interactions with my neighbours, in an interview with
Levinas in which he expands on the biblical roots of the idea of the face and the
commandment it issues to me not to kill:
In the Old Testament there is the sixth commandment, 'Thou shalt not kill'.
This does not mean simply that you are not to go around firing a gun all the
time. It refers, rather, to the fact that, in the course of your life, in different
ways, you kin someone. For example, when we sit down at the table in the
morning and drink coffee, we kill an Ethiopian who doesn't have any coffee.
It is in this sense that the commandment must be understood. There is also
the phrase 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour'. It is expressed in several ways.
There is also 'Thou shalt love the stranger.' (Levinas, 1988, p. 173)
Here the relation to the neighbour includes the obligation towards the stranger we have
never met, and this is linked to the question ofjustice: what I have, my place in the sun, is
put into question by the needs of others whom I have never met who also demand justice.
Zizek argues that it is not so much the socio-political consequences of Levinas' s position
that he finds problematic, but rather his account of the Other's face: 'This rendering is
wrong in its own terms, as a phenomenological description, since it misses the way the
Third is always-already here' (Zizek, 2005, p. 184). But this is what Levinas emphasises
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too: I cannot be in a relation with my neighbour without the advent of all the others: 'The
other is from the first the brother of all the other men' (DB, p. 158).
Hand suggests that 'Neighbours and Other Monsters' is based more on a disagreement
with Butler than Levinas - 'Butler somehow morphs into a German-language, anti-
Nietzschean, conservative Hegelian, Adorno stand-in' (Hand, 2009, p. 119) - and as a
result, Levinas's account emerges stronger than Zizek's. Hand sums up the way in which
Zizek's own conclusions seem remarkably similar to, if less forcefully articulated than,
Levinas's own conceptualisation ofjustice via the neighbour and the third:
Given Levinas's actual presentation, then, of the face's 'non-phenomenality',
it is ZiZek's figures which emerge as limited, local and merely political, while
his supposedly anti-Levinasian conclusion, in which the third party's
presence suspends the hold of the face, resembles a timid version of
Levinas's developed description of the introduction of justice, where '[t]he
relationship with the third party is an incessant correction of the asymmetry
of proximity in which the face is looked at' (DB, p. 158). (Hand, 2009, p.
121)
Thus while Zizek does perhaps draw our attention to the ways in which excessive
philosophical transcendentalism can lead us to neglect concrete demands for justice, it is
actually his own language of facelessness, more than Levinas's, that makes the 'unlovely'
an abstraction and fails to draw attention to the neighbour's vulnerability and need of my
response.
In his more recent Violence (2009), Zizek appears to contradict the earlier charge against
Levinas that the neighbour is known and unjustly privileged, with the new charge that the
unknowability ofthe neighbour could lead to violence:
There is ... another obverse and much more unsettling dimension to the
Levinasian figure of the Neighbour as the imponderable Other who deserves
our unconditional respect. That is, the imponderable Other as enemy, the
enemy who is the absolute Other. .. whose very reasoning is foreign to us, so
that no authentic encounter with him in battle is possible. Although Levinas
did not have this dimension in mind, the radical ambiguity, the traumatic
character of the Neighbour makes it easy to understand how Levinas's notion
of the Other prepared the ground (opened up the space) for it in a way strictly
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homologous to the way that Kantian ethics prepared the ground for the notion
of diabolical evil. Horrible as it may sound, the Levinasian Other as the
abyss of otherness from which the ethical injunction emanates and the Nazi
figure of the Jew as the less-than-human Other-enemy originate from the
same source. (.Zizek, 2009, p. 47)13
We have already discussed in Chapter 3 how for Levinas, the possibility of peaceful
relations with the neighbour must reject any assumptions of sameness. Ethics must be
rooted in alterity, the radical otherness of my neighbour, since if ethics is grounded on
sameness a door is opened for violence towards those who are not seen as 'really' the
same. An example used by Zizek, in the same book, serves to highlight precisely this
point. If ethics is grounded on any idea of shared brotherhood or shared humanity, this
can lead violence against those who reject that brotherhood:
The Christian motto'All men are brothers' ... also means that those who do
not accept brotherhood are not men. In the early years of the Iranian
revolution, Khomeini played on the same paradox when he claimed, in an
interview for the Western press, that the Iranian revolution was the most
humane in all of history: not a singled person was killed by the
revolutionaries. When the surprised journalist asked about the death penalties
publicised in the media, Khomeini calmly replied: 'Those that we killed were
not men, but criminal dogs!' (Zizek, 2009, 47)
It seems that Levinas is right to see the otherness of the neighbour as fundamental to the
ethical relation. The question is, however, whether his conception of the relation between
the neighbour and the third party ends up conceding too much to ontology, such that the
sense of the alterity of my neighbour and the infinitude of my obligation to him are
diminished through their being relegated to an other-worldly order of justice. This is a
problem that Caygill articulates provocatively.
In his analysis of the final chapters of Otherwise than Being, Caygill examines how
Levinas attempts to link proximity, substitution and responsibility with the order of
13 Zizek's disdain for what some interpretations of Levinas have become is also clear in The Puppet and
the Dwarf, in which he argues that the subversive kernel of both Christianity and Judaism is dialectical
materialism: '1 do not think that the present vague spiritualism, the focus on the openness to Otherness and
its unconditional Call, this mode in which Judaism has become almost the hegemonic ethico-spiritual
attitude of today's intellectuals, is in itself the "natural" form of what one can designate, in traditional
terms, as Jewish spirituality.' (Zizek, 2003, p. 8)
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ontology. He describes how for Levinas, as we have seen above, proximity 'acts as a
control on the exercise of power or the application ofjudgement ... Proximity is called to
serve as a control on the equalising operations of the state and its institutions and upon
the realm of work and commerce' (Caygill, 2002, p. 142). The problem that Caygill
draws attention to arises when Levinas attempts to describe how it is that proximity might
control and correct the operations of the state, leading 'to an unexpected insistence on the
priority of the relation to the other over the third' (ibid.). We can see this, for example, in
the following passage:
In no way is justice a degradation of obsession, a degeneration of the for-the-
other ... , a degeneration that would be produced in the measure that for
empirical reasons the initial duo would become a trio. But the
contemporaneousness of the multiple is tied about the diachrony of two:
justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no distinction between
those close and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility
of passing by the closest. (DB, p. 159, emphasis mine)
Caygill points out that this seeming privileging of the other over the third, in an attempt
to preserve the alterity of the other, leaves open the possibility of violence and war
against the third in the name of the other, in a manner similar to Zizek's original charge:
'If the responsibility for all is channelled through the other, then the potential of a war
against all except one's other remains a possibility' (Caygill, 2002, p. 143). The reason
that Levinas resorts in this passage to privileging the other and maintaining the
distinction between the other and the third is, as Caygill points out, to prevent the other
being absorbed by the totality. He cites the danger Levinas alludes to that 'the State
issued from the proximity of the neighbour is always on the verge of integrating him into
a we, which congeals both me and my neighbour' (DB, p. 161) and notes that this makes
an assumption of the fragility ofproximity, and the superior power of the state. Caygill is
critical of this move, and considers the possibility of its reverse:
The contrary position in which all thirds become others is relegated to an
'angelic order of justice' and not considered to be an option for this world.
With this move Levinas makes himself vulnerable to the same criticism that
he himself made on a number of occasions of the corruption that can ensue
from the other-worldly orientation of the Christian political theology, namely
the displacement of the 'angelic order of justice' to the city of God is
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effectively to surrender the possibility of justice in the human city. (Caygill,
2002,p.143)
This might lead, as Caygill suggests, to a diminishing of the force of the ethical and
political challenge of Otherwise than Being, with Levinas having to 'concede too much to
ontology and [leaving] its structures intact, while opening up just enough space to permit
an ethical role for philosophy as the questioning of the state' (ibid.). However, as Caygill
argues, this is not the only conclusion that can be reached: a more compelling vision for
how the idea of the neighbour leads to the possibilities of peace, community and justice is
provided through the interwoven themes of fraternity and illeity.
We have already considered, in the previous chapter, something of the significance of
Levinas's concept of illeity for understanding what it is to be religious and how this will
affect our understanding of religious education. There we explored how Levinas uses
this concept to signify what is near at hand, yet always at a distance, overflowing
cognition. Caygill argues that illeity is central to Levinas's prophetic politics if we are to
avoid the disappointing conclusion that the otherwise than being can lead us back to war.
He describes the importance of illeity as follows:
The extremely concentrated concept of illeity is central to Levinas' s notion of
prophetic witness both beyond and within philosophy. It is called at once to
name the third mode of thought between philosophy and religion, to
epitomise Levinas's critique of phenomenology, and to provoke the most
unrestrained version of his ethics, and in extremity even to serve as one of the
names of God. (Caygill, 2002, p. 145)
We saw in the previous chapter how illeity can serve as one of the names of God. In the
relation of proximity, Levinas describes illeity as 'the Infinite that escapes the
objectification of thematisation and of dialogue ... in the third person.' (DB, p. 150) Yet
this "'thirdness" is different from that of the third man' (ibid.); it is not the third party
who interrupts proximity and demands justice. While illeity resists thematisation, it is
neither self nor the neighbour, but the way in which my responsibility arrives,
anarchically, without origin or principle. In this sense, as Caygill suggests, it is not only
a third between the self and the neighbour, but a third between immanence and
transcendence, and thus not the space of the Hegelian mediation between self and other,
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but rather the hollowing out of a distance which yet 'open]s] the relation of self and
other, but always exceeding the terms of any relation' (Caygill, 2002, p. 147).
As already outlined, illeity is used by Levinas in contrast with the notion of reciprocity
and means that slipping into a relation of equality is impossible, so that neither I, nor the
third, nor my neighbour, can be reduced to essence or identity. With illeity, the emphasis
is placed by Levinas on the impossibility of fusion, on the space of separation between
the I and the Other and, as this space, we see the 'thirdness' of illeity. As Llewelyn
explains:
Levinas underlines the importance of retaining a different third-personal
pronominality in the primary intrigue. In the space marked by the hyphen
between the I and the Thou intrudes not It, but He. In the trace of the never
having been here - the never Daseinly Da - of illeity stands the Thou whom I
approach, lest even the asymmetrical proximity of response that conditions
responsibility fuse into being-with. (Llewelyn, 1995, p. 188)
Thus, the trace of the transcendent, never brought to presence, is always in the approach
of my neighbour and the introduction of all the others, as illeity, and this prevents the
asymmetrical relation of responsibility from becoming the pure mutuality of Buber's 1-
Thou.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Levinas describes illeity as the trace of the divine, the
Infinite by which the subject is inspired, and its glory is the saying, 'that is, a sign given
to the other, peace announced to the other, responsibility for the other, to the extent of
substitution' (DB, p. 148). This breaks up the Kantian unity of transcendental
apperception, and can only be witnessed, not thematised, signifying out of responsibility.
As passive, receiving this inspiration, there is also a sense in which I find the order in
obedience within my own consciousness, already there, and this finding, 'in a remarkable
way, reconcil[es] autonomy and heteronomy' (ibid.). This hearing of the command
through illeity is traumatic and I cannot know its origin, but it is through this ambiguous
hearing of the command, of which I am also the author and as a result of this I perceive
the other in the same, that ethics is possible. The difficulty of Levinas's prose, in trying
to bear witness to this idea of finding the order within myself, itself testifies to the
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impossibility of describing or thematising this idea of the ambivalence of this trauma -
finding the infinite demand that the neighbour addresses to me that comes to me from the
thirdness of illeity, but finding it in myself, already having been obedient to the demand
ofmy neighbour, as we see in the following passage:
The inscription of the order in the for-the-other of obedience is an anarchic
being affected, which slips into me 'like a thief through the outstretched nets
of consciousness. This trauma has surprised me completely; the order has
never been represented, for it has never been presented... to the point that it is
I that only says, and after the event, this unheard-of obligation. This
ambivalence is the exception and subjectivity of the subject, its very psyche, a
possibility of inspiration. It is the possibility of being the author of what had
been breathed in unbeknownst to me, of having received, one knows not from
where, that ofwhich I am author. In the responsibility for the other we are at
the heart of the ambiguity of inspiration. The unheard-of saying is
enigmatically in the anarchic response, in my responsibility for the other.
The trace of infinity is this ambiguity in the subject, in turns beginning and
makeshift, a diachronic ambivalence which ethics makes possible. (DB, pp.
148-49)
We have already considered an earlier version of these ideas, from 'Truth of Disclosure
and Truth of Testimony' in relation to the idea of autonomy in Chapter 3. Here, in the
development of these ideas, we see that it is finding this order within the self that
interrupts the unity of transcendental apperception, consciousness, and leads to the
possibility ofjustice, inspiration and prophecy - 'this responsibility prior to commitment,
is precisely the other in the same, inspiration and prophecy, the passing itself of the
Infinite' (p. 150).
CaygiU suggests that this might lead us to a more compelling vision of justice than the
view outlined earlier, which can ultimately lead back to war. He describes how this voice
heard in the command may also be the voice of the third or illeity, and this might
interrupt the demand that the neighbour makes on me in the name of justice, thus
overturning the priority of the neighbour that Levinas seems to suggest in some of the
passages we considered earlier. This idea of prophecy might then lead to a prophetic
politics:
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Prophetic politics opens the possibility for a notion of justice as perpetual
interruption, of the self by the other and of the other by the third. The third in
question here, and the justice to which it gives rise, is not the third of the state
and its justice thought of in terms of equivalence and measure, but the third
thought of in terms of divinity and in the divine approbation of human
fraternity. It is with fraternity that the section 'Witness and Prophesy' [in
Otherwise than Being] ends, namely, with the impossibility of denying
fraternity, of prophetically interrupting every fixing of fraternity between self
and other in the name of the third. (Caygill2002, p. 150)
This idea of fraternity, which prophecy or a prophetic politics is 'incapable of denying'
(OB, p. 150), is, as we have seen, also bound up with the idea of the neighbour, who is
also my brother. This leads to a prophetic understanding of the possibility of community
arising from responsibility rather than any notion of commonality. Levinas emphasises
this understanding of fraternity predicated in the separation of illeity:
It is not because the neighbor would be recognized as belonging to the same
genus as me that he concerns me. He is precisely other. The community
with him begins in my obligation to him. The neighbor is a brother. A
fraternity that cannot be abrogated, an unimpeachable assignation (OB, p. 87).
Caygill draws attention to Levinas's exploration of this relation between illeity as
thirdness, fraternity, responsibility and proximity in the 1969 essay 'The Name of God
According to a Few Talmudic Texts'. Here Levinas describes fraternity as providing a
concrete example of what might seem an abstract idea of anarchic responsibility, or here
'the Absolute':
This abstract idea of something that precedes the originary which we seem to
be constructing is provided for us in a concrete way by the responsibility
prior to commitment, by the responsibility that obligates us to others and not
to myself. Or, more simply, by human fraternity. A configuration of purely
ontological notions turns here into ethical relations. As in the Talmud: the
absolution of the Ab-solute, the effacement of God, is positively the
obligation to make peace in the world. (BV, p. 125)
Here Levinas suggests that the Transcendent, the obligation, that is in me, preceding any
origin, is also found in fraternity and 'the obligation to make peace in the world'. He
goes on to again describe this idea of a prior responsibility, which finds a concrete
expression in fraternity, as illeity:
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This anteriority of responsibility must be understood in relation to freedom as
the very authority of the Absolute which is 'too great' for the measure or
finitude of presence, revelation, order and being, and which consequently, as
neither being nor non-being, is the 'excluded third party' of the beyond of
being and non-being, a third person that we have called 'illeity' and that is
perhaps also expressed by the word God. A beyond being, resistant to
thematization and origin .,. an authority that orders my neighbour for me as a
face. (p. 126)
This anterior responsibility, arising in my responsivity to the neighbour and making
fraternity possible, is, as we have explored in the preceding chapters, 'the essence of
language' (ibid.), and thus already implied in the condition of being taught by the
neighbour, receiving language, meaning and the uniqueness of my subjectivity as a gift.
Illeity then, as a thirdness, a space, between me and my neighbour who is my brother, and
between him and all the brothers, can be described as a surplus of responsibility that is
always there, and Levinas as witnessing to it prophetically, inviting his hearer to attend to
it to bring about the conditions of a more just community.
Illeity, this quality of thirdness, roots responsibility in me, but it is a responsibility for all
the others, which deepens the more I take it up and means that it is impossible to separate
my responsibility for my neighbour from my responsibility for all. One way of thinking
about this is illustrated by Arthur Miller's All My Sons. This play is set in affluent
America, in the years after the war, and Joe Keller's story is apparently one of success
and devotion to his family. Yet during the play, we learn that Keller, has sold cracked
cylinder heads to the US Army Air Force, which led twenty one planes to crash, a
responsibility he only gradually owns up to at the end of the play when he realises that
his son, Larry, has killed himself on learning of his father's part in those crashes. The
theme of this play is the conflict of responsibilities Keller experiences: his responsibility
to his family - Keller paints his refusal to own up to his guilt in the pilots' deaths as
motivated by his desire to support his family by allowing his factory to continue to
operate, so that his other son, Chris, can eventually take over the family business -
balanced with his responsibility to others in society. Ultimately, Miller aims to show,
through the death of Larry, how these responsibilities are bound together: we cannot
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separate our responsibilities to our family from our responsibilities to others in society. In
gradually accepting his own part in the deaths of the pilots, Keller comes to recognise
that his responsibility was not just to his son or to his family, but to all those his actions
affected: 'Sure, he was my son. But I think to him they were all my sons. And I guess
they were, I guess they were' (Miller, 1947, p. 68). His wife responds to this with a
refusal to accept this unboundedness of responsibility for all the others, but her son Chris
tells her that more than this is necessary - responsibility in this sense cannot be limited:
'You can be better! Once and for all you can know that there's a universe of people
outside and you're responsible to it' (p. 69). Thus the lesson of All My Sons has to do
with the relation to the neighbour and the relation to all the others: Keller answers to the
demands of the relation to his family, but is blind to the demands of those others beyond
that. The tragedy is played out through his failure to see that his relation to his sons is
already structured by his relation to all the others.
Illeity likewise means that justice and peace begin with accepting my responsibility to all
the others: my responsibility for those close by cannot be marked off from my
responsibility for all the others. In this sense, illeity radically differentiates Levinas's
theory of society from other political and philosophical theories. There is in this fraternal
society founded on a prior asymmetry of responsibility, a surplus that cannot be
represented, yet which is the possibility of society and of justice within society. As
Theodore de Boer suggests, 'It is sometimes called a 'surplus'; yet, far from being
superfluous, it is a condition of possibility ... It is true that charity without social justice
is void, but social justice without this dimension of goodness and hospitality may be
blind' (De Boer, 1986, p. 103). And so the surplus in the trace of illeity allows my
neighbour and all the others to remain beyond my comprehension and the self-absorbed
affection, of which Zizek accuses Levinas's theory, yet at the same time allows a way of
understanding society as predicated on the possibility of peaceful relation between self
and neighbour.
The idea of community that this understanding ofthe neighbour leads to can be compared
with the way in which Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons outline an understanding of
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community in education, drawing on the work of Roberto Esposito. Although we often
think of community as relating to what individuals share in common, they emphasise
another way of thinking:
The original meaning of munus (void, debt, gift) in communus is exactly the
opposite of this conception [of commonality]. According to [Esposito],
community is not a matter of 'having' something in 'common', something
that we share with others, but of the opposite: it is not a matter of 'having' but
of 'lacking'; not about 'something' but about 'nothing'. This void or lack
refers to what we owe to others; it means that we have obligations towards
others, despite our not being able to define precisely what these obligations
are. The'!' or the 'you' is caught up in a network of obligations that it
cannot answer. The subjects of a community are united by a common
obligation in the sense of 'lowe you something' (not 'you owe me
something'). (Masscheleinand Simons, 2002, pp. 601-2)
Levinas might warn us against the idea of 'common obligation' as it seems to lead away
from the idea of asymmetry of responsibility, that my obligation is mine and mine alone.
Yet there are resonances here with this idea of community beginning in obligation, in
responsibility for another. Masschelein and Simons describe how in this notion of
community, as in Levinas's, the subject is always infringed by others, with an otherness
within the self in the obligation that is found in the self. They suggest that against this
notion of community, there is a tendency within social relations to im-munise against this
demanding obligation that impinges upon me, attempting to define what we have in
common, to legislate our responsibilities, 'transforming every social relation into a
transparent rule, norm, contract or agreement, and seeing every task we undertake within
an economy of calculable exchange' (p. 602).
This tendency can be related to the economy of exchange we explored in Chapter 4, but it
is worth restating the point: education and the responsibility of subjectivity, whatever
one's role within the educative relation, can never be entirely bound by regulated
structures, whether in terms of regulating relationships, or the clear setting of aims and
objectives for what is taught. As a teacher, my responsibilities to all within the academic
community within which 1 am situated - my students, colleagues, subject discipline - are
boundless and often aporetic. 1 am addressed from the outside by all of these, and
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Masschelein and Simons suggest that this implies the importance of listening in the
educative relation:
Being a listener involves precisely one's being addressed: one owes an
answer; one is positioned in a network of obligations (towards the other
person, the language, and so on), a network that one is not able to master.
And this means that I will not be able completely to pay my debts. Even the
supposition that I might be able to do so, that it would be possible to calculate
exactly what lowe to the other (for example, to my father, or to my son or
my teachers or students), would itself be unethical. It would mean that in
principle I might be able to absolve myself of these relations, to get rid of
them, to pay my debts. (p. 603)
This then is the idea of community that Levinas might be seen as inviting us to attend to
within education, at odds with the current tendencies in educational discourses and
practices that we have considered in the preceding chapters. As a teacher, my
subjectivity emerges in response to the multiple, incalculable demands that I am always
in the process of answering, and never could answer fully. As one who is also being
taught, my responsibility to the texts that I read, that I can never fully master, my
responsibility to my teachers, to my peers, to listen and attend to all of these, is also
unlimited. The judgements I make in discharging these responsibilities must inevitably
involve comparison, rationality and thus the ontological is brought into this process of
responding ethically, yet the ethical demand is always there, for each subject within an
educational community.
What then does this idea of community, beginning with my obligation to my neighbour,
mean for how we might understand the practice of dialogue within education? In order to
consider this, let us return to the question of loving the neighbour, which was seen as the
starting point for interfaith dialogue in A Common Word.
Dialogue Between Neighbours and Strangers
In an essay on Rosenzweig, 'Between Two Worlds', Levinas considers the idea of loving
the neighbour in a way that we have not seen in either Totality and Infinity or Otherwise
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than Beingi" In addressing the question of what the commandment to love means within
Judaism, Levinas emphasises that this obligation is commanded within both Christianity
and Judaism:
Two typically Jewish elements have appeared: the idea of the commandment,
as something essential to the love-relation; love is manifested in the
commandment, it is alone in being able to command love; the idea of Man the
redeemer and not of God the Redeemer. ..
In order for love to be able to penetrate the Word, which is Redemption, in
order for Time to move to Eternity, Love must not remain at the state of
individual enterprise, it must become the work of community, the time of a
community. (DF , p. 193)
The obligation to love, he suggests, does not remain my obligation, but becomes 'the
work of the community.' This was one of the central messages of the Muslim leaders in
A Common Word. It was also emphasised as a shared obligation by the Archbishop of
Canterbury in a statement issued on l l" October 2007:
In this country, in which we are together both British citizens and citizens of
heaven, love of neighbour could happily be our watchword for the year
ahead. My hope is that we will be able to demonstrate the meaning of
neighbourly love towards those around us, whether of faith or not.15
Levinas emphasises the shared heritage of Islam with Judaism and Christianity and
suggests that the monotheism of each obliges members of each to enter into peaceful
dialogue:
it obliges the other to enter into a discourse that unites him with me. This is a
point of the utmost importance.. . Monotheism, the word of the one and only
God, is precisely the word that one cannot help but hear, and cannot help but
answer. It is the word that obliges us to enter into discourse. (DF, p. 178)
14 The omission of love from Otherwise than Being is perhaps related to the way that love can imply an
intentionality on the part of the one who loves, which proximity itself disrupts. Todd draws attention to the
ambiguity of love in this sense: 'how does love - particularly an intentional love at that - make possible
that openness and vigilance that are the markers of responsibility? Rather than simply claiming that love is
responsibility, the more important question ... is to what extent love participates in the conditions of
responsibility , where such radical openness leads to a learning from the Other that lies beyond choice.'
(Todd, 2003a, p. 80)
15 Taken from http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/releases/07101Ia.htm. accessed on 1.I2.07
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In 'Israel and Universalism', Levinas suggests that the basis for entering into dialogue is
conscience:
Father Danielou spoke movingly of the dramatic fate of every religion which,
when confronted with others, is tom between charity and truth... Like him, I
believe that we must take our conscience from this common civilization and
that we must take conscience in common, in order to understand one another.
(p. 176)
Levinas's idea that on the one hand monotheism obliges us for dialogue, and that on the
other conscience obliges us, can be linked to the way in which religion is bound up with
illeity as the obligation prior to rationality ofthe self towards the Other.
However, it is not this idea of the obligation towards dialogue that I take to be Levinas's
most significant insight for thinking about relations between those of different and no
faiths within education. The question Levinas raises is rather how to think again about
relations between individuals in education in the light of his notion of the proximity of
the neighbour, who elects me, as eleve, to an elevating responsibility. His notions of
illeity, concretely manifested in fraternity, and the vulnerability of the neighbour are the
most significant insights for enriching how we think about relations between those of
different and no religious perspectives within education. Much writing on dialogue in
subjects in which it is particularly prominent, for example, religious education, tends to
emphasise the importance of reaching shared understanding, and empathising with the
Other, as we saw in the previous chapter. They can also make what takes place in
dialogue sound, as Julian Stem comments when explaining the place of interfaith
dialogue in RE, 'rather glib' (Stern, 2006, p. 22). He outlines how interfaith dialogue is
now built into the National Framework for RE (QCA 2004), which states that students
should:
'reflect on ... the significance of interfaith dialogue', which should in turn
help in 'promoting racial and interfaith harmony and respect for all,
combating prejudice and discrimination, contributing positively to
community cohesion and promoting awareness of how interfaith cooperation
can support the common good.' (ibid.)
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Levinas's emphasis on illeity and the traumatic approach of the neighbour draws our
attention to the difficulty of dialogue, the fact that attending to alterity does impose
enormous demands, yet at the same time holds open the idea that it is through potentially
difficult dialogues that peace becomes a possibility.
Levinas's approach therefore challenges the view of dialogue that often dominates the
way it is practised in education, with emphasis placed on the importance of reaching
consensus and mutual understanding. His notion of illeity challenges me to recognise
that I can never fully bring my neighbour within my understanding. We can see this
emphasis in an essay 'Dialogue: Self-Consciousness and the Proximity of the Neighbor',
in which Levinas specifically addresses the way in which an 'absolute distance' between
I and You is hollowed out in dialogue, and at the same time, 'there unfolds - or
intervenes, disposing the I as I and the you as you - the extraordinary and immediate
relation of dialogue, transcending this distance without suppressing it or recuperating it'
(GM, p. 144). This disrupts the focus placed on the importance of recognition by those
working within the politics of identity in education, for Levinas emphasises the distance
between self and neighbour, and in the surplus of illeity between us, my identity itself is
interrupted:
There is in the radical difference between the I and the You, placed in the
relationship of dialogue wherein the encounter is formed, not a simple failure
of recognition of the one by the other, or of the synthesis of their coincidence
and their identification. There is, rather, the surplus or the better of a beyond
oneself, the surplus and the better of the proximity of the neighbor; 'better'
than the coincidence with self, despite or because of the difference separating
them. 'More' or 'better,' signified in dialogue, not by some supernatural
voice interfering in the conversation... 'More' or 'better than' would be the
gratuitous gift or the grace of the other's coming to meet me, of which Buber
speaks. Yet the surplus of fraternity can go beyond the satisfactions that one
still expects from gifts, even if gratuitous! (pp. 146-47)
This surplus, the 'better,' within dialogue is a grace that goes beyond the satisfactions of
mutuality implied by Buber's l-Thou, and there is always a risk that this can degenerate
into hostility . Yet Levinas emphasises that it also opens the possibility for love:
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Dialogue is the non-indifference of the you to the I, a dis-inter-ested
sentiment certainly capable of degenerating into hatred, but a chance for what
we must - perhaps with prudence - call love and resemblance in love. In
saying this, one is not duped by morality or naively subject to the ideas and
values of an environment. It is in the dialogue of transcendence that this idea
of the good rises, merely by the fact itself that, in the encounter, the other
counts above all else. (ibid.)
Here then we see the importance of practices of dialogue in education. Whilst it is
impossible to guarantee that they will not lead to hostility, they nevertheless open the
possibility of love, of breaking down the walls Zizek spoke of, but not by assumptions of
commonality, but rather through realising that between my neighbour, myself and all the
others lies absolute distance. So although in addressing me, as we saw in Chapter 1, the
neighbour creates a common world between us, he remains beyond my comprehension.
It is, however, not just the transcendence of illeity that is significant for considering
practices of dialogue in education, but also Levinas's emphasis on the condition of the
neighbour's vulnerability. Although the traditions of the Abrahamic faiths do suggest the
idea of the neighbour as a stranger, there is little specific emphasis on the vulnerability of
the neighbour. Furthermore, while education tends to emphasise the right of the
individual to speak, Levinas's conception of responsibility might lead to an emphasis on
listening and attention in dialogue. As Caygill suggests: the rights I have only come from
the prior rights of the Other, who as vulnerable addresses me and asks for my response.
Thus, 'The origin of rights does not lie in an act of possession but in an event of
dispossessing the self before the other' (Caygill, 2002, p. 152), and while this state of
dispossession is prior to the ontological, it might seem to imply that further emphasis
needs to be given to the often overlooked importance of listening within educational
settings of dialogue.16
The vulnerability of those involved in the exchanges of dialogue is something that needs
to be attended to further, if vulnerability is not to be seen as an excuse for creating
barriers between self and neighbour. Butler has drawn on the work of Levinas in
16 Todd, in 'Listening as an Attentiveness to Dense Plots', provides an eloquent exploration of what ethical
listening might look like within formal education (Todd, 2003a, pp.117-39).
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Precarious Life, in which she calls for the recognition of vulnerability, which is often
covered over and denied, as opening the way for a new humanism and a new road to
peace between both nations and individuals:
A vulnerability must be perceived and recognized in order to come into play
in an ethical encounter, and there is no guarantee that this win happen. Not
only is there always the possibility that a vulnerability win not be recognized
and that it will be constituted as 'unrecognizable,' but when a vulnerability is
recognized, that recognition has the power to change the meaning and
structure of vulnerability itself. (Butler, 2006, p. 43)
Jacqueline Rose also highlights the significance of thinking of mutual vulnerability as the
path forward for future peace. She examines psychoanalytic interpretations of
vulnerability, how we are commonly in denial of our vulnerability and seek to hide this
condition through an attitude of aggression. She considers this in an examination of the
way the Shoah has been used to justify violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict and
clearly articulates how recognition of shared vulnerability might be a way out of the cycle
ofhostility. The following passage is troubling and worth quoting at length:
Israeli soldiers are regularly sent on visits to Auschwitz in order to strengthen
their resolve. Responding in July 2003 to questions about the killing of
Palestinian children by the Israeli army (in the conflict at that time, one in
five dead Palestinians was a child), the commander in Gaza starts by taking
responsibility: 'Every name of a child here, it makes me feel bad because it's
the fault of my soldiers', but by the end of the conversation he has - in the
words of the interviewer - returned to being 'combative', invoking the
Holocaust as his rationale: 'I remember the Holocaust. We have a choice, to
fight the terrorists or to face being consumed again.' There are suicide
bombings on the part of the Palestinians in which Israeli children have died;
they have rightly been described as unacceptable crimes. But the flames on
the streets of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are not the flames of the Holocaust...
What would the situation in Israel-Palestine look like if the commander in
Gaza deduced from his 'memory' of the Holocaust, for example, a shared
vulnerability of peoples? What kind of nation would Israel become if the
state ceased to promote omnipotence as the answer to historical pain? To
recall Hareven: 'Even if often in history I have been the victim of others, I
will never oppress those weaker than myself and never abuse my power to
exile them.' (Rose, 2007, pp. 55-6)
This striking passage mirrors the way in which Levinas' s writing seeks to encourage his
reader to break the cycle of hostility with my actions, my recognition of the neighbour's
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vulnerability to my words and my actions, and my own situation as vulnerable within the
community of neighbours, the community into which we must educate the next
generation, but which the next generation is already part of.
It is worth pointing out, however, that Levinas's own comments on the way in which acts
of aggression against Palestinians have been justified by reference to historical pain do
not always seem to square with the conclusion that Rose reaches, or even with his own
ethical positions. In September 1982, two weeks after the massacre of Palestinian
refugees at the camps of Sabra and Chatila, Levinas participated in a radio interview with
Alain Finkielkraut, addressing questions of Jewish ethics and responsibility. In this,
Finkielkraut specifically raised the question of 'the temptation of innocence', or the
temptation for Israel to make itself unaccountable because ofmemories of past horror. In
reply, Levinas acknowledged this temptation and emphasised the importance of
individual responsibility, but nevertheless invoked the Holocaust, and went on to
emphasise that defence is necessary:
No-one has forgotten the Holocaust, it's impossible to forget such things
which belong to the most immediate and the most personal memory of every
one of us, and pertaining to those closest to us, who sometimes make us feel
guilty for surviving. That in no way justifies closing our ears to the voice of
men, in which sometimes the voice of God can also resound... I don't at all
believe that there are limits to responsibility, that there are limits to
responsibility in 'myself ... But I think we should also say that all those who
attack us with such venom have no right to do so, and that consequently,
along with this feeling of unbounded responsibility, there is certainly a place
for a defence, for it is not always a question of 'me', but of those close to me,
who are also my neighbours. I'd call such a defence a politics, but a politics
that's ethically necessary. (LR, pp. 291-92)
Following on from this rather disappointing notion of a politics as defence, which seems
at odds with the prophetic ideal we have discussed, Finkielkraut asked about the way in
which the war crimes committed at Sabra and Chatila can be justified by 'reason of the
State', to which Levinas responded by defending Zionism as both a political and ethical
ideal (p. 292), but also suggested, in a somewhat evasive manner, that responsibility for
the events at Sabra and Chatila is universal. This led the programme's presenter,
Salomon Maika, to question directly whether politics should not be seen as 'the very site
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of the encounter with the "other", and for the Israeli, isn't the "other" above all the
Palestinian?' (p. 294). Levinas's reply to this was, as Caygill points out, chilling, and
seems to contradict the very position we have been exploring on the nature of our
relations to alterity:
My definition of the other is completely different. The other is the neighbour,
who is not necessarily kin, but who can be. And in that sense, if you're for
the other, you're for the neighbour. But if your neighbour attacks another
neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on
another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least then we are
faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong, who is
just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong. (LR, 294)
It is difficult to give an apologetic response to defend the way in which Levinas's ethics
as articulated, fails the test of his own justice, seemingly refusing to acknowledge the
vulnerability of the Palestinian as other'". He also fails to acknowledge the contradictions
that must arise in ontologically according the State of Israel exemplary ethical and
political status. Hand's critique ofLevinas's responses is justified:
we hear a reluctant recognition of an other that is hurriedly transposed into a
regurgitation of published ethical writing or made equivocal through the re-
introduction of ontological and political calculations regarding knowing who
is right or wrong. Reference to the supreme threat being the one that is posed
to books... can also here sound astonishingly naive or even indifferent in the
context of real massacres; while appeal to a Talmudic text ... seems here
complacently academic, and a comprehension of being that Levinas's own
mature philosophy exposes so convincingly at the heart of Western
philosophy. In the admittedly difficult and compromised freedom of a radio
interview, Levinas's reactions seem to fail the test of his own rigorous ethics.
(Hand, 2009, pp. 106-7).
17 Although Caygill does point out that the closing Talmudic reading of the interview referred to by
Levinas could also be interpreted as emphasising the necessity ofjustice being enacted by Israel, 'the State
of Israel is only justified if it obeys its prophetic call for justice - if it ceases to do so, then its inhabitants
will be expelled. The claims of prophetic ethics carried in the books are maintained in their interpretation
and will condemn any injustice on the part of a state that claims to act in their name.' (Caygill, 2002, p.
194)
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Space here precludes discussion of several other instances of Levinas's apparent deafness
to his own ethics". But rather than further reflecting on these political refusals of the
other as weaknesses in Levinas's project, we should see them as demonstrating to us, his
readers, the need for our own vigilance, to go beyond Levinas's own texts to recognise
not just moments of intolerance and the immunisation against the demands of the other in
his work, but to work together as individuals within particular political communities to
resist deafness to the demands of neighbours both within and outside our communities,
those near, yes, but also those far away, the faceless others who are not immediately
present to us and yet whose lives are affected by our actions and inactions. And thus,
such an idea of politics goes beyond what Levinas himself seems to elaborate in this
interview of a politics defending those close by, but is closer to the idea of a prophetic
politics, that Caygill emphasises in his interpretation of Levinas, that will condemn the
unjust actions of a state that claims to speak on our behalf.
Levinas's own comments about how it is possible to fmd in alterity an enemy then should
draw our attention to what interfaith dialogue in education must strive to avoid. We have
already seen that Levinas suggests that the starting point for dialogue might be the
experience of conscience. This moves us beyond the commandment of 'loving the
neighbour' as the starting point for working towards peace suggested in A Common
Word. The obligation to the neighbour we have explored also suggests moving beyond
the reciprocal ethics implied in the Abrahamic commandment. For Levinas, the
neighbour must come before myself: it is only through responsibility to him, hearing his
prior address, that I could be myself. In both the Abrahamic traditions and in Levinas's
presentation, the commandment of responsibility to my neighbour comes from a
transcendent height. But the authority that compels me to responsibility is in Levinas's
presentation invested by its very vulnerability: 'There are two strange things here in the
face: its extreme frailty - the fact of being without means and, on the other hand, there is
authority. It is as if God spoke through the face' (Levinas, 1988, p. 169). The
18 For commentary on these, see Hand, 2002, pp. 96-9, Standish, 2007, p. 89. There is some equivocation
over Jewish-Muslim relations in Levinas's writing, for example, DF p. 193, but at other times, Levinas
emphasises a shared heritage between Judaism, Christianity and Islam, for example DF, p. 175. See
Caygill, 2002, p. 183 ff. for more extended discussion of this.
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responsibility towards this vulnerable stranger, my neighbour, is potentially already there
in every relation I have with others, although I am commonly in denial of this: indeed all
my interactions with others depend on this prior relation ofresponsibility.
Within education, Levinas's notion of dialogue based on illeity and deepening
responsibility extends the understanding of neighbourly love within the Abrahamic faiths
to an ideal that has broader appeal. It encourages us to reassess the ideal of neighbourly
love, and yet it is an approach to the neighbour that would surely find acceptance among
most strands of the monotheistic faiths. If education could encourage attentiveness to
vulnerability and difference, it might be possible to foster relations of non-violence
between those of very differing religious sensibilities and between secularists and those
of religious faith, of vital importance in the current climate of suspicion and latent
hostility harboured by many who feel marginalised because of their religious views. A
Common Word highlights the importance of working towards common ground In
religious understanding:
Finding common ground between Muslims and Christians is not simply a
matter for polite ecumenical dialogue between selected religious leaders.
Christianity and Islam are the largest and second largest religions in the world
and in history. .. making the relationship between these two religious
communities the most important factor in contributing to meaningful peace
around the world. If Muslims and Christians are not at peace, the world
cannot be at peace. With the terrible weaponry of the modem world, with
Muslims and Christians intertwined everywhere as never before, no side can
unilaterally win a conflict between more than half the world's inhabitants.
Thus our common future is at stake. The very survival of the world is
perhaps at stake. (A Common Word, pp. 15-6)
We have seen that within religious education there is already seen to be a place for
drawing attention to common ground and working towards non-violent relations, but
further work needs to be done on the way that other subject disciplines, for example other
humanities subjects, might likewise work towards a deeper sense of community and
vigilance in the name of peace. This is not a sentimentalised view but one recognising
the capacity for violence, whilst also emphasising the possibility of peace and shared
vulnerability that lie at the heart of intersubjectivity. This is a vision of increasing
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attentiveness to responsibility for the neighbour that is aware of the aponae of
understanding and potential for violence lying between the self and every other. It does
not attempt to smooth over and provide facile and false bridges to overcome difference
and sees those aporiae as an inescapable part of what it means to stand as a singular,
unique subject.
Reading Levinas challenges us to work towards those moments of non-violence which
the writers ofA Common Word are also calling for, in which I begin to attend to and take
up the infinite responsibility towards which my neighbour has summoned me. My
neighbour is ultimately a stranger to me, transcendent in alterity, but recognising this
strangeness and their singular fragility is the foundation of the relation of peace, a
peacefulness that lies at the heart of all intersubjectivity, human relations and society.
Freud is right that potential hostility is part of the relationship with my neighbour: in
summoning me to responsibility, they accuse me, place me in the traumatic and dizzying
position of an infinite responsibility for their vulnerability that takes me from my position
of self-sufficient enjoyment. But this traumatic accusation also offers the chance of
peace, and if one of the tasks of education is to foster peace, then the possibilities this
offers for thinking about interreligious dialogue in education provide a challenging ideal
for educationalists to heed.
Let us draw this chapter to a close by considering what this means for how we might
think of questions of the politics implied in creating a school community, or a community
of schools.
Education and the Meaning of Community
In Beyond Learning, Biesta draws on Levinas's idea of the Other to develop the idea that
within education there are always two 'communities' present: a rational community and
an 'other' community. Membership of the rational community enables people to speak as
rational agents. In this, people become interchangeable, since what matters is what is
said, rather than who speaks, and it is easy to see how institutions of education play an
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important role in building and reproducing such rational communities (Biesta, 2006, p.
56). Biesta sees this 'other' community as living within the rational community and
interrupting its work, coming 'into presence as soon as one responds to the other, to the
otherness of the other, to what is strange in relation to the discourse and logic of the
rational community. It comes into existence when one speaks in one's own voice' (p.
66). The 'other community' he describes, following Levinas and Alphonso Lingis, as
the community of those who have nothing in common, the community of
strangers, the community without community, is of an ethical nature. The
community of those who have nothing in common is constituted by our
response to the stranger, the one who asks, seeks - demands, as Levinas
would say - my response, who seeks to hear my unique voice. (p. 65)
Biesta suggests that such a community 'cannot be brought into existence in any deliberate
or technical way' (p. 69) and so, as educators, 'The only thing we can do is to make sure
that there are at least opportunities to meet and encounter what is different, strange, and
other, and also that there are opportunities for our students to really respond, to find their
own voice' (ibid.).
This seems a disappointing conclusion, leaving little impetus to challenge the status quo,
with the ethical realm relegated to an educational community that seems similar to the
'angelic realm of justice' that Caygill alluded to as problematic when Levinas insists on
the distinction between the neighbour and the third. Space here precludes examination of
Levinas's own difficult and changing attitudes towards Zionism, but we see clearly in
different places in his writing his hope that Israel should be the State that enacts justice
and the monotheism to which his writing bears witness, for example in 'The State of
Caesar and the State ofDavid':
For two thousand years, Israel was uninvolved in History. Innocent of all
political crime, ... Israel had become incapable of thinking a politics which
would bring to perfection its monotheistic message. Henceforth, the
commitment has been made. Since 1948. But all has just begun. Israel is no
less isolated in its struggle to complete its extraordinary task than was
Abraham, who began it four thousand years ago. (BV, p. 181)
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Whilst for many readers, these Zionist commitments and the ethical contortions to which
this led Levinas are problematic, they nevertheless demonstrate that the ethical ideal and
the idea of community to which Levinas attests suggest rather more than just 'allowing
opportunities to meet and encounter... what is strange, and other' (Biesta, 2006, p. 69).
But is it possible to say more ofwhat this might mean in practical terms?
One possibility might be the creation of school communities that practically meet the
needs of the vulnerable, the poor, the marginalised, attempting to enact a demanding
justice. Levinas's own work at the ENIO might be seen in this sense. At a dinner
marking his eightieth birthday, Levinas spoke of this work with the importance of a
calling:
After Auschwitz, I had the impression that in taking on the directorship of the
Ecole Normale Israelite Orientale I was responding to a historical calling. It
was my little secret '" Probably the naivete of a young man. I am still
mindful and proud of it today. (Malka, 2006, p. 84)
The ENIO as an educational institution was part of the Alliance Israelite Universelle,
which was founded to work for the emancipation of Jews in countries where they had no
rights to citizenship, and Levinas clearly saw his work for the schools of the Alliance, as
a response to the pressing ethical need for a renewed exploration and renaissance of
Jewish spirituality after the Shoah. Levinas's concerns surrounding spirituality and
education at this time are demonstrated in the essays of Difficult Freedom, and the
descriptions of daily life and the curriculum at the school given by Levinas's students
reflect likewise Levinas's own vision of Judaism as 'rigorously intellectual, rooted in the
textual study, rationalistic, anti-mystical, humanist and universalist' 19 (Critchley, 2002, p.
xx). The Jewish education provided by these schools, not funded by the State and seen
by Levinas as operating in a sense at distance from the State, is described by Levinas as
providing emancipation for Jews of the Mediterranean basin who experienced
marginalisation and a struggle for a sense of Jewish identity, and emancipation not
19 Something of the day-to-day experience of students at the ENIO at this time is captured in Catherine
Chalier and Ami Bouganim's essay 'Emmanuel Levinas: School Master and Pedagogue' (Chalier and
Bouganim, 2008, pp. 13-25).
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understood in just economic terms (DF, p. 285). Such freedom, Levinas suggests, arises
through the observance of ritual and attentiveness to texts, rather than through imposing
totalitarian constraints to freedom:
Jewish education does not rely on the ineffective brutality of constraints
imposed by the totalitarian State in order to maintain a law within freedom
and guarantee freedom through law. It associates generous ideas with the
discipline that is prerequisite to ritual, the distance taken with regard to the
self and nature. (DF, p. 288)
This might seem to suggest a Jewish particularist account of education that many today
would find unpalatable, yet the idea of a community emerging in the faithful and
disciplined attentiveness to shared texts and ritual, which we see in Levinas's own
hermeneutical approach, is all too often lacking in conceptions of community that
privilege the mastering of rational discourse as what unites, or what should unite us (for
example, in Habermas's Pragmatics ofCommunication, 1999). In a sense, Levinas might
be seen in these schools as attempting to enact a just political and ethical education,
creating 'other' communities in a very real way, not as some 'angelic order of justice',
through encouraging attentiveness and responsibility to traditions, rituals and texts, and to
practices of discourse and dialogue, an ethical responsibility of universal significance.
We also see this emphasis on attentiveness to reading present when discussing his other
role in education, as a professor within a university and therefore within State funded
formal education:
I encountered many difficulties in preparing my courses. I always felt better
when I was borne by a text and a commentary. The construction of a
systematic course, the anticipation of all questions and objections, always
seems to me abstract and artificial. (RE, p. 79)
Here we see that Levinas's thought seems to lead away from the idea of teaching in a
community in which all can be planned for in an economy of exchange, towards an idea
of teaching taking place in fidelity to both texts and to the demands and unexpected
encounters that arise between teacher and students. And it is this triangulation of fidelity
and relationship between teachers, students, and the content of the curriculum, and the
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infinite demand that solicits an attentiveness and a hospitality as a surplus beyond
institutionalised roles, aims and objectives, that is surely intrinsic to any understanding of
educative community following on from Levinas.
Although the texts Levinas refers to are philosophical texts in his work as a professor,
and Scripture in his work at the ENIO, the idea of 'fidelity to texts' that I am suggesting
implies a broader understanding of what is textual. In this sense, it is possible to see the
traditions of subject disciplines as texts that require attentiveness and disciplined reading.
This is not, however, simply to be an apologist for the canon. To 'read' in this way
suggests, as Levinas describes in his reading of the Talmud, 'a reading in search of
problems and truths' (TR, p. 9) rather than 'the litany or pious murmur of a consent given
beforehand' (p. 8). Reading in this sense is required of both teachers and students, and
can be compared to the initiation into truth-procedures that Badiou suggests as an ideal
for education, requiring fidelity in appropriating the meaning of the truth within the
coordinates of the current state of the situation. As I argued in Chapter 4, such an
approach suggests the need for more curricular autonomy for teachers, in choosing which
are the texts that they recognise as of significant importance to their discipline and that
they feel their students should have the opportunity to engage with, and which might
come to define educational communities in this sense. One of the primary reasons
influencing the choice to become a secondary school teacher is love of one's subject'",
and we should have more faith in the judgements of those so motivated about what texts
they see as revealing truths, and which they see as worthy of passing on to the next
generation.
In addition to this demand for reading, Levinas' s emphasis on the discipline of ritual in
Jewish education as linked to freedom is challenging. Although Levinas is concerned
with specifically Jewish rituals, this nevertheless raises the question of how rituals
constitute community in schools today. The idea of rituals in school life has been treated
with political suspicion: in his provocative Schooling as a Ritual Performance, Peter
20 For research on this, see, for example, hnp://pdfserve.informaworld.com/313757 751264654.pdf,
accessed 14.08.09
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McLaren, for example, analyses how capitalist ideologies and the logic of consumption
and conformity are transmitted through ritualised classroom practices (1999).21 But this
need not be the case. Although rituals can be used in ways that perpetuate and further
reinforce existing injustices, as McLaren highlights, Levinas's emphasis on the
importance of disciplined performance of ritual within Jewish education leads me to
question what kind of rituals might interrupt totalising logics and lead to a deeper sense
of community. Given that schooling inevitably involves ritualised performances, further
attention needs to be given to the question of which rituals are desirable: which rituals
would enable the development of more just school communities, and communities with a
sense of obligation not just to neighbours within those communities but to neighbours
outside that particular educational space? This is a challenging question to consider, and
it would be totalising to impose a set of rituals within any kind of national framework for
education, 'the ineffective brutality of constraints imposed by the totalitarian State' (DF,
p. 288), but is a question that should rather be addressed at the level of individual
schools. In relation to the rituals Levinas emphasises, the performance of religious rituals
does seem to imply exclusiveness in the membership of a religious community, and in
relation to the idea of 'common schools', it is difficult to consider what kinds of rituals
would be desirable or acceptable - certainly the rituals Levinas speaks of, embedded in
thousands of years of history, seem to operate in a different space from and have no
obvious counterpart with what might count as rituals within common schools today.
But perhaps the question of considering what kind of rituals might lead to a better sense
of community, even if that encourages some degree of exclusiveness within a distinctive
educational community, is an unavoidable question. It could be argued that the
distinctiveness of particular educational communities is not something to be feared, as it
21 He describes schooling and the Catholic schooling he researched in particular as 'a site of surveillance
and the marking and reproduction of power, where working-class bodies are located as inferior,
quarantined within designated spaces of formal identity, dissected by the white gaze of power, masticated
by the jaws of capital, made receptive to the command metaphors of formal citizenship, and, and
transformed into semiotic battlegrounds where the capitalist law of value and the law of the Father become
sanctified in the daily pedagogical practices.' (Mcl.aren, 1999, p. xxxiii)
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all too often is in educational discourses that demonstrate a desire for homogeneity.f
Further attention needs to be paid to the question of how to create educational
communities which are bound together with an orientation of responsibility and
hospitality towards those who are not educated within those particular communities, a
desire to protect and welcome the stranger. Given the way in which exclusiveness can
lead to exclusion in violent and unjust terms, the creation of educational communities in
this sense might be seen as a fine risk. Yet given the way that current educational
systems already lead to exclusion, as McLaren highlights, and in the way Zizek suggests
is symptomatic of our current situation, this is surely a fine risk that must be run.
This idea of community, rooted in illeity and manifested in a fraternity that reads texts
vigilantly and attentively, provides a more compelling vision for ideas of responsibility in
education than ideas of shared rationality or social contract ethics as foundational.
Caygill points out that in 'Reflections on Hitlerism', Levinas warns that liberalism, with
its focus on autonomy, freedom and equality, but without communal narratives, is left
without a strong basis for community, and thus it is left vulnerable to proposals for
exclusivist communities, which are
opposed to freedom and equality, such as the national, confessional, class
and, more ominously, racial fraternities that pervade modernity and are able
through their own dramatic narratives of repentance and redemption to
exploit the deficit of liberal rationalism. (Caygill, 2002, p. 35)
For Levinas, rather than autonomy or rationality, it is infinite responsibility for the
vulnerable neighbour, a responsibility beyond thematisation that is the beginning of the
possibility of such ideals as equality and reciprocity.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to debate the relative merits of private schools and
institutions of education operating with relative independence from the operations of
22 This desire for homogeneity and normalising standards is extending beyond schools, for example in the
National Curriculum, to higher education also. The call from some politicians, within both the Labour and
Conservative parties, for universal standards for degrees, tougher inspection and central codes of
admission, seen by many as a direct attack on the independence of universities, is discussed at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2009/aug/02/universitv-degree-comparison-oxford, accessed
15.08.09.
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government. At this present time, it is difficult to conceive of British schoolteachers
operating with anything like the curricular autonomy that Levinas possessed at the ENIO.
Their situation is perhaps closer to the institutional role Levinas had as university
professor.f though with less autonomy than Levinas enjoyed in that role because of the
climate of managerialism, as analysed in Chapter 4. But the conception of community in
education to which Levinas leads us is one in which the obligation to the neighbour is the
beginning, end, and meaning of community, rather than the emphasis of community
arising out of commonality or shared rationality. This is not to say that shared rationality
is not important, as I have emphasised in preceding chapters, but rather to see that my
capability for discourse and dialogue is only possible because of responsibility to my
neighbour, as a gift arising from their prior address. Masschelein and Simons suggests
that such an understanding of community should lead to a different way of thinking about
education, and on the place of language and therefore of dialogue, than the emphasis on
contractual responsibilities that seek to layout exactly what our responsibilities are:
our plea is for the continuance of the conception of education and teaching as
a relation of transfer or transmission - although not simply a continuance as
this must also involve reformulation. Perhaps, better, it is a relation of giving
and receiving. We speak indeed of giving words or giving a language. But
the giving of a language, giving words, means that we do not know, and that
we cannot know, exactly what we give and what we receive. (Masschelein
and Simons, 2002, p. 605)
My condition of being taught depends on the anarchic condition of responsibility. I am
always already a subject in community, yet called to bring about a better community, a
community of neighbours in which we work towards the conditions of justice and
fraternity that Levinas testifies to, breaking down the walls Zizek speaks of through
practices of dialogue that do not cover over the conditions of illeity and vulnerability that
23 We should also note, however, that Levinas had another vision for higher education, in the hopes he
expresses for the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, which will 'translate into a modern idiom the wisdom of
the Talmud, to confront it with the problems of our time' (TR, p. 9). This task, which makes the university
both universal and situated within a concrete locality Levinas describes as 'the most noble essence of
Zionism' (ibid.), Levinas acknowledges however that this work of education through translation, a
universal caning, is too bold a vision for other locations: 'The Diaspora, stuck in its living forces by
Hitlerism, no longer has either the knowledge or the courage needed for the realization of such a project'
(p. 10), and of course, he himself worked within a university as a state funded, secular institution of higher
education.
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would make such a community possible. This community and this education are clearly
not limited to institutions of formal education. Yet considering the way in which Levinas
saw his own pedagogical work within educational institutions as of deep political and
ethical significance, I am left questioning how we might understand and deepen our
understanding of the anarchic ethical responsibilities that teachers in schools currently
face, in a very different political climate, in the day-to-day demands of their work. To
the question of what teachers can do in response to Levinas's prophetic attestation of
ethical and political subjectivity, let us now turn.
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Chapter 7
Political Disappointment, Education and the
Anarchic Ethical Subject
Support yourself
by inconsistencies:
two fmgers
snap in the abyss, in
scribblebooks
a world rushes up, this depends
on you (Celan, cited inM, p. 105)
What would it mean, supported by inconsistencies, for the world rushing up to depend on me?
Badiou uses this poem to consider the idea that an edict ofjustice that can overturn and interrupt
the injustice of 'the usual course of conservative politics' is always uttered in subjectivity before
community. Following on from considering the meaning of community in education in the
previous chapter, in this fmal chapter I will explore what it could mean to think of political
subjectivity within an educative community. This will be an understanding of political
subjectivity beginning in response to situated injustices and political disappointments, read
together with Levinas's writing on the an-archy of ethical subjectivity. In the preceding chapter,
I acknowledged that it is difficult to conceive of teachers enjoying the freedom to create a
community of schools acting at a distance from the State, and therefore our analysis must begin
with the current situation in education, which is, for the reasons I have considered in Chapters 3
and 4, politically disappointing. I will begin therefore by considering the question of political
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disappointment and how a common response to this within educational theory has been a
discourse of hope. I will then explore how Levinas and Badiou offer us an alternative approach
to hope, more motivating than the utopian conceptions more usually offered, and enriching our
sense of the possibilities ofpolitical subjectivity within education.
Philosophy and Political Disappointment
One of the most prominent recent considerations of the challenges of Levinas for thinking about
political subjectivity and action has been Critchley's Infinitely Demanding. Here he argues, as
mentioned earlier, that philosophy does not begin in the experience of wonder, but in the
experience of disappointment, 'the indeterminate but palpable sense that something desired has
not been fulfilled, that a fantastic effort has failed' (Critchley, 2007, p.l). He focuses on two
forms of disappointment: religious and political, both of which he sees as giving rise to
philosophy. Religious disappointment, he suggests, is experienced when religious belief systems
and traditions become no longer believable, leading to a sense of meaninglessness, and nihilism.
'Nihilism', he writes, 'is this declaration of meaninglessness, a sense of indifference,
directionlessness or, at its worst, despair that can flood into all areas of life' (p. 2). The
philosophical response to this he sees exemplified in Nietzsche's attempt to think through the
fact that what had been seen as the foundation of meaning had become meaningless. I would
question whether this theme of religious disappointment makes itself so pressingly felt as
Critchley seems to suggest: whilst many may experience a sense of nihilistic meaninglessness in
life, I am not sure that this is necessarily in response to any kind of religious disappointment, or
sense that 'God is dead' in the Nietzschean sense.I His outline of political disappointment is
more compelling. This he sees as 'the sense of something lacking or failing aris[ing] from the
realization that we inhabit a violently unjust world, a world defined by the horror of war, a world
where, as Dostoevsky says, blood is being spilt in the merriest way, as if it were champagne' (p.
I Predictions of the demise of religion are also questionable. As Reza Aslan writes, 'Despite all the confident
predictions one hears about the death of God, the truth is that religion is a stronger, more global force today than it
has been in generations. At the dawn of the twentieth century, one halfof the world's population identified itselfas
Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or Hindu. One hundred years of social progress, technological innovation, and
scientific advancement, and that number stands now at nearly two thirds' (Aslan, 2009, p. 10).
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3). Political disappointment is related to awareness of injustices in the world, but also a
disappointment at wrongs within political systems, ranging from current anger at MPs' expenses,
to the corrosion of political structures through a politics of fear. The response to such
disappointment that philosophy takes up, Critchley suggests, is the question ofjustice: what does
justice mean, or what kind ofjustice do we seek, in the world we inhabit? Critchley outlines and
rejects two possible responses to such disappointment: a passive nihilism that retreats from the
injustices of the world in mysticism, contemplation and meditation, and active nihilism and other
forms of revolutionary vanguardism, that seek to destroy the current order of things, which he
sees exemplified in Al-Qaeda, using the resources of capitalist globalisation against that very
system itself. Critchley rejects these approaches that attempt to either retreat from or destroy
the current order of things. What is needed instead, he suggests, is to think through and begin
working out of the situation in which we fmd ourselves:
We have to resist the temptation of nihilism and face up to the hard reality of the
world. What does that reality teach us? It shows violent injustice here and around
the world; it shows growing social and economic inequalities here and around the
world; it shows that the difference between what goes on here and around the world
is increasingly fatuous. It shows the populations of the wen-fed West governed by
fear of outsiders, whose current names are 'terrorist', 'immigrant', 'refugee' or
'asylum seeker'. It shows populations turning inward towards some reactionary and
xenophobic conception of their purported identity, something which is happening in
a particularly frightening manner an across Europe at present. It shows that because
of the excessive diet of sleaze, deception, complacency and corruption liberal
democracy is not in the best of health. It shows, in my parlance, massive political
disappointment. (pp. 6-7)
We can see in the way that Levinas addresses concrete problems of injustice, for example in the
essays ofDifficult Freedom and his work at the ENIO, and the way in which he situates his work
as a response to the presentiment and mourning of the Nazi horror, that he was concerned to
begin thinking out of the situation in which he found himself, even if at times the difficulty ofhis
philosophical expression can make that response seem somewhat abstract. Within the present
2 See for example the Retort group's discussion of this in Afflicted Powers, for example the coding language used by
al-Qaida: 'Directives were encrypted in a quaint corporate language - terror was "commercial activity", bin Laden
was dubbed the "contractor", the Taliban became the "Omar Brothers Company" - but at the same time made use of
the Allied Forces' cryptographic system used in World War Two. Al-Qaida ... was from the start a modern virtual
organization, or more properly, a modern network with a decentralized cell structure' (Retort, 2006, p. 152).
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situation that we fmd ourselves, it is difficult to disagree with Critchley's diagnosis of the
disappointing nature of current political systems, leading to a desire for a new approach to
politics, which has become palpable in the wake of the unprecedented debt crisis of 08/09 and in
Britain over the disappointment and anger about MPs expenses. We can see this sense of
disappointment, anger and a desire for something new in the rhetoric used by those working
across the political spectrum, from The Guardian' s 'New Politics' thread - stating that 'public
dissatisfaction with politics has never been greater: a national debate is needed on what must
change" - to Philip Blond' s assertion that we are 'at one of those epoch changing moments in
British political history', marking 'a paradigm shift, an utter and complete reversal of the pre-
existing order and the arrival of something new, something revolutionary and something
transformative' (Blond, 2009, p. 1). This leads me to question how teachers respond to political
disappointment with current systems of education. To what extent do they feel that education is
politically disappointing, and what does this mean for how we think about their political
subjectivity? Indeed, what does that phrase even mean? Let us turn to consider the way in
which educational theorists have expressed and responded to political disappointment.
Education, Disappointment, Hope
There are many ways the idea of political disappointment in education could be thematised and I
do not wish to provide an exhaustive survey. Disappointment ranges from the ways in which the
political role of teachers has been conceived as the answer to all societal ills, and the lack of
support they are given for this, to broader disappointment that schools become the site of
reproduction of existing social inequalities. David Halpin opens his Hope and Education with a
thoroughly depressing article by a 46-year old male teacher from the Times Educational
Supplement. It is worth quoting this at length to illustrate the profound disillusionment that
teachers can feel, and how those experiencing disappointment do not necessarily see it as leading
to a paradigm shift:
3 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/series/politics-and-refonn, accessed 28.08.09
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I work with 14-year old children who have 39-year old grandparents, whose families
are fourth or fifth generation unemployed and whom the police deem 'out of control' .
Many started their sex lives at 12 and already smoke and drink heavily. We manage
and they pass some exams, but they won't get jobs because there aren' t any .. . My
office is a chair in the staff room and I don't have a personal phone or computer
terminal. The windows and roof leak . . . It is cold in winter and too hot in the
summer ... Some of my classes have more than 30 children, all of which have a right
to individual attention and some of which have special needs. I haven't had a full set
of textbooks in years and produce photocopies and worksheets in my own time. If
children misbehave, it is apparently my fault for inadequate child-management skills.
I have been hectored by the press, badgered by parents, pressured by the
management, and insulted by politicians, just for being a teacher ... I've worked
through innumerable Secretaries of State for Education, and I feel that I can wear my
despair and cynicism as the professional equivalent of a long service and good
conduct medal .. . I am a good teacher because I appreciate and like children. I enjoy
my subject, and I admire learning, but I am going to need a lot of help to trust a
politician again. The Government and my management will have to support me in
order to get back some of the loyalty and sense of vocation that has been squandered
needlessly. The years to retirement are going to be a long, hard haul and if I could
leave teaching, I'd go tomorrow .. .. I'm not sure I have much hope or faith left.
(TES, 6 November 1998, in Halpin, 2003, pp. 10-1)
Halpin points out that such an assessment must be read alongside more positive accounts of
teaching. However, while it reports a single case of massive disappointment, I am sure that any
schoolteacher would recognise parts of his account. Halpin also points to figures issued by the
Teacher Training Agency suggesting that many of those becoming teachers today do not regard
it necessarily as ajob for life and higher numbers are seeking early retirement (pp. 11-2).4
Beyond this individual case, educational researchers have explored other disappointments with
educational structures, policies and practices in numerous fields, often, as in the example above,
expressing a view that teachers feel that there is little that they can do to effect change, both at
the level of educational systems and at the level of teacher-student interactions. As Julian
Edgoose writes, 'As educational policies like testing and media influences are increasingly
4 Furthermore, research carried out by Alan Smithers and Pamela Robinson from the University of Buckingham's
Centre for Education and Employment shows that in recent years, the drop-out rate in teacher training courses in
Britain is 15%, with a further 28% failing to take up a teaching post once they graduate, see
http://www.independent.co .uk/news/education/education-news/alarm-at-rising-dropout-rate-for-student-teachers-
876794.html, accessed 12.08.09.
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guided by global concerns, teachers feel powerless to effect students. They have less curricular
freedom, yet perhaps also fewer ideas about how their teaching might make a difference'
(Edgoose, 2008, p. 100). It seems that many teachers feel the opposite of the sense in the Celan
poem that the world, rushing up, depends on them. In the last twenty years, much ofthe political
disappointment expressed by educational theorists has been in response to the adoption of
policies of marketisation and economic managerialism in education, as explored in Chapter 4,
with the language used about education increasingly shifting towards the idea that it is a service,
of which either students or their parents are the consumers. Giroux, for example, lambasts the
way in which neoliberal education policies have led to a distortion of the goals of education in
response to the demands of the marketplace:
Teachers are under siege like they have never been in the past, and schools are
assaulted relentlessly by the powerful forces of neoliberalism, which want to tum
them into sources of profit. What is good for Disney and Microsoft is now the
protocol for how we define schooling, learning and the goals of education. Schools
are no longer considered a public good but a private good and the only form of
citizenship increasingly being offered to young people is consumerism. (Giroux,
2001, p. xxii)
The critique of neoliberal education policies in America and Britain has been so extensively
explored elsewhere that I do not intend to revisit the arguments here (see for example, Apple,
2000, Bridges and Jonathan, 2003, McLaren, 2006). Various responses within education theory
however do seem to correspond to Critchley's thesis that philosophy arises from disappointment,
and much educational research can be seen as constituting a form of resistance, an attempt to
stand at a distance from the state in order to articulate the present situated injustice and propose a
more just alternative.
In responding to disappointment, several educational theorists have consciously used a discourse
of hope. Giroux, for example, following his provocative critique of how the market ideology of
hypercapitalism has monopolised education at all levels, concludes Theory and Resistance in
Education with a note of hope of the possibility of an education otherwise, and the need for
educators to have faith in the idea of creating a more just society, rooted in 'a concrete
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utopianism' (Giroux, 2001, p. 242). Halpin has likewise argued for the need for hope in
response to political disappointment, arguing that hope as the exercise of a utopian imagination
will allow us to think of alternative responses to current educational wrongs and injustices and
therefore offer relief from cynicism and 'debilitating pessimism' about the possibility of change:
Applying the utopian imagination to such problems ... can lead to very different
outcomes. Certainly, by facilitating the process of temporarily putting to one side
our assumptions about the existing order of things and the current supposed limits of
change, it assists the development ofradical, previously untried and potentially
successful policies for education .,. [U]topianism provides a justification for
considering the previously inconceivable without fear of embarrassment or
premature contradiction (Halpin, 2003, p. 9).
Is this language of hope, rooted in a 'concrete utopianism' the most helpful response to political
disappointment? It clearly offers one way of resisting the pessimism that can be the response to
disappointment, but how does it relate to the way that teachers themselves respond to what they
find disappointing in education?
If we turn to research conducted into the ways that teachers respond to unliked policy changes,
we can see that the response to disappointment 'at the chalk face' is complex. As the teacher
cited by Halpin suggests, many teachers feel powerless to resist policy changes that they regard
with ambivalence or hostility. This we can see documented in the research carried out by Alex
Moore and others. In 'Compliance, Resistance and Pragmatism', Moore and his co-researchers
document the findings of a major research study showing that after initial hostility to new policy
initiatives, following the New Labour victory of 1997, teachers became far less openly
oppositional to what were initially unpopular educational policies, and teachers were happy to
describe themselves as pragmatic instead of political. One primary schoolteacher in their study,
for example, expresses this position:
I think that the problem with education too often in the past is that it ... polarised
politically .... And because New Labour haven't polarised it, in a sense it's a bit
more difficult to make those distinctions. I think that people [now] are much more
pragmatic in the methods they use. So things like pupil grouping don't become a
political issue so much. You are actually looking at the evidence, you are looking at
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the research and what works best for the kids, what are the pros and cons (Moore et
al., 2002, p. 562).
The authors suggest that this language of pragmatism reflects the way that during the period of
their study, teachers' self-identification reflected their 'buying into the emergent dominant
discourse of pragmatism' , operative in the 'Third Way' politics of New Labour, which became a
'force of conservatism ... an ideology at whose centre, paradoxically, is a critical opposition to
ideology and therefore, by implication, to politics' (p. 563). The authors suggest that at the time
of their research, the question of the political subjectivity of teachers became a matter of the
gradual accommodation and colonisation of thinking in alignment with dominant pragmatist
discourses. This may have initially been a coping strategy in response to new initiatives, but has
become, they argue, a process of depoliticisation, 'in which the inclination to mobilise for active,
collective political opposition is diverted ... to more isolated engagements in the internal politics
of their own institutions' (p. 564). Their article was published in 2002. If we fast-forward to
today, have times changed?
Reading a recent issue of the NASUWT'S5 magazine for its membership, it would appear not.
Although one might expect the teachers who are on the executive of this union to be among the
more obviously politicised members of the profession, in the way in which Moore et al. use the
term political as 'characterised by argument, passion and debate', the language used by members
of the executive focuses on 'better management' in a tone that is in clear alignment with the
dominance of economic managerialism within current political systems." and throughout the
publication there is excessive focus on improving the working conditions of teachers. This was
exemplified in the way in which members of the NASUWT responded to the plan to end SATS
for l l-year-olds, threatening to strike if the tests were abolished, arguing that if the tests were
5 The National Association of Schoolmasters and Union of Women Teachers (NASUWT) is the largest teaching
union in the UK.
6 For example, an NASUWT executive member, when asked 'what makes a good headteacher?' replied: 'You may
wen have the qualifications, training and perceived skills and competencies, but good leadership depends on how
you manage teaching and learning and most importantly how you manage people' (Teaching Today, May 2009,
Issues 67, p. 14).
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abolished, the workload for teachers would become intolerable.i Clearly this was, contra Moore
et al., an example of teachers being mobilised into a collective political opposition, but not
because of discontent with current educational systems, but out of conservatism: a desire to keep
the status quo.
However, this does not tell the whole story. In contrast with the NASUWT's proposed action to
strike if Key Stage 2 SATS are dropped, delegates at the National Union of Teachers (NUT) and
the National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT) conferences this year have voted
overwhelmingly to boycott SATS next year over ideological opposition to what they represent.8
Proposing the resolution for industrial action, Steve Iredale of the NAHT's National Council
pronounced: ' The Department for Children, Schools and Families' industry of mechanising the
education system, reducing it to numerical nonsense, must be stopped once and for all. ' While
Ed Balls was making efforts to avert the resolution to strike, the former president of the NAHT,
Sue Sayles, described the decision to strike as a moral decision: ' It's our moral duty personally,
within our local branches and as a national association, to show Ed that we have balls,9. The
actions of teachers resisting other forms of assessment and surveillance strategies imposed by
school managers can also be seen within individual schools. Two teachers, in an article for The
Guardian, give an account of how teachers in their school responded to the installation of CCTV
cameras in their classrooms by refusing to teach in those rooms:
Earlier this year, on a school day like any other, we shuffled into our politics class at
11.20 on a Monday morning. What we didn't notice straight away were four tinted
CCTV domes hanging from the ceiling including a huge monitor dome staring right
at us. Confusion and anger broke out among us. A teacher casually stated that they
were for teacher training purposes. After a thought of ' God, George Orwell was
7 See http://www .guardian.co .uk/education/2009/apr/16/teachers-sats-nasuwt-strike, accessed 12.08.09, for
discussion of this.
8 Although the resolution would have to be passed through a ballot of members of both unions before it could go
ahead, and the government have argued that industrial action on this issue would be illegal.
9 See http://www .guardian.co.uk/education/2009/may/02/headteachers-sats-boycott-ed-balls for coverage of NAHT
conference, accessed 13.08.09
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right' , some of us angrily packed up and left - we weren't comfortable working in a
classroom with cameras.10
The students supported their teachers' decision to boycott those teaching rooms, and eventually,
the school management turned the cameras off in response to their action. If the research carried
out by Moore suggests that in 2002, the teaching profession was becoming depoliticised, are
these incidents signs that teachers are becoming repoliticised, and no longer aligning their
thinking to conform to policy changes they regard with hostility?
Let us turn now to consider an alternative conception of political subjectivity, following from the
reading of Levinas I have been developing in the preceding chapters, which takes seriously the
view that teachers are not in the process of being de- or re-politicised, but are always already
political and ethical subjects, rooted in an an-archie conception of ethical subjectivity that leads
towards an alternative conception of hope.
An-archism, Levinas and Ethical Protest
Let me begin this section by returning to Critchley's claim that philosophy begins in the
experience of disappointment. Critchley described how two responses to political
disappointment were active and passive nihilism: a retreat from or attempt to destroy the present
order of things. He also suggests that disappointment with what political parties stand for can
have a positive effect in leading to a renewed sense of the urgency of political activism outside
of electoral systems. He cites activities of the anti-globalisation movements, indigenous rights
groups, and the work of various NGOs and other activist networks as examples of these
approaches to political activism operating outside of traditional electoral forms of politics.
Criticising and rejecting the Leninist idea that the state should and will wither away, he argues:
politics must be conceived at a distance from the state, taking up a distance in a
specific situation. More specifically, at a time when the state is seeking to saturate
and control more and more areas of social life, I claim that the task of radical
10 Their article is at http://www.guardian.eo.uk/eommentisfree/libertyeentral/2009/jun/03/eetv-elassroom , accessed
13.08.09
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political articulations is the creation of interstitial distance within the state territory
(Critchley, 2007, p. 92).
Critchley names the operation of such a politics, acting at a distance from the state, neo-
anarchism. There is a doubling of meaning in the way that he uses the term, gesturing towards
ethical anarchism and political neo-anarchism, both of which he sees as entwined. He explains
his use of the term as following Levinas's use of the term to critique the 'archie' idea of
subjectivity that Levinas describes as dominant within post-Enlightenment philosophy:
On Levinas's view ... it is the sovereign, self-positing subject that has dominated
modem philosophy since Descartes, where the arche or principle governing selfhood
is autarchy, understood as self-origination or self-legislation. Against this, Levinas
argues that ethical subjectivity is affected by the other in a way that places in
question the self's purported sovereignty and autonomous majesty. In this sense, the
ethical relation to the other is anarchical, which, for Levinas, is not devoid of
political significance. (p. 93)
Before we examine how far this idea of an-archy relates to political neo-anarchism, as Critchley
suggests, let us consider how Levinas uses the term. In Otherwise than Being, Levinas
introduces the term in the pivotal chapter, 'Substitution'. Here he proposes that an-archy is an
interruption of the arche of a self-positing subject, that through its own autonomy puts itself in
place, sovereign over itself. In contrast with this, Levinas describes the an-archy of the subject,
prior to and irreducible to consciousness, that disturbs the idea of any overarching or totalising
principle or origin of subjectivity. This is, as Critchley highlights, a critique of the Kantian idea
of autonomy, 'where each moral subject would be sovereign over itself insofar as it was freely
determined by the moral law' , but has a history before Kant: 'we might think of this self-positing
in terms of the res cogitans in Descartes as the Archimedean point of certainty that arrests the
movement of doubt' (p. 121). Levinas sees this idea of the self-positing subject continued in the
ontology of Heidegger, for whom, as Critchley describes, 'the anticipatory resoluteness of
authentic Dasein is simply a more existential version of self-positing autarchy' (ibid.). Levinas
criticises any self-positing idea of subjectivity as ultimately a form of egoism: 'It is the very
egoism of the ego that posits itself as its own origin, an uncreated, sovereign principle, a prince'
(CP, p. 138).
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For Levinas, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, ethics must be rooted not in the self, but
in the disturbance of the self through the approach of the other. I have already emphasised that
this disturbance of the idea of the sovereign self through the other approaching and electing it as
one responsible has political significance for Levinas. As Caygill suggests:
By locating the consistency of his life and signature between the presentiment and
the memory of political horror, Levinas unambiguously aligned his philosophical
work with the thinking of the political, or, more precisely, with the thinking of
political horror. (Caygill, 2002, p. 5)
Given this alignment between his philosophy and his memory of political horror, Levinas's
attempt to expose the limitations of subjectivity conceived in terms of a certain understanding of
self-positing autonomy that can lead to totalitarianism and the refusal to accept difference, must
be seen as already a political as well as an ethical conceptualisation of subjectivity. It is also
worth emphasising again that while developing these philosophical positions, he was also
responding to very concrete political problems related to 'the Jewish ordeal' (RE, p. 39) in his
pedagogical work at the ENIO, a profession he described, as I have already mentioned, as
'responding to a historical calling' (Malka, 2006, p. 84).
An-archy is a term that became increasingly prominent in Levinas's essays published before
Otherwise than Being. It is one of several terms used to interrupt this ideal of the self-governing
subject that Levinas argues has dominated Western philosophy, and that, as we saw in Chapter 3,
has been an important ideal within education. We have seen why Levinas argued that such an
ideal can lead to totalitarianism and political horror. What is specific to this term an-archy, as
Levinas uses it, is this sense that the approach of the other, my responsibility for her, disrupts
both senses of the term arche in its double meaning of principle and origin. In the 1969 essay,
'The Name of God According to a Few Talmudic Texts', we see Levinas emphasising how the
idea of origin is foundational for rationality in Western philosophy, within the ontological
approach he is aiming to interrupt: 'Being has an origin: it is arkhe. In Western philosophy,
rationality is identified with the search for an origin. It is essentially archaeology' (BV, p.125).
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In contrast, responsibility affects me anarchically, without origin or reason, resistant to
thematisation, through the thirdness of illeity as we explored in the previous chapter. I am
affected by the demand of my neighbour 'Anarchically, without beginning in a present, without
beginning at all' (BV, p. 126).
In Otherwise than Being, this an-archie responsibility of subjectivity is described, as we saw in
Chapter 2, in terms ofan 'obsession', affecting and disturbing my spontaneity and sovereignty:
irreducible to consciousness, even if it overwhelms it. .. Obsession traverses
consciousness, countercurrentwise, it is inscribed in consciousness as something
foreign, a disequilibrium, a delirium. In undoes thematization, and escapes any
principle, origin, will or apX11, which are put forth in every ray of consciousness.
This movement is, in the original sense of the term, an-archical. (OB, p. 101)
The an-archie ethical subject, as we have seen, emerges from its self-unbinding, from my
neighbour's appeal, confronting me with her need, looking for the response I alone can give.
This responsibility undoes my self-possession. While it might demand of me a justification for
my actions, responsibility itself is:
justified by no prior commitment, in the responsibility for another - in an ethical
situation - ... the me-ontological 11 and metalogical structure of this anarchy takes
form, undoing the logos in which the apology by which consciousness always
regains its self-control, and commands, is inserted ... The consciousness is affected,
then, before forming an image of what is coming to it, affected in spite of itself. (p.
102)
In 'Humanism and An-archy', Levinas describes an-archy as 'the trace of an immemorial past' 12
(CP, p. 136), pre-original passivity, prior to freedom.
11 'Me-ontological' indicates non-ontological, or concerned with non-being, or what might remain outside of
ontology, from the Greek prefix Py/ / me 'non', and here Levinas uses the term to indicate that it is in the ethical
situation of being called to responsibility that this anarchy of subjectivity takes form, but that this is outside of
ontology and as rnetalogical,beyond logic.
12 This trace is described as 'immemorial' because it can never be remembered, for to remember it would be to
bring it to consciousness, thematisation and our own modes of temporalisation. The trace, as transcendent, can
therefore never fully be present or brought into the order - the arche - of the world.
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The an-archic subject's ethicality is rooted then in its sensibility to the demand that is addressed
to it, rather than any overarching principle or foundation, or free decision on my part. This
responsibility shatters self-sufficiency and exceeds any law that could be imposed on me. It also
troubles the work ofthe state, because, as Caygill writes,
The ethical subject is never under law, but always in pursuit of the promised land of
goodness that - an infinite territory - is ever beyond it. The promised land consists
in the pursuit rather than the attainment, for the nomadic ethical subject can never
arrive at infinity; accomplishment of the duty to the other provokes more
responsibility. The self in this way is 'deepened' by the experience of an infinite
responsibility and becomes a singularity that cannot be subsumed under the law of a
totality: the 'work ofjustice' exceeds the 'work ofthe state' (Caygill, 2002, p. 126).
We can see from this passage how Levinas's conceptualisation of the ethical subject as an-archic
might lead Critchley to connect this with political neo-anarchism. But is this a theme we fmd in
Levinas's own articulation of an-archic subjectivity?
In a footnote to 'Principle and Anarchy', Levinas comments on how his understanding of
anarchical subjectivity relates to political anarchism:
The notion of anarchy we are introducing here has a meaning prior to the political (or
antipolitical) meaning currently attributed to it. It would be self-contradictory to set
it up as a principle (in the sense that the anarchists understand it). Anarchy cannot be
sovereign, like an arche. It can only disturb the State - but in a radical way, making
possible moments of negation without any affirmation. The State then cannot set
itself up as a Whole. (OB, p. 194n4)
Critchley interprets this to imply that Levinas's understanding of anarchy means a disturbance of
the state, 'a disruption of the state's attempt to set itself up or erect itself into a whole ... the
continual questioning from below of any attempt to establish order from above' (Critchley, 2007,
pp. 122-23). Following on from this, he suggests that this is similar to contemporary forms of
anarchism that he sees as operative in groups such as Ya Basta! and the Rebel Clown Army, who
have created a form of civil disobedience that troubles the state through satirical pressure, using
humour to show new political possibilities and alternatives to the current state of the situation.
Critchley argues that such forms of neo-anarchism can be distinguished from earlier forms of
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anarchism, for example, 1960s anarchist impulses, which he sees as 'libertarian and linked to the
sexual revolution' (p. 125). What is distinctive, he argues, about contemporary forms of
anarchism, which link them to the Levinasian idea of subjectivity, is their emphasis on
responsibility, flowing 'from an experience of conscience about the manifold ways in which the
West ravages the rest; it is an ethical outrage at... yawning inequality, impoverishment and
disenfranchisement. .. It is an anarchism of the other human being who place me under a
heteronomous demand rather than an anarchism ofthe autonomous self' (pp. 125-26).
At this point, let me interrupt to consider an alternative argument, that the autonomous subject of
liberal moral philosophy would equally express outrage at unjust wars, unrestrained corporate,
military capitalism, etc.: the heteronomous subject does not have a monopoly on responding to
the wrongs that Critchley lists above. While clearly a conception of rational, autonomous
subjectivity, as articulated by Rawls, for example, can point towards a similar outrage at specific
injustices, Levinas's description leads us towards a different understanding of the meaning of
moral responsibility, as I will show in relation to the idea of teachers' responsibility and
subjectivity.
To return to Critchley, while I find his interpretation original and provocative, his neo-anarchism
is problematic when considering what this means for understanding the idea of teachers as
political subjects, for three reasons:
1. A Levinasian understanding of political subjectivity does not necessarily gesture towards the
political anarchism advocated by Critchley.
2. If we take seriously the idea that teachers are always already responsible, as Levinas describes
his own experience of being confronted by pedagogical demands that impinge in a very concrete
manner, the political space of their subjectivity, in which they negotiate the space between the
ontological and the ethical, is very real, but ultimately aporetic.
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3. While the type of carnivalesque neo-anarchism he advocates might be a helpful way of
conceiving of political demonstrations, when we consider the situation of teachers, or other
professionals employed by the state whose roles are institutionalised, it is less easy to see the
relevance of these modes ofresistance.
Let us consider how these objections are linked. Although it is possible to see Levinas's
articulation of anarchism leading to political anarchism, I would argue that both Levinas's
footnote on anarchism referred to above and his writings on Zionism would appear to set his
understanding of ethical anarchism at a distance from the more usual political understanding of
the term. Indeed it is striking that Critchley does not seem to confront these writings when
considering the meaning of political subjectivity for Levinas. Caygill interprets the same
footnote as implying that Levinas distinguishes his an-archy from the anarchist political
movement, suggesting that Levinas's 'anarchism signifies a politics of the trace, a politics of
disturbance rather than of constitution' (Caygill, 2002, p. 138). Levinas himself appears to align
his philosophy with the liberal idea of democracy, in which there is space for difference and a
prophetic politics as the operation of conscience, calling for the exercise of an always better
justice, 'beyond the straight line of the law' (TI, p. 235). Responsibility is anarchic, irreducible
to knowledge, unbounded by any state, but Levinas does suggest that it is necessary to have a
state, to have laws, to bring about freedom. The institutionalisation of laws is necessary for there
to be justice and freedom, as we have already discussed (CP, p. 17). While that process of
institutionalisation may be insufficient, Levinas prophetically attests to the idea that politics
should have a messianic vision, guided by the good manifested in the idea of fraternity. The
process of institutionalising justice 'should be guided by ethical conscience and by the hope that
its institutions and its citizens will live just lives' (Morgan, 2007, p. 405).
There is not scope here to provide a detailed analysis of the varying and often problematic
attitudes towards the State of Israel we see within Levinas's writingsv', but they appear to
suggest that the an-archy he describes requires more in terms of justice than the exertion of
13 For detailed commentary on the various positions Levinas seems to take, see Morgan, 2007, pp. 395-414; Caygill,
2002, pp. 159-98.
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satirical pressure against the State that Critchley suggests. The difficulties and evasions of
Levinas's discussions of the State of Israel reflect the tensions that must necessarily arise when
considering the adjustment between the sense of a universal, infinitely demanding ethics, and a
political ontology that acts in a totalising and violent manner. We see in these Levinas's hope
for a State that might embody the demands of justice and the political philosophy of
monotheism, perhaps most clearly articulated in his 1971 essay 'The State of Caesar and the
State of David', and this certainly seems a considerable distance from the neoanarchism
advocated by Critchley. Yet when considering the situation ofteachers operating within political
systems that are disappointing, his writings on the State of Israel are perhaps not the most helpful
starting point. When writing in more general terms about the relation between the 'State' and
responsibility, Levinas emphasises that it is necessary to think about responsibility in a concrete
manner, with a concern that goes beyond the operations of the State. The State must inevitably
involve totalising operations, as we explored earlier in relation to Totality and Infinity and
Otherwise than Being: for there to be justice, there must be judgement, which means there must
be totalising comparisons, bringing the other within the order of a genus, institutions defending
the rights of the others, and my rights also. But the state is possible only in totality and infinity:
whilst the operations of the state must necessarily be totalising, the desire for justice and the
surplus of responsibility always exceed the demands ofthe State. Levinas articulates the way the
excessive demand for justice is always present within the current imperfect situation in an
interview with Francois Poirie:
I think that the universality of the law in the State - all this violence done to the
particular - is not license pure and simple, because as long as the State remains
liberal its law is not yet completed and can always be more just than its actual justice.
Hence a consciousness, if you will, that the justice on which the State is founded is,
at this moment, still an imperfect justice. (RB, p. 68)
Levinas goes on to suggest though that this thinking of justice within the State must not be
conceived in an abstract way: 'One has to think it in an even more concrete manner, with a
preoccupation of the rights of man which is not coincident with the presence of the government'
(ibid.). And so it is necessary within the liberal State, to work for that better justice, to question
and challenge laws that fall short of both the truth ofjudgement and the responsibility of charity.
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As a practical example of this, Levinas states, 'The suppression of the death penalty seems to me
an essential thing for the coexistence of charity with justice' (p. 51). However, despite the
imperfection of the liberal state, Levinas suggests that the state must be liberal to protect against
totalitarianism: any 'regime which is straightaway charitable' runs 'the risk of Stalinism' (ibid.).
Although Levinas at times opposes politics to ethics, most significantly perhaps in the preface to
Totality and Infinity, in which he states that 'Politics is opposed to morality' (TI, p. 21), this is a
totalitarian politics he rejects. The idea of a prophetic politics that we discussed in the previous
chapter, in contrast to the totalitarian idea, represents the movement between ontology and
ethics, troubling and opening up the question of where justice is to be found. In a sense, the
political in Levinas's thinking is that very disjunction and yet necessary relation between
ontology and ethics, and it is, as Caygill suggests, 'the lack ofjoint between ethics and ontology
that opens the space for politics, but also leaves the character of that space undecidable' (Caygill,
2002, p. 96). Living always within the State, I am called to exercise political judgement, which
may be totalising, yet Levinas's call is always for a more just politics, vigilant against the
totalising operations of the State. Responding to the anarchic demands of subjectivity would
lead the mature political subject to respond to concrete political disappointments and call for a
better justice, working to bring about a community of neighbours in peaceful relations as we
discussed in the previous chapter. Politics, as both ontological and ethical, must then necessarily
operate within the realm of the said, but it is only made possible, according to Levinas, by the
prior anarchic relation of responsibility. Just as my responsibility to my neighbour and all the
others is infinite and in a sense deepening the more I take it up, so the demands of justice are
ever extending. Because the subject always exists in a society of many others, she cannot fully
attend to the demand of the other, and so the process of calculation, weighing up duties and
responsibilities towards the many competing claims for attention is necessary in political
judgement. These calculations and judgements are part of the ontological, but this is troubled by
the an-archism of ethical responsibility, revealing to me that those calculations and judgements
are not yet good enough.
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Levinas's writing on the necessity of the liberal state, in 'The Rights of Man and the Rights of
the Other', illustrates this simultaneous disjunction and relationship between the ethical and
political in his thinking. The state defends the rights of the human, but can also lead to a
totalitarianism indifferent to the needs of the singular other, whence the need to disturb and
question the state. Therefore:
the defence of the rights of man corresponds to a vocation outside the state,
disposing, in a political society, of a kind of extra-territoriality, like that of prophecy
in the face of the political powers of the Old Testament, a vigilance totally different
from political intelligence, a lucidity not limited to yielding before the formalism of
universality, but upholding justice itself in its limitations. The capacity to guarantee
that extra-territoriality and that independence defmes the liberal state and describes
the modality according to which the conjunction of politics and ethics is intrinsically
possible. cos. p. 123)
The undecidability of that political space and vigilance, and the aporetic nature of the experience
of responsibility - genuinely not knowing what is the right way to respond to multiple needs that
confront me through the neighbour and all the others - therefore leads me away from the
principle of nee-anarchism that Critchley advocates, as this approach seems to imply an
overarching principle that the state must be resisted, and that visible forms of resistance in the
form of protests and carnivalesque demonstrations are the best form of resistance. Levinas's
emphasis on defending the rights of man is anarchic and takes us beyond the demands of the
State, but at the same time, his writing on the death penalty for example suggests that this should
lead us to seek to change the work of the State, so that the State enacts a better justice.
Levinas's conception of anarchic subjectivity troubles then not just Critchley's interpretation, but
also the language used by Moore et al. of teachers being de-politicised, Indeed, the fact of
confronting the multiple, seemingly infmite challenges that are part of the every day experience
of being a teacher, could be seen as an example of the aporetic nature of responsibility, already
political and ethical, that Levinas describes as the state of subjectivity. This we can see in
Levinas's own account of his work at the ENIO, a passage I have referred to earlier, but it is
worth pausing to consider again his description of the demands he faced there:
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Concrete problems with spiritual repercussions. Facts that are always enormous.
Thoughts coming back to ancient and venerable texts, always enigmatic, always
disproportionate to the exegeses of a school. Here you have, in administrative and
pedagogical problems, invitations to a deepening, to a becoming conscience, that is,
to Scripture. (RR, p. 39)
Although my political context is very different, as a teacher I likewise feel the unbounded nature
of responsibility - I cannot ever give as much time or attention to the needs of each of my
students as they deserve, I can never have enough time to read as deeply or as fully the texts of
my subject as I would like, I never have enough time to talk to my colleagues about whether or
not we agree with such and such a policy - even though I too often seek, as discussed in the
previous chapter, to immunise myself against the unbounded and unknowable nature of my
obligations to all the others. The practicalities of my job mean that I must make decisions about
how I respond to these demands, which are already within the realm of politics.
In this sense then, as a teacher I am always already, contra Moore, a political subject, my work
situated between the ethical demands of my 'becoming conscience' and the ontological site of
the said, within which schooling takes place. I am also aware however of the political
repercussions of my work in the more usual meaning of the term. To give an obvious example:
the bulk of my time in school is spent preparing students to sit public exams, and so
demonstrates a conformism on my part to the political demand for an education system that
encourages competition and individualism. But to speak of conformism in this way misses the
complexity and aporetic nature of ethical responsibility with which every teacher is confronted in
their work. I may not like the fact that I am helping, through systems of high stakes testing, to
encourage amongst my students an attitude of competition and comparison, which win serve
them well in a capitalist economy (even if I remind them frequently that exams are not a
competition). Nevertheless, I feel a duty to each of those students, not only to draw them into a
deeper understanding of my subject, but also to help them to do well in the world that they
currently inhabit.
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When Moore et aL speak of teachers being depoliticised, their understanding of the political
action whose passing they are mourning seems to imply a willingness to mobilise for collective
political action. They speak dismissively of 'isolated engagements in the internal politics of their
own institutions' (Moore et aL, 2002, p. 564). But for individual teachers, resisting unjust
policies is an example of attending to the concrete demands with which they are faced on an
immediate level, and such acts of resistance have broader political consequences. The example
of the teachers refusing to teach in a classroom with CCTV may only be related to 'the internal
politics of their institution', but clearly it relates to the political trend towards a surveillance
society, in which the state seeks to saturate and control more areas of social life. Furthermore
the case of teachers acting in rebellion to the senior management of their own school on a point
ofprinciple provides a powerful witness to students of the possibility of resisting the normalising
exercise of power. In my own school, teachers were asked in a recent curriculum review what we
would like to see changed. The answers given demonstrated a desire to move away from the
current excessive focus on exams, preparation for exams, and league tables. The response to this
was that students will now sit one less GCSE, with more time devoted to a new non-examined
course in the humanities, and AS exams will be sat at the end of Year 13, together with A2
exams, so that less school time is devoted exclusively to exam preparation, with more time for
non-examined courses. These are just two examples, but they are indicative of the fact that
speaking of teachers as depoliticised does not take seriously the idea that teachers may already
be aware of the political implications of their practices and judgements, and that they are already
responding to their own political disappointment in different ways. Their decisions to strike or
not to strike are therefore reflective not of depoliticisation, but of the difficult nature of
discharging the unbounded, an-archic responsibilities of their profession.
To speak in this way of the unbounded demands of teaching might sound demotivating.
However, this need not be the case. Failure, or the sense that I could have done more, or should
have acted differently is, according to this view of responsibility, inevitable. But this should not
be seen as leading to further disappointment. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Critchley expresses
how this unboundedness of responsibility should rather be 'viewed as the condition for courage
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in ethical action. The motto for ethical subjectivity is given by Beckett in Worstwood Ho, "Try
again. Fail again. Fail better.''' (Critchley, 2007, p. 55). That "trying again' might be seen as
dependent on the exercise of hope. Let us now turn to consider how we might, drawing on this
conception of anarchic ethical subjectivity, articulate an alternative discourse ofhope.
Levinas, Badiou and the Meaning of Hope
I have already outlined how several educational theorists have used a discourse of hope in
responding to political frustrations with education, and I would agree with the emphasis that they
place on its political significance. But if, as the teacher cited by Halpin suggests, many teachers
do feel a sense of hopelessness and powerlessness about their profession and the impossibility of
meeting the demands made of them, how is it possible to provide an alternative and more
motivating account ofhope?
Badiou, in a discussion with Critchley held at the Slought Foundation in 200i4, criticised his
focus on disappointment. Badiou instead argued that political subjectivity must begin with the
experience of a victory. I would agree that motivations for political resistance tend to be rooted
in at least some experience of a promise, a success. But such subjective victories are often
inseparable from the disappointment that motivates action leading to the experience of victory.
In the following passage from 'Messianic Texts' , we see how Levinas describes the experience
of political disappointment and cynicism:
suppose for a moment that the moral ends which politics prides itself on achieving,
but amends and limits by virtue of achieving them - that these ends appear steeped in
the immorality that claims to sustain them; suppose, in other words, that you have
lost the meaning of the political and the consciousness of its grandeur, that the non-
sense or non-value ofworld politics is your first certainty... (DF, p. 94)
14 This can be downloaded from http://slought.org/content/11385/, accessed 13.08.09
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Levinas goes on to consider how from this moment of experiencing of political hopelessness,
'my responsibility is the more irreplaceable... At this point the real universality, which is non-
catholic, can affirm itself. It consists in serving the universe. It is caned messianism' (p. 95).
In 'Teaching Our Way Out When Nobody Knows the Way', Edgoose has offered an illuminating
discussion of how this messianism might be related to the question of hope. He distinguishes
between Christian and Marxist understandings of hope, which see history as a process oriented
towards a future victory, with the Judaic understanding of messianism, in which the present
moment is the one in which there is the possibility of the messianic. He cites Walter Benjamin
as an example of this:
We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future. The Torah and
the prayers instruct them in remembrance, however. This stripped the future of its
magic, to which all those succumb who turn to the soothsayers for enlightenment.
This does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future turned into homogenous,
empty time. For every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah
might enter. (Benjamin cited in Edgoose, 2008, p. 102)15
Edgoose explains this contrast between 'empty time' and 'messianic time' as the contrast
between the idea of 'time comprised of empty blocks to be filled with activity' and 'an
understanding of time rooted in the Judaic experience of the divine' (ibid.). He links this latter
understanding of messianic time with what he describes as a Levinasian conception of hope, in
which the meaning of the future and the direction of history is left radically open:
Nothing sets the orientation of the future. The open future of Judaic messianism
depends upon our abdication of the sense that we know how the world works, or that
we can discern the tide of history, or that we have adequate tools from the past. It is
a focusing on the suffering of the world without the reassurances of narratives of
liberation or oppression. (p. 105)
15 While both Levinas and Benjamin might reject a linear eschatology, they nevertheless have different approaches
to history and politics. As Morgan notes, 'the major difference between the two... concerns politics - the nexus of
economic, social, and organizational structures and institutions that makes up our public lives. Here Levinas is
guarded but more sanguine than Benjamin, who is decidedly negative.' (Morgan, 2007, p. 400)
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This idea of hope is, in contrast with eschatological and teleological Christian and post-Christian
approaches, opposed to both teleology and eschatology. It challenges conceptions of hope that
we have seen in theorists such as Halpin, which Edgoose argues 'risk being uncomfortable
impositions on students' and 'a denial of the very real complexities of the world itself' (p. 106).
Levinas's understanding of messianism is focused on both the present and its interruption by
what is never present, as beyond being and presence. The messianic, breaking the closed circle
of totality, can be seen as what is implied by the ideal of prophetic politics, a politics that would
be vigilant against the violence of totalisation and work towards peaceful, fraternal communities.
Morgan expresses this clearly:
Messianism involves all those commitments that are concerned with our
responsibilities to others; it is about realizing ethics in our lives. Politics is about the
institutions of organized social life that enable us to live together and with one
another. Politics should have a messianic vision; it should be guided by ethical
conscience and by the hope that its institutions and its citizens will live just lives.
Messianism and politics are both unavoidable features of all our lives. (Morgan,
2007, p. 405)
Although there appear to be utopian moments in Levinas's writing, given that this idea of
messianism begins with pouring our attention into very real relationships and the complex
demands of the world in which we live, in a responsibility that suspends totality, I do not think it
is helpful to describe this messianism as utopian. In 'Place and Utopia', we see that Levinas
prefers not to describe ethical responsibility as utopian:
One can uproot oneself from this responsibility, deny the place where it is incumbent
on me to do something, to look for an anchorite's salvation. One can choose Utopia.
On the other hand, in the name of spirit, one can choose not to flee the conditions
from which one's work draws its meaning and remain here below. And that means
choosing ethical action. (DF, p. 100)
In thinking about the infinite demands of education, the response that teachers must give is
always rooted in the present moment, and it is from responding to these demands that their work
draws its meaning. Whilst there is undoubtedly a future-oriented motivation in their work,
towards creating a better future for those they teach, most teachers derive the meaning of their
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work primarily from their experiences in the present, which are already bound up with the past
and future, and that this should therefore be central to our understanding of hope in education,
rather than any teleological or utopian conception.
Edgoose suggests that it is in the present experience of encounter with their students that teachers
might fmd the source of hope. In the section of Totality and Infinity exploring fecundity,
Levinas describes a view of the future that is 'both my own and non-mine, a possibility of myself
but also a possibility of the other' (TI, p. 267). Edgoose interprets this as suggesting that the
future is dependent on our interactions with others and is therefore unpredictable, as every
teacher will have found - 'the best laid lesson plan is necessarily subject to the unpredictability
of classroom dynamics' (Edgoose, 2008, p. 108). But this unpredictability of the encounter can
be a source of hope for two reasons:
First, it reminds us of the meaninglessness of our naive sense that we know the
direction of the future ... Hope ... depends on otherness, on our students being distinct
others whose words and actions surprise our expectations...
The second way in which Levinas's dialogical future brings hope is in the ways in
which teachers' and students' fates are intertwined... [in] teaching we are made most
aware of the threads of responsibility which bind us, and the extent to which our
future is entwined with the futures of those with whom we have interacted... In
teaching, these threads are the clearest and perhaps most difficult to ignore. (p. 109)
Edgoose acknowledges that obviously that unpredictability of the teacher-student relationship
can lead to both negative and positive surprises. It is, however, in those unpredictable bonds of
interdependency and responsibility that he locates Levinas's statement that 'The pupil-teacher
relationship... contains all the riches of the meeting with the Messiah' (DF, p. 85).
Edgoose's conception of Levinasian hope, as anti-utopian, found in the everyday possibilities of
the encounters between teachers and students, revealing the ways our futures are intimately
bound up together, is beautifully articulated and gestures towards what many teachers probably
do find to be the most motivating aspect of their profession. However, I do not think a
conception ofhope founded on the teacher-student relationship goes far enough. While a teacher
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may experience his responsibility to his students as the primary motivating element of his work
and thus the source of his hope, his response and responsibilities are also already bound up with
wider political judgements and his place within the current state of the situation. Therefore this
understanding of hope needs to be seen as related not just to the teacher-student relationship, but
also to Levinas's understanding of prophetic politics and his conception of messianic
consciousness, interrupting the totalising tendencies of political ontology. This understanding of
messianic consciousness implies not only a vigilance against the violence of the State, and a
working towards a State which enacts a better justice (BV, pp. 179-81) but also an interruption of
the way we think of education in a linear, developmental sense. This idea of the messianic
suggests that within every meeting of self and neighbour, in every taking up of responsibility, is
the possibility of peace, the possibility of a politics that works for a better justice, and thus a new
beginning. Preceding the discussion of messianic consciousness in 'The Infinity of Time' in
Totality and Infinity', Levinas discusses the way in which each present moment gives to 'the past
a new meaning', which 'weighs upon the present instant, "laden with all the past", even if it is
pregnant with the whole future' (TI, p. 282). This leads towards an understanding of time that is
discontinuous, opening up the idea of 'an absolute youth and recommencement' as possibilities
in every moment, just as in every encounter with the Other there are infinite possibilities of new
beginnings and a better justice.
Although this idea of the vigilance of messianic consciousness might sound somewhat abstract,
we can see concrete ways in which it interrupts totalising tendencies of political ontology. We
have already considered the following Talmudic reading from 'The Nations and the Presence of
Israel' in Chapter 4, but it is worth repeating here as a clear example of how Levinas sees 'rays
of Messianic light' as both revealing and suspending the totalising tendencies of an ever-
extending capitalist logic:
those rays break the evil spell of having by which being insists on being. They offer
a glimpse at a future suspension of the heaping up, the amassing, the accumulation
by which, for being-in the advent of its being - it is ever again a question of its own
being. A forgetting, a failure to recognize the other! A piling up, amassing,
unending totalization of the objects and money that mark the rhythm and essential
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structure of the perseverance of being in its being. Its concrete modes: stock-piling
and banks. But also men at war. A suspect ontology! (TN, p. 108)
Caygill points out that in this passage Levinas equates Heideggerian ontology with the logic and
idols of commercial totality and capitalist accumulation, and also the accumulation of military
power by the state. He goes on to suggest that 'Messianic peace and justice consist in the
suspension of totality. .. The messianic is manifest as the Sabbath, or suspension of the "suspect
ontology" informing the idols of the accumulation of wealth and power' (Caygill, 2002, p. 197).
The enormous challenge for the teacher as a mature political subject is to consider how she might
respond both to the immediate and already infinite demands of her students, parents, subject
discipline etc., and to a political demand to disrupt the way that the logic of education is
perverted by the logic of accumulation, not just through the methodology of marketisation and
the language of the service industry as we discussed earlier, but also through the way that
education is conceived as a process of amassing demonstrable skins which can be clearly
measured and evaluated.
To think of a teacher as a political subject in this way recognises that the demands of her
profession are always enormous, and further deepening the more she attends to the political
significance of her role. Therefore, also needed in this understanding of hope, rooted in anarchic
responsibility and prophetic politics is recognition of the importance of tenacity. Badiou, like
Levinas, conceives of hope in an anti-utopian manner, as tenacity, the principle of struggle, and
the quality of endurance that means the subject continues in the struggle - 'a simple imperative
of continuation, a principle of tenacity, of obstinacy' (SP, p. 93). This is founded not on
disappointment, but on the experience of a victory, which motivates the subject to endure, to
struggle for the sake of that hope. Hope, he argues, is not hope in a future victory, but 'it is a
subjective victory that produces hope' (p. 95). The idea of hope rooted in the teacher-student
relationship emphasised by Edgoose provides an example of this: it is those moments when I
have seen a student excited, enthused and inspired through what they have learnt that frequently
provide motivation for me to continue in my task. Yet, that experience of a victory can also be
found in the interactions between individual teachers and the hierarchical powers of their
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institutions, or political authorities. In the debate between the NAHT and government over the
boycotting of the SATS, the actual experience of speaking out against a system of assessment
that appears to go against their own educational ideals can be seen as an experience of a
subjective victory in the act of fmding a shared voice for those concerns. This subjective victory
then produces hope amongst those teachers who will continue to struggle against what they see
as an educational wrong.
This element of struggle involved in perseverance, which all teachers would see as an element of
their profession, is an important element of a non-utopian conception of hope. It is this quality
of hope as enabling endurance that means that when faced with political disappointment, most
teachers do not give up. Even if they feel they have nothing left to give and are all too aware of
their failure to meet all the needs that are addressed to them, anarchically, most persevere, with
the sense as in Waiting for Godot: 'I can't go on. I'll go on.' According to Badiou's particular
conception of political subjectivity, not all teachers would be political subjects, since his
definition of politics sees politics as always operating at a distance from the state." We have
seen through Moore et al.'s research that the relationship between teachers' political self-
understanding and dominant political discourses is, however, complex, and many teachers would
not see themselves as acting at a distance from the state. However, there is, if we follow
Levinas's understanding of an-archic subjectivity and the ways in which this is always already
implicated in politics, a sense in which the teacher is already a political subject, even if she may
not describe herself in this way.
If we are to take seriously a Levinasian reading of the meaning of hope, in which what happens
depends on me and the other and the relationship between us, which cannot be separated from
my responsibility to all the others, then, to return to Celan's poem that Badiou refers to, the
world, rushing up, really does depend on me. I may be in denial of this, and may refuse to accept
16 See for example, his analysis in Metapolitics, in which he states: 'Organised in anticipation of surprises, diagonal
to representations, experimenting with lacunae, accounting for infinite singularities, politics is an active thought that
is both subtle and dogged; one from which the material critique of all forms of presentative correlations proceeds,
and which, operating on the edge of the void, calls on homogenous multiplicities against the heterogenous order of
the State which claims to prevent their appearance' (M, p. 77).
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that my responsibility is unbounded, but Levinas's writing on the an-archic demands of the many
others who confront me leads to a view that teachers should recognise that their actions do have
significance, at ethical and political levels. Zizek is critical of Levinas and Critchley's neo-
anarchism as too conservative and unable to change existing inequalities:
Critchley's anarchic ethico-political agent acts like a superego, comfortably
bombarding the state with demands; and the more the state tries to satisfy these
demands, the more guilty it seems to be. In compliance with this logic, the anarchic
agents focus their protest not on open dictatorships, but on the hypocrisy of liberal
democracies, who are accused of betraying their own professed principles. (Zizek,
2007, p. 3)
Zizek uses the example of Hugo Chavez to suggest that a better response to political grievance is
seizing state power. If we look, however, to the complex relationship between teachers and the
state that employs them, I do not think that Zizek's approach of seizing state power, operating
firmly within a post-Christian / Marxist conception ofhistory and hope, is necessarily a practical
way for teachers to think about what can be done in the situation in which they find themselves.
If the political space is radically undecidable, and the future is radically unpredictable, then the
best way for teachers to confront disappointment cannot be set out in advance according to one
principle such as either seizing state power or resisting it, but must start from thinking through
how to respond to concrete problems and demands with both better justice and charity.
The challenge for teachers is to deepen their sense that their actions do have significance and for
them to reflect on a hope founded in their everyday work that will inspire them to challenge the
political injustices they encounter. In responding to the unbounded demands of conscience,
within the state and yet disturbing its totalising operations, their political subjectivity might be
prophetic as it seeks to work for a better justice, or in this case, a better education. I have already
pointed out that in Beyond Learning, following on from his reading of Levinas, Biesta is
pessimistic about the possibility of education leading to a more democratic society:
Because subjectivity is no longer something that only occurs or is created in schools,
the approach to democratic education that follows from my considerations puts the
question about the responsibility for democratic education back where it actually
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belongs, namely, in society at large. It is an illusion to think that schools alone can
produce democratic citizens. (Biesta, 2006, p. 144)
Whilst I would not wish to exaggerate the difference that schools can make, I am more optimistic
than this about the difference schools can make to the political subjectivity of students through
the example of teachers' awareness of their own political judgements. Many of the students I
have taught are involved in various forms of political activism at many different levels, from
attending demonstrations and protests against specific injustices in the manner celebrated by
Critchley, to committed involvement with parliamentary political parties, seeking in ways they
are only beginning to explore, how they can work to bring about a better justice. I do not think
that this is unrelated to the different individual political judgements that they see their teachers
making.
Edgoose draws attention to how the unpredictability of a Levinasian conception of hope as
anarchic can lead us to have greater faith in the meaning of our actions, even if we see no
resolution to current grievances. He cites a provocative passage from Vaclav Havel to illustrate
this:
You have certainly heard of the 'butterfly effect'. It is a belief that everything in the
world is so mysteriously and completely interconnected that a slight, seemingly
insignificant wave of a butterfly's wings in a single spot on this planet can unleash a
typhoon thousands ofmiles away.
I think we must believe in this effect for politics. We cannot assume that our
microscopic yet truly unique everyday actions are of no consequence simply because
they cannot resolve the immense problems of today. That would be an a priori
nihilistic assertion, and an expression of the arrogant, modem rationality that
believes it knows how the world works. (Havel, 1994, p. 93, cited in Edgoose, 2008,
p. Ill)
Teachers, as political subjects, do make a difference, in the way that Havel and Levinas
suggest.l" The challenge is to become more aware of this an-archic nature of responsibility, in
17 In his letters from prison to his wife Olga, Havel refers to his reading of Levinas on several occasions. The
following comments demonstrate his admiration for the philosopher: 'Levinas's idea that "something must begin,"
that responsibility establishes an ethical situation that is asymmetrical, and that this cannot be preached but upheld,
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which the meaning of political subjectivity is aporetic. In the difficult everyday demands with
which they are already engaged, in deciding how to respond to the needs that confront them,
teachers should be aware and take heart from the knowledge and hope that their actions have
significance in this unpredictable and undetermined way. My hope, arising from my own
developing self-awareness of the political implications of my actions, is for other teachers to also
become more attentive to the political significance of their day-to-day actions, an attentiveness
which might lead them to seek more control of the sites where they work, and to resist unjust
policies and the distortion of the very meaning of education through the rhetorics of
accumulation, service and performativity.
While it is possible to respond to disappointment through accommodating one's thinking in line
with dominant political discourses, as Moore's research demonstrated, the response to which this
an-archie conception of subjectivity could lead us instead is resistance and a refusal to allow our
discourses and thinking about education to be colonised by neoliberal rhetorics which, as Badiou
argues, appear to obliterate politics by management and can obliterate the meaning of education
itself. To resist such discourses, obedient to the demands of responsibility, unbounded by the
state, would be just one aspect of striving for a better justice. Given Levinas's admiration for
Celan, it is appropriate to conclude by returning to the poem cited by Badiou with which I began
this chapter. As in this poem, justice is found, despite my wishes for firmer ground, in
inconsistencies and unpredictable demands, and it is only on these that I can find my footing and
support myself. The demands of conscience that the teacher experiences and on which their
subjectivity depends, are infinite, like those two fmgers snapping in the abyss, and ask for more
than I contain. But through those fmgers snapping, a world rushes up and rushes forward, in
scribblebooks, and that does, even ifI mostly choose to ignore or deny that fact, depend on me.
corresponds in every detail with my experience and opinion. In other words, I am responsible for the state of the
world.' (Havel, cited in Maika, 2006, p. 82)
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Coda
But is this all? Is this Celan poem with which the final chapter opened a disappointing end?
Does this reading of Levinas only take me as far as the Platonic sense of the need to return to the
cave, to go back to the everyday demands of teaching?
I do not think this is so. We have been taken beyond the need to return to the cave to the sense
that the demands of education, infmite in what they ask of us, gesture towards the promised land
of goodness. We have seen how Levinas invites us to view education in a radically different
way, beginning with the scene of teaching, in which the very possibilities of thought, knowledge,
language, society and justice depend on my prior condition of responsivity as responsibility, an
infmite responsibility that deepens the more I take it up. Thus education can never be contained
within the more limited aims of developing cognitive rationality, or acquiring measurable and
demonstrable skills of critique and evaluation. But it is not enough just to recognise this richer
vision of education. Just as the neighbour persecutes me and draws me into an uncomfortable
position of responsibility, so Levinas leads us to an awareness of the vertiginous heights of
responsibility, challenging us to go 'beyond the straight line of the law, that is, of finding a place
lying beyond the universal' (TI, p. 245) in working for a better justice. It is not enough just to
carry on as before, hoping for moments in which the 'other' community might come to presence,
as Biesta suggests. But at the same time, I cannot set out in advance what all the requirements
for a better education in this sense might be, as such an approach would end up relying 'on the
ineffective brutality ofconstraints imposed by the totalitarian State' (DF, p. 288).
I have shown that both teachers and students are always already ethical and political subjects,
and that this understanding of subjectivity beginning in responsibility deepens the more we
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attend to it. It is through this condition of responsibility that education, knowledge and truth are
possible: 'This curvature of the intersubjective space inflects distance into elevation; it does not
falsify being, but makes its truth first possible' (TI, p. 291). Reading Levinas disturbs us by
challenging us to recognise that deepening responsibility, and inviting us to work for a better
education, aware of the totalisation that must take place within education, yet always vigilant in
trying to bring about a more just State. As ethical and political subjects, our actions as educators
and students already have political and ethical significance, but Levinas invites us to become
more conscious of the meaning of that significance and ensure that our work leads to educational
institutions that enact a better justice, working not from some utopian conception of hope, but
rooted in the specific situations in which we find ourselves, thinking these demands ofjustice 'in
an even more concrete manner, with a preoccupation with the rights of man which is not
coincident with the presence of government' (RE, p. 68).
Within the current political context in which my work as a teacher is situated, I have
demonstrated that this approach interrupts dominant educational discourses that can become
totalising: Levinas challenges us to recognise that self-sufficient rational autonomy, which since
the Enlightenment has been the goal of education, is a myth, and also exposes, with Badiou, the
limitations of the totalising, all-encompassing logic of capitalist accumulation. Reading Levinas
invites us to work towards an education in which the dominance of these approaches is
suspended, and in which we attend to the possibility of more peaceful relations with our
neighbours, a more attentive reading of texts, and a more disciplined performance of rituals that
will not serve to perpetuate existing injustices and inequalities, but will manifest the ideal of a
community rooted in illeity and fraternity. Within the situation in which I find myself, as a
teacher of RE, I have considered some of the ways Levinas has led me to see the limitations of
the current dominant frameworks of my subject, and work towards the possibility of a religious
education otherwise. I would not wish to set out the challenges that Levinas poses for other
subject disciplines, since such questions would be better attended to by those working within
those disciplines. But through all subject disciplines, what Levinas bears witness to is the call
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for an education that attends to the an-archie responsibility that is always already there, and a
more demanding reading ofthe texts and of the language that has come to us, as a grace.
Levinas articulates something of this demanding task in his essays 'Ethics and Spirit' and 'A
Religion for Adults'. In these, Levinas outlines the Jewish understanding of education that
'consist]s] in instituting a link between man and the saintliness of God and in maintaining man in
this relationship' (DF, p. 14). This saintliness of God is no numinous religious experience, but
the demand of social justice for my response to the appeal addressed to me through the face with
peace rather than violence:
The face ... is inviolable; those eyes, which are absolutely without protection, the
most naked part of the human body, none the less offer an absolute resistance to
possession, an absolute resistance in which the temptation to murder is inscribed: the
temptation of absolute negation. The Other is the only being that one can be tempted
to kilL This temptation to murder and this impossibility of murder constitute the
very vision of the face. To see a face is already to hear 'You shall not kill', and to
hear 'You shall not kill' is to hear'Social justice'....
'You shall not kill' is therefore not just a simple rule of conduct; it appears as the
principle of discourse itself and of spiritual life. Henceforth, language is not only a
system of signs... Speech belongs to the order of morality before belonging to that of
theory. Is it not therefore the condition for conscious thought? (pp. 8-9).
To have language, to have conscious thought, as I have explored, means to have received the
command not to kill, to have heard the demand for justice. Any understanding of educative
community, the existence of many held together by dialogues, texts, rituals and traditions,
depends on this prior condition of already having heard the demand for peaceful response.
Education is possible because of my exposure to the appeal of the human face. In responding to
this, I respond to God:
Man begins in the desert, where he dwells in tents, and adores God in a transportable
temple.
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From this existence - free with regard to landscapes and architectures, all those
heavy and sedentary things that one is tempted to prefer to man - Judaism recalls, in
the course of its whole history, that it is rooted in the countryside or in the town...
Freedom with regard to the sedentary forms of existence is, perhaps, the human way
to be in this world. For Judaism, the world becomes intelligible before a human face
and not, as for a great contemporary philosopher who sums up an important aspect of
the West, through houses, temples and bridges. (DF, pp. 22-3)
This philosopher, who prefers houses, temples and bridges, 'those heavy sedentary things that
one is tempted to prefer to man', is Heidegger, representing the tendency to attend to structures,
whether of knowledge, institutions, ideologies, or principles, in contrast with radical openness
and hospitality towards the Other, my neighbour, a hospitality in which my self-sufficiency is
undone. Within education likewise, it is possible to see how the structures of self-sufficient
autonomy, efficiency and utility can become sedentary and totalising: what is required is a
conception of education that refuses to be limited by such totalising logics but, always in
movement, breaches the ethical and intellectual closure represented by such approaches.
This leads us to question which texts, traditions and rituals should be carried together on the
journey, not as 'heavy, sedentary things' that we might 'prefer to man', but rather as those that
will lead to greater awareness of how 'the world becomes intelligible before a human face'.
Moreover, this notion of education leads us to consider the very way in which these things are
carried together, and handed over, as a gift, to those being taught, in which what is learnt
depends on that teaching coming from the face. Maika, who was a student of Levinas at the
ENID, described how Levinas used to say, recalling Husserl, 'We do not dissociate a lesson from
the face that was the necessary interlocutor' (Malka, 2002, p. xxxiv). While Levinas has led us
to consider the face through which we are taught as not just the face of the specific human
teacher, but the manifestation of the Other, we can see through Levinas's comment here that the
way in which texts, traditions, rituals, are brought to us, the way in which they are handed on,
affects the way in which the gift is received.
This can be connected with the way in which Levinas alludes to the blessing and danger of fire,
as highlighted by Caygill. In 'Means ofIdentification', Levinas describes how Jewish identity is
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inscribed in 'difficult books, and plunges us into strict and laborious study' (DF, p. 52). He goes
on to question, however:
Are the true books just books? Or are they also the embers still glowing in the ashes,
as Rabbi Eliezer called the words of the Prophets? In this way, the flame traverses
History without burning in it. But the truth illuminates whoever breathes on the
flame and coaxes it back to life. More or less. It's a question of breath. To admit
the effect that literature has on men is perhaps the ultimate wisdom of the West in
which the people of the Bible may recognize themselves. (p. 53)
Caygill emphasises how in this passage the reader takes the place of the priest attending to burnt
offerings in the Temple: this reading, breathing on the embers, 'provokers] fire and light..., a
light which exceeds the breath sacrificed to raise it' (Caygill, 2002, p. 200). It is the task of the
teacher to read in such a way that they breathe onto the texts that they have chosen, a reading that
requires effort, the sacrifice ofbreath, in coaxing flames from the embers.
As emphasised in Chapter 6, I am not, in highlighting the importance of reading, presenting an
apology for the canon. To read, as I have already stated, is not in any way 'the litany or pious
murmur of a consent given beforehand' (TR, p. 8). Levinas describes how the practice of
Talmudic reading is always 'in search of problems and truths' (p, 9) and seeks to translate a
text's meanings to modem languages, linking such texts 'in an immediate way to the present and
to the present's understanding' (p. 6). My desire in this thesis is to have engaged in a reading of
'Levinas' 'in search of problems and truths', and translating the truths of this reading to some,
although by no means all, present understandings of education and concrete demands that
teachers encounter in their work. But this reading is also the very task of education, an act of
translation dependent upon the fidelity and hope of the teacher, her responsibility, and the
responsivity of the one who is taught.
This idea of education orients our relation to knowledge, language and community differently
from conceptions emphasising commonality, consensus and co-operation. This can be compared
with the distinction Standish highlights between the idea ofjustice beginning in conversation and
a Rawlsian justice beginning in co-operation, drawing on Stanley Cavell's articulation of a
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'conversation ofjustice'. Standish highlights how the way of being together that begins from an
ideal of co-operation - suggesting 'the idea of a society as a whole either as having a project or,
at the other extreme, as being a neutral field in which each can pursue his or her own projects'
(Cavell, cited in Standish, 2007, p. 87) - limits our participation in working together in
community. In contrast with this,
Conversation ... emphasises neither any given ambition of a society nor a field of
fairness for individual projects. It draws attention to the opacity of our interactions,
which are seen as the outcome of a history of attempts to reform ourselves in the
direction of justice. It requires listening, responsiveness to difference, and
willingness to change. (Standish, 2007, p. 87)
To read in the way Levinas suggests might be seen as conversation in this sense, recalling how
conversation is described as a teaching in Totality and Infinity, a conversation in which I am
brought more than I contain. In such conversation my responsibility deepens in attending to the
demands that the texts bring me, demands that reveal 'invitations to a deepening, to a becoming
conscience' (RE, p. 39) in the concrete situations in which I find myself.
These texts that are carried and read together on the journey are not the same as roots: the only
'anchor' for this understanding of education is the demand of my neighbour through which I am
subjected and can have language and meaning. But this rootless journey, free from the idea of
existence as sedentary and settled, always in exile, leads to the possibility of greater freedom:
This freedom is not in the last bit pathological, or strained or heartrending. It
relegates the values to do with roots and institutes other forms of fidelity and
responsibility. Man, after all, is not a tree and humanity is not a forest. It promotes
more human forms, for they presuppose a conscious commitment; freer forms, for
they allow us to glimpse a human society and horizons vaster than those of the
village where we were born. (p. 23)
And it is my hope that in the potential for glimpsing such horizons, glimpsing a human society
beyond 'the village where we were born', we might come to understand the very meaning of
what it is and what it could be to be educated, and respond with hope to the infinite, anarchic
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demands for an always better justice, working towards a better State in which charity and truth
can breathe.
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